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MAPPING A RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW SAILING
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS
RIGIS BISMUTH*

I. INTRODUCTION
"I never had dinner with a legal person - Neither did I, although I often saw it
paying the bill." This aphorism, part of the classics heard by every law student in
France, remarkably encapsulates the genuine ambivalence of the concept and
status of "legal persons."2 This is more particularly the case with corporations,
which have become the main vehicles of human economic activities. As creatures
of domestic law, corporations do not enjoy the plenary legal personality of natural
persons, which is limited not only by the consent of their creators but also by the
scope of rights and duties available for them in the domestic legal order from
which they stem. The intense scholarly debate concerning the content of corporate
legal personality, going far beyond the legal sphere, has highlighted a critical
dividing line on the question of the existence of a moral dimension of corporations.
Indeed, they are, for some, potentially "full-fledged moral persons,"4 while others
consider that corporations "lack the emotional make-up that allows natural persons
to show virtues and vices." 5 Besides, the lack of consensus on this issue - and
therefore on a possibility of the existence of a mens rea of such entities - is
reflected in the disparities among domestic laws on the criminal responsibility of
corporations which, when existing, are often restricted to specific offenses and are
triggered under specific conditions.6

* Ph.D. (Universit6 Paris 1 Panthdon-Sorbonne), LL.M. (Columbia Law School, Harlan Fiske Stone
Scholar), Research and Teaching Fellow in Public International Law at Universit6 Paris 1 Panth6onSorbonne, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche en Droit International - CERDIN (since 2004). E-mail:
regis.bismuth@gmail.com. The author is grateful to Eugenia Levine for her useful comments on a
previous draft. The views expressed in this article are those of the author only and any errors or
omissions are his sole responsibility.
1. The first part of the sentence has been attributed to Ldon Duguit, one of the most reputed
French legal scholars of the early twentieth century, the retort to Professor Jean-Claude Soyer.
2. For a sampling of the seminal analyses of the concept see, e.g., Frederick W. Maitland, Moral
Personalityand Legal Personality,6(2) JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION 192

(1905); Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283 (1928); see also LtON MICHOUD, LA
THORIE DE LA PERSONNALITE MORALE ET SON APPLICATION AU DROIT FRANQAIS 16 (1908); see also
ERNST ZITELMANN, BEGRIFF UND WESEN DER SOGENANNTEN JURISTISCHEN PERSONEN 12 (1873).

3. See W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of Corporation and the State, 21 L. Q. REV. 365
(1905).
4. Peter A. French, The Corporationas a Moral Person, 16(3) AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979).
5. Robert E. Ewin, The MoralStatus of the Corporation, 10 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 749 (1991).
6. See, e.g., JONATHAN CLOUGH & CARMEL MULHERN, THE PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS
(Oxford University Press 2002); JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME
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Beyond the issue of the criminal responsibility for the violations of domestic
laws, recent developments have demonstrated the growing outreach of the
international humanitarian law ("IHL") framework for corporations, and
consequently its possible international criminal responsibility corollaries. Indeed,
modem armed conflicts involve more and more non-state actors, notably private
military forces, 7 but also implicate, although indirectly, traditional corporations
carrying out economic activities, notably in the field of extraction and/or
commercial exploitation of natural and mineral resources. In these contexts, it is
often the case that "financial gain . . . may be either the cause of atrocities

committed in conflicts or the reasons for their continuation." 9 Several acts
conducted within the framework of business activities during an armed conflict
may eventually fall under the scope of international humanitarian law and
constitute war crimes. 10 A recent study of the ICRC mentions the following:
unlawful taking of property, forced labor, displacement of populations, severe
damage to the environment, and the manufacture and trading of prohibited
weapons." Although it should be mentioned that "transnational companies are not
necessarily the worst perpetrators," 12 the trend of their involvement in contentious
activities in the context of an ongoing armed conflict raises the legitimate question
of the criminal responsibility of these legal entities, especially given that
"accountability would be increased if it were possible to prosecute directly the
companies participating in such atrocities."1 3
Envisaging the criminal responsibility of corporations for grave violations of
IHL necessarily implies a determination of whether they hold rights and duties
under the international law of armed conflict. It should be pointed out beforehand
that corporations are currently only legal creatures of domestic legal orders and
they are not subjects of the international purely interstate legal system. States,
however, may adopt norms of public international law recognizing such rights and
(Butterworths LexisNexis 2003). For a recent and exhaustive contribution to this debate see Thomas
Weigend, Societas Delinquere non Potest? A German Perspective, 6 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 927
(2008).

7. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private Military Security Companies and
InternationalHumanitarian Law, 88 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 525 (2006); Cedric Ryngaert,

LitigatingAbuses Committedby Private Military Companies, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1035 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Rights and Accountability in Development, Unanswered questions - Companies,

Conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004) [hereinafter RAID], available at
http://www.raid-uk.org/docs/UN Panel DRC/Unanswered Questions ES.pdf.
9. ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN
INTODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 453 (Cambridge University Press
2007).

10. See id.
11. ICRC, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW - AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
24 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC]; see also Erik Mose, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Rwandan
Genocide, 6 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 973 (2008) (providing the example of involvement of media
corporations in the Rwandan genocide).

12. Malin Helgesen, War Zones and Grey Zones - Does Legal Liability of CompaniesExist Under
the InternationalLaw ofArmed Conflict?, 4-5 TIDSSKRIFT FOR RETTSVITENSKAP 576 (2005).
13. CRYER, FRIMAN, ROBINSON & WILMSHURST, supranote 9, at 453.
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duties to non-state actors.1 This, for instance, is the case for corporations through
the network of international investment agreements.15 While the latter category
recognizes rights to corporations, it is doubtful that IHL and international criminal
law frameworks embed international duties weighing on domestic legal persons.
On the basis of the foregoing, Part I will assess the existence of legal
obligations under international law for corporations and will inquire into the
possible channels for the recognition of their responsibility. This analysis will
demonstrate that international law provides minimal and fragmented mechanisms
of responsibility for violations of IHL by corporations. Domestic legal orders,
however, offer a more appropriate and welcoming environment. Being creatures of
and enjoying a broader legal personality under domestic law, corporations are
subject not only to the purely national regulations but also to the international
obligations inserted in domestic law, among which are those of IHL. Part II will
consider this emerging application of fundamental IHL norms to corporations, and
the litigation ensuing before domestic courts, with a special emphasis on the US
Aliens Tort Claims Act.
II. THE MINIMAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHL IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
Despite the growing presence of non-state actors in the majority of armed
conflict, IHL remains a "state-based order" 16 and criminal responsibility
mechanisms that have been established focus primarily on individuals, leaving no
room for the recognition of violations of IHL by corporations at the international
level (A). Beyond this structural lack of criminal accountability, alternative
channels of responsibility need to be explored as they suggest a growing concern
of the international community about the implications of corporations becoming
increasingly involved in armed conflict (B).
A. A Structural Unsuitability for Corporations to Be Held Responsible of
Violations ofIHL Before InternationalCriminal Courts and Tribunals
As mentioned above, the first step in the analysis requires determining the
content of the international legal personality of corporations. In the Reparations
case, the ICJ pointed out that "[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights." 7 As a state-

14. As pointed out in 1928 by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, "it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international
agreement, according to the intention of the contracting Parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of
some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations." Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig,
Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15, at 17, available at http://www.worldcourts.com/
pcij/eng/decisions/1928.03.03_danzig/.
15. See Patrick Dumberry, L 'EntrepriseSujet de Droit International?Retour sur la Question a la
Lumidre des Diveloppements Ricents du Droit International des Investissements, 108 REvuE
GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 112-13, 116-17 (2003).
16. Helgensen, infra note 122, at 574.
17. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 178 (1949).
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centered legal system, States enjoy a plenary international legal personality18 and
"possess a general competence." 19 The content of the legal personality of other
subjects of international law may, however, significantly vary from one to
another.20 When it comes to assessing the potential responsibility of corporations at
the international level, it is necessary to determine the duties of corporations under
the IHL framework (1) and the possible suitability of the existing international
mechanisms of accountability for corporations (2).
1. The Potential International Legal Personality of Corporations under IHL
The respect of the core IHL instruments, i.e. the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Additional Protocols, rests with the High Contracting Parties which
have undertaken in common Article 1 "to respect and to ensure [their] respect for
the present Convention[s] in all circumstances." 21 However, the fact that non-state
actors are mentioned in other passages of these instruments does not ipso jure
render them accountable for violations of JHL at the international level.22
This is notably the case for serious violations of these Conventions since it is
the duty of the High Contracting Parties to "enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches" of the fundamental rules of IHL, 23 the same
breaches constituting war crimes under the Statute of the International Criminal
18. Grigory Tunkin, InternationalLaw in the InternationalSystem, 147 RECUEIL DES COURS 2012 (1975) ("States possess a full-size international legal personality which comprises, inter alia, the
following elements: (1) rights and duties under international law; (2) sovereignty which means supreme
power over their respective territories and population; (3) sovereign equality of all states; (4) privileges
and immunities; (5) the capacity to participate in the process of creating norms of international law; (6)
the capacity to participate in international legal relations; (7) the capacity to bring international claims;
(8) the capacity to take enforcement actions under international law; (9) the capacity to bear
international responsibility.").
19. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Reports 66, 78 (July 8) ("The Court need hardly point out that international organizations
are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence.").
20. CHARLES DOMINICE, La Personnaliti Juridique dans le Systime du Droit des Gens, in
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY - ESSAYS IN HoNouR OF

KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 147, 160 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., Kluwer Law International 1996) ("A cet
6gard, il faut dire qu'd l'6vidence l'ensemble des droits dont un sujet de droit est susceptible d'etre
titulaire varie grandement selon les sujets de droit mais nous prdfdrons y reconnalitre un probl~me de
comp6tence. Autrement dit ... la personnalit6 juridique n'est pas divisible - elle est on elle n'est pas mais ... en revanche le faisceau de droits, facult6s, comp6tences, est trbs variable selon les cat6gories de
sujets du droit international.").
21. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field art.1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC (I)]; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC (II)]; Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.135 [hereinafter
GC (III)]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC (IV)].
22. See GC (I), supranote 21, art. 49; see aslo GC (II), supranote 21, art. 50; see also CG (III),
supranote 21, art. 129; see also GC (IV), supranote 21, art. 146.
23. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 49; GC (II), supranote 21, art. 50; CG (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supranote 21, art. 146.
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Court ("ICC"). 24 Additional Protocol No. 1 ("AP(I)") does not mention the
incriminations at the domestic level for these violations and, when providing that
"[t]he High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave
breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches" 25 and that
"grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes,"26 it offers
an international incrimination for such violations, but without mechanisms of
enforcement.
Considering that the Conventions do not define the meaning of the term
"persons," possibly indicating that it includes not only individuals but also legal
persons,27 and considering that AP(I) refers to "war crimes" without mentioning
the nature of their authors, 21 it appears that these instruments do not explicitly
preclude corporations bearing duties under IHL. Besides, an ICRC study points out
that "although states and organized armed groups bear the greatest responsibility
for implementing international humanitarian law, a business enterprise carrying out
activities that are closely linked to an armed conflict must also respect applicable
rules of international humanitarian law." 2 9 However, while corporations are likely
to fall within the scope of IHL, these instruments do not implement mechanisms of
enforcement for violations of these obligations.30 We must therefore determine
whether the responsibility of corporations may be held under the international
criminal law framework, separately from IHL.
2. The Nonexistent International Legal Personality of Corporations under
International Criminal Law
Although international criminal courts and tribunals have decided cases
involving activities carried out by corporations, they have persistently refused to
consider the possibility of the criminal responsibility of legal persons. Besides, this
position has been integrated in the Statute of the International Criminal Court
("ICC") which does not contemplate corporate responsibility.
Regarding the first generation of international criminal tribunals, it should be
mentioned that the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
("IMT") had jurisdiction for "the trial and punishment of the major war
24. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90, 94
[hereinafter ICC Statute] ("For the purpose of this Statute, 'war crimes' means: (a) Grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention . . .").
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 86, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, 42-43 [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
26. Id. at 42.
27. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 53 (referring to the prohibition of "[t]he use by individuals,
societies,firms or companies eitherpublic or private ... of the emblem or the designation 'Red Cross'
or 'Geneva Cross' .... ," suggesting that the term "persons" of Article 49 may include all these
categories) (emphasis added).
28. Additional Protocol, supra note 25, art. 75.
29. ICRC, supranote 11, at 14.
30. See, e.g., GC (I), supranote 21; see also GC (II), supranote 21; see also CG (III), supra note
21; see also GC (IV), supranote 21.
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criminals ... acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as
individuals or as members of organizations."31 The responsibility of legal persons
was therefore removed ab initio and, besides, the IMT declared in a much-quoted
passage that "[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced." 32 However, a very distinctive
feature of the IIMT Charter was the possibility "[a]t the trial of any individual
member of any group or organization" to "declare . . . that the group or

organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization" 33
and, as such, four organizations were declared as criminal by the Tribunal.34 The
recognition of the criminal responsibility of these defacto or dejure organizations
should not, however, be interpreted as a recognition by the IIMT of the criminal
responsibility of legal persons. Indeed, this specific provision of the IMT Charter
was linked to the so-called "Control Council Law No. 10" established to prosecute
criminals of lower rank. To be sure, an individual's mere membership in one of
the organizations already declared as criminal by the IMT constituted a crime. 36
Therefore, the criminalization of several organizations by the "Control Council
Law No. 10" served to provide a legal basis for the prosecution of individuals and
should be distinguished from genuine corporate responsibility mechanisms, the
rationale of which is not to establish a collective punishment of all persons
involved in an organization3 7 and does not necessarily imply that the entire
organization was inherently criminal in its purpose. Nonetheless, several cases known as the "Industrial Cases" 38 - decided under the "Control Council Law No.
10" are very instructive as they highlighted the potential relationship between
corporate activities and the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity
(e.g. manufacturing and supplying poison, spoliation of private property, forced
labor), although only individuals, executives of these companies, were ultimately
found guilty. 39
31. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
280 (emphasis added) [hereinafter IMT Charter].
32. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, 466 (Int'l

Military Tribunal 1948).
33. IMT Charter, supranote 31, art. 9.
34. The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, the SD and the SS. See OFFICE OF
UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAzI CONSPIRACY AND
AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 91, 97,102 (United States Printing Office 1947).
35. See Jia Bing Bing, Control Council Law No. 10, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 281-2 (Antonio Cassese ed., Oxford University Press 2009).
36. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG
WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 Appendix D, art. II (Government
Printing Office 1949) ("Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime ... (d) Membership in
categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military

Tribunal.").
37. Helgesen, supranote 12, at 584.
38. Id. at 580.
39. See William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the
Accomplices, 83 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 439, 442 (2001); Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business
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Subsequent developments in the field of international criminal law have
confirmed the lack of power to prosecute corporations in the international arena. In
this regard, the statutes of the international criminal tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (respectively "ICTY" and "ICTR") expressly provided
that they have jurisdiction "over natural persons." 40 However, while Article 25 of
the Statute of the ICC provides identically jurisdiction "over natural persons,"
therefore "implicitly negat[ing] - at least for its own jurisdiction - the
punishability of corporations and other legal entities," 41 its drafting history shows
that some negotiating States considered the possibility of implementing a criminal
responsibility over legal persons.42 Indeed, the 1998 Draft Statute for the ICC
provided that, in addition to natural persons and to the exclusion of States, "[t]he
Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States,
when the crimes committed were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by
their agencies or representatives." 43 This proposal, made with the idea of easing
access to restitution and compensation," was not eventually adopted by state
parties and several arguments were raised against such a possibility, including,
among dominant ones, evidentiary problems as well as the rejection of corporate
criminal responsibility concept in many domestic laws, which would have
impaired the complementary mechanism of the ICC 45 (although some authors have
suggested that these obstacles are far from being insurmountable).46 It should also
be stressed that the fictional dimension of legal persons, through which
responsibilities may be shielded and assets protected by the corporate veil, renders
effective criminal responsibility more complex.47
Therefore, while IHL imposes obligations on legal persons and while the case
law of the IMT has shown how their activities may facilitate or serve as a basis of
commission of serious violations of IHL, corporations have stayed outside the
with the Devil. The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials whose Business Transactions
Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 AIR FORCE L. REv. 167, 178 (2005);
Helgesen, supranote 12, at 580.
40. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 art. 6
(1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 art. 5 (1994); see
Micaela Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY I, at 527, 530-1 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D.
Jones eds., 2002).
41. Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY I, at 767, 778 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta &
John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
42. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15 - July 17, 1998, Draft Statutefor the International
CriminalCourt, art. 76, n.9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (April 14, 1998).
43. Id. art. 23(5).
44. Eser, supra note 41, at 779.
45. Frulli, supra note 40, at 532-33; Eser, supra note 41, at 779; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN

Cambridge University Press
2004).
46. For a comprehensive analysis see Joana Kyriakakis, Corporations and the International
CriminalCourt: The Complementary Objection StrippedBare, 19 CRIM. L.F. 115, 120-21 (2008).
47. Helgesen, supranote 12, at 585.
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 101 (2nd ed.,
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scope of ratione personae jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals.
Corporate criminal conduct may therefore be judged in the international arena only
throughout the residual criminal responsibility of the natural persons 48 deciding,
directing or implementing these activities, and leaving unsolved the matter of
compensation of victims and the maintaining of an activity that structurally fuels
the conflict and the commission of crimes.4 9 However, concluding the complete
inexistence of responsibility of corporations for violations of IHL at the
international level seems an excessive position as recent developments have shown
the development of alternative channels of responsibility.
B. Fragmented and Alternative Channels of non-Criminal International
Responsibilityof Corporationsfor Breaches oflHL
The lack of international criminal accountability of corporations for violations
of IHL does not entirely overshadow the growing concern of the international
community about contentious corporate activities in the armed conflict context.
Thus, several international law mechanisms have in fact addressed the need of
corporate accountability. This is particularly reflected in the sanctions of the UN
Security Council (1) and other mechanisms of soft international responsibility (2).
1. UN Security Council Sanctions for Violations of IHL
As the guardian of the collective security system, the Security Council may,
under Article 41 of the UN Charter, adopt non-military coercive measures,
including "the complete or partial interruption of economic relations" (known as
"economic sanctions").o Thus, the Security Council has the power to interfere
with the course of business activities in case of threats to peace, and impose
sanctions - without any ratione personae limitations - on States, individuals,
groups of individuals or legal persons."
Following an evolution of armed conflicts implicating more non-state actors,
the practice of the Security Council since the nineties has highlighted a growing
focus of its sanctions on non-state individuals and entities, also known as
"targeted" or "smart sanctions."5 2 This new policy has resulted in measures such as

48. Outside the realm of international criminal tribunals, and under stringent conditions, they
could also fall under the scope of state responsibility, notably concerning the growing phenomenon of
outsourcing of military operations to private entities. See, e.g., Carsten Hoppe, Passingthe Buck: State
Responsibilityfor PrivateMilitary Companies, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 989, 1014 (2008).
49. Helgesen, supra note 12, at 585 (concerning a declaration of the Prosecutor of the ICC
pointing out that "[t]here is general concern that the atrocities allegedly committed in the country may
be fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources there and the arms trade, which are enabled through
the international banking system" and that "investigation of the financial aspects of the alleged
atrocities will be crucial to prevent future crimes."); see also Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., (Prosecutor)
Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, No.: pids.009.2003-EN (July 16,
2003).
50. U.N. Charter art. 41.
51. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, United Nations Sanctions After Iraq: Looking Back to See
Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329,330-32 (2003).
52. For an overview see SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (David
Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002).
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embargoes on arms and petroleum against an Angolan military group in 1993 5 and
on diamonds exports in the Sierra Leone Conflict in 2000.54 In this latter situation,
the Security Council specifically expressed its concern "at the role played by the
illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone."55 Other examples
may be found with the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against the
Taliban regime and Al-Qaida,56 the Democratic Republic of Congo, 7 C~te
d'Ivoire58 or Sudan, 59 as well as establishing committees for the monitoring of their
implementation.
Two distinct kinds of corporations may be taken into account in these
decisions: those already involved in a given armed conflict and directly targeted by
the sanctions, and all the others that are preventively prohibited from carrying out
certain activities linked to this conflict.
Certainly, UN sanctions are practically limited, and cannot be compared in
terms of efficacy with the actual laws holding corporations accountable for
breaches of IHL. Given that it is the role of the UN member States to ensure the
compliance with these resolutions, the UN Security Council has no authority to
directly prosecute individuals, groups and legal persons violating its embargoes. 60
Nevertheless, the practice of the UN Security Council in imposing targeted
sanctions preventing or restricting economic activities, and thus impacting
corporate behavior in armed conflict, highlights the existence of selective
mechanisms for imposing indirect responsibility on corporations for violations of
IHL.
2. Soft Responsibility Mechanisms
Some international organizations, notably the UN and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have taken several initiatives
aimed at improving the corporate compliance with rules of fundamental IHL.6 1
These initiatives focus mainly on multinational corporations and target, in the
context of IHL, corporate conduct in developing countries.62 Although the
standards promulgated by the UN and the OECD are notper se binding and are not

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

S.C. Res. 864, 1 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (Sept. 15, 1993).
S.C. Res. 1306, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000).
Id. at Preamble, T 6.
S.C. Res. 1267, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
S.C. Res. 1493, 120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003).
S.C. Res. 1572, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004).
S.C. Res. 1591, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005).

60. 2

INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION

OF JURISTS,

CORPORATE

COMPLICITY

&

LEGAL

ACCOUNTABILITY: CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 50 (2008).

61. For an overview see John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving Agenda,
101 AM. J. INT'LL. 819, 819-20 (2007).
62. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, 7, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974); OECD, Annual
OECD Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility, The OECD Guidelines and Developing Countries:
Building Trust, Summary (June 14, 2005), availableat www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/23/35394320.pdf.
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accompanied with judicial accountability mechanisms,63 they tend to develop a
body of soft norms playing a great role in practice.
Among the leading soft law standards for corporations are those promulgated
by the OECD. Since 1976, the OECD has developed "Guidelines" for
multinational enterprises (the latest version released in 2000),64 which constitute a
comprehensive instrument viewed as "the central international normative
framework for corporate behaviour." 65 As such, these guidelines have a broader
scope than IHL as they deal with issues such as disclosure, taxation and
competition. However, they are governed by the general principle that enterprises
should "[r]espect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent
with the host government's international obligations and commitments" 66 and
include rules on employment, environment and bribery, all of them being vehicles
for the integration of IHL rules.67 An illustration of the outreach of these
Guidelines in an IHL context may be found with the report of the UN Panel of
Experts on the "Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" that used the OECD standards
as a "yardstick." 68 The panel listed the corporations considered to be in violation of
the OECD Guidelines and recommended, inter alia, that "Governments and the
UN should co-operate fully with investigations which are being launched by the
ICC into, inter alia, the complicity of business in war crimes in the DRC" 69 (for
the purpose of holding individuals accountable under international criminal law),
highlighting the potential connections between the Guidelines and the
implementation of IHL in the context of economic activities. More recently, in
2006, the OECD developed a "Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises
in Weak Governance Zones," supplementing the Guidelines of 2000, in order to
provide a stronger guidance for corporations in situations of government failures.
The innovative aspect of this instrument lies in its explicit reference to IHL, and
notably in the scope of application of this instrument as it indicates that "weak
governance zones can be identified by ... serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law and endemic violent conflict . . . involving

potentially diverse combatants."7 Special attention should therefore be paid to this
new instrument in the coming years.

63. Bernali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative Approaches to Attributing
Liability to Corporationsfor ExtraterritorialAbuses, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 43,63-66 (2005).
64. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporation: Revision 2000, art. 2(2), June 27, 2000, 40
I.L.M. 237, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en 2649 34889 2397532 1_11_1,
00.html [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
65. Helgesen, supranote 12, at 591.
66. OECD Guidelines, supra note 64, art. 11(2).
67. Id. arts. IV-VI.
68. RAID, supra note 8, at 1.
69. Id. at 7. On this report and the OECD Guidelines, see Daniel Leader, Business and Human
Rights - Time to Hold Companies to Account, 8 INT'L CRIM. L. R. 447, 451 (2008).
70. OECD, Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones (June
9, 2006), available at http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/21/36885821.pdf
71. Id. at 42.
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The issue of corporate responsibility has also been put on the agenda of the
UN.72 Among the latest initiatives aimed at better framing corporate activities
having human rights and IHL negative impacts, the "Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights" adopted in 2003 by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights has reaffirmed and clarified the duty of
corporations to respect IHL norms, notably concerning the security of persons and
the rights of workers.73 Although this instrument was not adopted by the
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission requested the Secretary General
to appoint a special representative on this issue with the mandate, inter alia, "[t]o
identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for
transnational corporations ... with regard to human rights" and "[t]o research and
clarify the implications for transnational corporations . . . of concepts such as

'complicity' and 'sphere of influence'." As part of this mission, the recent reports
published by the special representative John Ruggie have drawn up an inventory of
the most relevant soft law instruments with their compliance and accountability
mechanisms, including the OECD Guidelines, 75 highlighting how soft law has
strengthened standards of corporate behavior in terms of compliance with IHL.
Interestingly, the Ruggie reports have devoted substantial attention to
domestic judicial mechanisms for corporate responsibility, one of the reports
pointing out "the extension of responsibility for international crimes to
corporations under domestic law" 76 through the incorporation of the
aforementioned international frameworks. This highlights the necessity to have
recourse to domestic legal orders for an effective implementation of IHL rules.
III. THE EMERGING RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF IHL IN
DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS
Previous developments have demonstrated that although there are emergent
mechanisms aimed at improving standards of corporate behavior on an
international level, the legal responsibility of corporations in the international legal
72. For a broad and recent analysis see Karin Buhmann, Regulating CorporateSocial and Human
Rights Responsibilities at the UN Plane: InstitutionalisingNew Forms of Law and Law-making
Approaches?, 78 NoRDic J. OF INT'L L. 1 (2009).
73. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Fifty-fifth Session, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of
TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 26, 2003). For an overview see David Weissbrodt & Muria
Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 912 (2003).
74. ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Human
Rights and TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.87
(April 15, 2005).
75. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountabilityfor CorporateActs,
45 - 62, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35
(February 19, 2007); see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Protect,Respect and Remedy: A Framework
for Business and Human Rights, 92, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008) (prepared by John
Ruggie).
76. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35, supranote 75, T22.
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order remains limited. Corporations bear duties under IHL but the ratione
personae limitations of international criminal courts and tribunals as well as the
lack of coercive powers of the Security Council to compel the implementation of
its sanctions prevent their automatic enforcement. To some extent, these duties and
sanctions are almost purely declaratory at the international level. As such, their
enforcement lies in domestic legal orders. In fact, UN Member States have the
obligation to implement Security Council resolutions adopting sanctions (A) as
well as their specific IHL obligations, stemming from the various IHL
Conventions, the Statute of the ICC or customary international law (B). As it
requires a prior decision of the Security Council, the former may be described as
an "indirect" channel of responsibility, whereas the latter results from "direct"
prosecution or suits by victims against corporations at the domestic level.
A. Indirect Responsibility of Corporations Through the Domestic Implementation
of Security Council Sanctions
Although indirect, the responsibility of corporations stemming from sanctions
adopted by the Security Council is, in practice, the most effective tool to enforce
IHL norms (2) given the almost "untouchable" legal authority of these resolutions
that States have the obligation to implement (1).
1. The Duty of UN Member States to Implement Security Council Sanctions
Under Articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter, UN member States have the duty
to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council.77 While they have the
obligation to implement such decisions, "[r]esolutions of the Security Council
leave to States the choice of means of implementation"'7 and there are almost as
many forms and vehicles of implementation as there are States. 79 Given this
diversity, only a few general remarks on the issue of implementation of these
sanctions merit some attention.
Not implementing a resolution adopting sanctions under Article 41 would
trigger the international responsibility of the recalcitrant State.o However, this
77. Article 25 provides that "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council" and Article 48 that "(1) [t]he action required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken
by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
(2) Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their
action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are member". U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48.
78. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law, in NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33, 37 (Vera GowllandDebbas ed., 2004). For an illustration of this latitude see U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004), supra
note 58 (concerning the C~te d'Ivoire where the Security Council decided that "all States shall ... take
the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply . . . of arms or any related materiel, in
particular military aircraft and equipment ...
(emphasis added)).
79. For a comparative study covering Argentina, Belgium, the European Union, Finland, France,
Germany, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, Poland, The Czech Republic, South Africa, Namibia,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States see NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004).
80. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing InternationalCriminal Justice in the
New Millennium: Lessonsfrom the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 938-39 (2000).
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obligation under the Charter does not necessarily mean that such resolutions are
self-executing in domestic law. As an instrument derived from a treaty these
sanctions have, most of the time, no direct effect and require a specific measure of
implementation, highlighting "the importance of collaboration between what has
been perceived as two autonomous legal orders."8 1 However, this operation of
transposition subjects the international sanction to domestic law which may gives
rise to a conflict between the two and, as pointed out by one author, "conflicts
between domestic and international law will be dealt with in accordance with the
law of the forum; domestic courts bound by their own rules may not always uphold
the primacy of international law and the consequences will depend on the place
attributed to international law in the national system." 82
In this context, issues have arisen from the judicial review of Security Council
resolutions by national courts and the extent to which the latter could second-guess
their validity,83 particularly in the context of resolutions mandating targeted
sanctions. Individuals and legal persons have indeed challenged national measures
of implementation on the ground that they were adopted in violation of their
fundamental rights. The recent judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
2008 in the Kadi & Al Barakaatcase highlights what may constitute an indirect
judicial review of UN economic sanctions.84
This case arose from the Security Council sanctions against the Taliban
regime pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), and the establishment
of the so-called "the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee" having the
mission to designate individuals and entities targeted by these sanctions. Mr. Kadi
and the Al Barakaat Intermational Foundation, the latter being a Swedish legal
person, contested before the ECJ the validity of the Regulation of the European
Council implementing these sanctions8 ' and notably their inclusion on the list
updated by the Sanctions Committee on the grounds, inter alia, that their right to
be heard and to an effective judicial review have not been respected.86 Beyond
discussions of the legal value of such resolutions in the European legal order, 7 the
ECJ challenged the presumed immunity from jurisdiction of European measures
implementing binding Security Council resolutions when such an implementation
would do violence to the fundamental human rights safeguarded by the European
legal order, and it pointed out that "in the light of the actual circumstances
surrounding the inclusion of the appellants' names in the list of persons and
81. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 78, at 34.
82. Id. at 35.
83. Matthias Herdegen, Review of the Security Council by National Courts: A Constitutional
Perspective, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 77 (Erika de Wet & Andre
Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
84. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council & Conn'n, 2008
E.C.R. 1-06351.
85. Council Regulation 881/2002, art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L139) 10 (EC).
86. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. 1-06351, para. 40, 49.
87. Stefan Griller, InternationalLaw, Human Rights and the European Community's Autonomous
Legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi, 4 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 528
(2008).
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entities covered by the restrictive measures . . . it must be held that the rights of the

defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review
of those rights, were patently not respected."
Thus, although it appears almost impossible to challenge the internal legality
of a Security Council resolution (whether, for instance, there was a situation
justifying the adoption of economic coercive measures under Article 41 of the UN
Charter), when it comes to sanctions targeting individuals or legal persons, there
exists a possibility to review the external legality of the resolution, that is to say, its
implementation in the domestic legal order. Transposing these conclusions to
resolutions having an impact on corporations, it seems therefore that the legal
authority of general embargo measures is unchallengeable and corporations have to
comply with these economic sanctions indirectly implementing IHL norms.
2. The Implementation of Security Council Sanctions Towards Corporations
The effectiveness of UN Security Council sanctions adopted in relation to
violations of IHL compared with the prosecution before international or domestic
tribunals lies in the absence of any ratione personae limitations, therefore
facilitating the inclusion of activities conducted by corporations. One illustration
may be found in the resolution 1493 (2003) concerning the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo where the Security Council decided "that all
States .

.

. shall .

.

. take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect

supply, sale or transfer, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their
flag vessels or aircraft,of arms and any related material . . . to all foreign and
Congolese armed groups and militias .. " In a nutshell, "it is States that must
enact domestic legislation to guarantee that those within their jurisdiction are not
violating embargoes." 90
At the same time, there are few examples of domestic prosecutions for
violations of these Security Council embargoes. The International Commission of
Jurists has recently reported two cases, in Italy and the Netherlands, involving
legal actions against individuals, for illicit arms sales to Sierra Leone and Liberia. 91
Although none of them resulted in convictions, this NGO pointed out that "they
may signal a new willingness on the part of national authorities to initiate
prosecutions against business people who are involved in sanctions violations
which give rise to crimes under international law."92 Beyond the rare cases of
prosecutions, it must be stressed that UN embargoes do not only potentially target
those blatantly violating these sanctions but may affect corporations in the regular
course of their activities. The case of the Turkish corporation Bosphorus is
particularly illustrative of this dimension.
In 1992 Bosphorus Airways, a Turkish charter airline company, entered into
an agreement with the Yugoslav national airline JAT, pursuant to which it leased
88. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. 1-06351, para. 334.
89. S.C. Res. 1493, 120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003).
90. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 60, at 50.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 50-1.
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one of its airplanes for a period of four years, the Turkish company having control
of the aircraft while JAT retained ownership.93 Following the implementation of
UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the European level, 94
the Irish authorities impounded the aircraft while on maintenance at the Dublin
airport,95 although the lease agreement was not adopted to circumvent the UN
sanctions and the rent due was paid into block accounts.96 Bosphorus instituted
proceedings in Irish courts to challenge the seizure of the aircraft, and the dispute
was ultimately brought before the ECJ.97 The European Court, despite recognizing
that Bosphorus was a completely innocent party acting in good faith, considered,
on the infringements of "Bosphorus' fundamental rights ... to peaceful enjoyment
of its property and its freedom to pursue a commercial activity,"98 that:
"[a]s compared with an objective of general interest so fundamental for
the international community, which consists in putting an end ... to the
massive violations of human rights and humanitarian international law
in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the impounding of the aircraft
in

question

.

. . cannot

be

regarded

as

inappropriate

or

disproportionate." 99
This case eventually ended before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), Bosphorus alleging a violation of its fundamental right to property.100
Recalling "that the general interest pursued by the impugned measure was
compliance with legal obligations flowing from the Irish State's membership of the
European Community,"1or the ECtHR decided that "the impoundment of this
aircraft did not give rise to a violation of this right."1 0 2 The Bosphorus case is
illustrative of how the enforcement of UN economic sanctions may affect

corporations that would have not necessarily been considered accomplices of
violations of IHL in other contexts.
In addition, the impact of UN sanctions may even exist regardless of their
domestic implementation. Indeed, one author has underlined "that provisions of a
Security Council resolution may affect the legal situation of individuals in their
93. Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Airways v. Minister for Transp., Energy and Commc'ns, Ir., para. 2,
1996 E.C.R. 1-3953.
94. Council Regulation 990/93, 1993 O.J. (L 102) (EEC) (implementing UN Security Council
Resolution 820 (1993)).
95. On the basis of Article 8 of the Council Regulation 990/93 which provides "[a]ll vessels,
freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person
or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall
be impounded by the competent authorities of the Member States." Council Regulation 990/93, art. 8,
1993 O.J. (L 102) (EEC); Bosphorus Airways, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3953, para. 4.
96. Bosphorus Airways, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3953, para. 3.
97. Id. para. 6.
98. Id. para. 19.
99. Id. para. 26.
100. Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, (2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=45036/98&sessionid=33090221&skin=hudoc
-en.
101. Id. para. 150.
102. Id. para 167.
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direct consequences on contractual obligations, even in the absence of domestic
implementing legislation"1 0 3 and therefore rendering possible termination of
contracts "on the basis of force majeure."104 Identically, such sanctions are applied
by arbitrators, who are not subject to a domestic legal system, as an international
public order.10 5 These situations highlight, therefore, the existence of a little selfexecuting dimension of UN sanctions in contractual and/or arbitral disputes.
Thus, once IHL violations have passed through the filter of the UN Security
Council, the sanctions adopted by the Security Council have a broad effect and
may significantly impact corporations in the course of their economic activities,
even those not closely connected to the IHL violations to which these sanctions
relate. However, this mechanism of indirect corporate responsibility remains
somewhat selective and limited as it requires a prior Security Council resolution
and, most importantly, does not take into account the compensation of victims.
This lack of restorative justice of UN sanctions may be corrected through more
traditional - and direct - mechanisms of liability that have been gradually applied
to corporations.
B. An EmergingDirect Liability of CorporationsThrough the Application of their
InternationalObligations in Domestic Legal Orders
The integration of international obligations in domestic legal orders has
created two channels of liability of corporations for violations of IHL norms:
criminal and civil. However, establishing a strict distinction between the two
remains a questionable stance. Indeed, in both cases, the liability stems from
similar international obligations and, moreover, similar standards of corporate
complicity are used, regardless of the civil or criminal form of liability. 106 But
while the distinction between civil and criminal liability of corporations tends to be
blurred from a substantive perspective,1 07 it gives a clearer picture of two
procedurally different channels of liability, the criminal (1) and the civil (2)
mechanisms presenting distinct jurisdictional challenges.
1. Domestic Criminal Liability of Corporations
According to the widely accepted nulla poena sine lege principle, the
prosecution and conviction of corporations for violations of IHL are subject to the
existence of such offences in domestic legal systems as well as their applicability
to legal persons. 10
103. Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 78, at 40.
104. Id
105. Genevive Bastid-Burdeau, Les Embargos Multilatirauxet Unilatiraux et leur Incidence sur
l'Arbitrage CommercialInternational,REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 753, 775 (2003).
106. See Lillian Manzella, The InternationalLaw Standardfor Corporate Aiding and Abetting
Liability, 2006 EARTHRIGHTS INT'L 14 (observing that "U.S. civil aiding and abetting standards are
remarkably similar to the customary international law standard"); see also G.A. Res. 8/16,
45-53,
H.R.C., 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (discussing domestic criminal liability and
domestic civil liability in relation to international standards).
107. Weigend, supranote 6, at 944.
108. The principle of nulla poena sine lege holds that there can be "no punishment without a law
authorizing it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004).
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The existence of domestic offenses for violation of IHL should stem primarily
from the State obligations enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Indeed, the
four conventions impose on High Contracting Parties the obligation "to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing,
or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches," 109 but also "to search for
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and ... bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts,"110 not to mention that they may "hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party" 1 under the principle aut dedere aut judicare.
Despite these provisions offering States a broad jurisdictional basis to prosecute
violations of IHL,112 "the system is jeopardised by the fact that most States do not
have suitable legislation."1 13 These conventions include a substantive basis for
prosecution of such crimes, but the absence of procedural norms as well as
mechanisms of coordination between High Contracting Parties have jeopardized
their effective and homogeneous implementation, if any. 114
The implementation of the ICC Statute in the domestic legal systems of state
parties has significantly reduced these national disparities and developed the
inclusion of such crimes in national legislations. Although the ICC is subject to the
"complementarity" principle1 5 according to which the ICC shall determine that a
case is inadmissible where it "is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it" 116 or it "has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it,""1 it must be noted beforehand that the ICC Statute does not
expressly compel state parties to implement the criminal prohibitions within its
jurisdiction (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - among which
genuine IHL obligations) in their domestic laws. However, its ratification by state

109. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 46; GC (II), supranote 21, art. 50; GC (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supranote 21, art. 146.
110. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 46; GC (II), supranote 21, art. 50; GC (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supranote 21, art. 146.
111. GC (I), supra note 21, art. 46; GC (II), supranote 21, art. 50; GC (III), supra note 21, art. 129;
GC (IV), supranote 21, art. 146.
112. Damien Vandermeersch, La Compdtence Universelle, in JURIDICTIONS NATIONALES ET
CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX 589, 891 (Antonio Cassese & Mireille Delmas-Marty eds., 2002).
113. Paolo Benvenuti, Complementarity of the InternationalCriminal Court to National Criminal
Jurisdictions,in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT I, at 21, 29
(Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999).
114. See, e.g., David Turns, Prosecuting Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw: The Legal
Positionin the UnitedKingdom, 4 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 1, 6 (1999).
115. John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY I, at 667 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta &
John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
116. ICC Statute, supra note 24, art. 17(1)(a) ("The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.").
117. Id. art. 17(1)(b) ("The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.").
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parties (110 so far) has led to a process of incorporation of these crimes in
domestic laws.1 18
The existence of such legal bases is not enough alone in order to prosecute
corporations as none of the existing IHL instruments "were drafted with legal
persons in mind" 119 and, moreover, as mentioned above, the ICC Statute excludes
legal persons from its ratione personae jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the growing
recognition of the general criminal liability of legal persons and notably
corporations in national legal orders, 120 added to the domestic transposition of
international crimes, have been the vehicle for liability of corporations for
violations of IHL. As pointed out by a recent report on this issue, "[s]ince most of
the countries that have incorporated [international criminal law] into their domestic
statutes also do not make a distinction between natural and legal persons .. ., these
jurisdictions include corporations and other legal persons in their web of
liability."1 21
A final aspect of domestic criminal liability of corporations compared with
the vacuum left by the ICC deserves attention. The jurisdiction of the ICC is
indeed limited ratione personae not only to individuals, but also by provisions
stipulating that persons amenable to ICC jurisdiction must either be nationals of a
State party to the Rome Statute, 12 2 or must have perpetrated their criminal conduct
on the territory of a State party. 123 In the absence of one the two conditions,
individual conduct must be related to a situation "referred to the Prosecutor by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations." 24
It is significant that domestic criminal legislation does not include such limitations
and makes possible, on certain conditions, the prosecution of a natural or legal
person of any nationality and even for a conduct occurring abroad. 125 Therefore, it
could be argued that the potential extension of domestic criminal laws to

118. Anita Ramasastry & Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies
for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of InternationalLaw, FAFO, No. 536, 15 (2006),
available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf; see Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution
of Corporationsfor InternationalCrimes, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 809, 814 (2007) (discussing the
Australian case); see W. Cory Wanless, Corporate Liabilityfor InternationalCrimes Under Canada's
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 201, 206 (2009) (discussing the
Canadian case).
119. Olivier De Schutter, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction as a Tool for Improving the Human Rights
Accountability of Transnational Corporations, 17 (December 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
at
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-extrat
available
rritorial-jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf.
120. See Weigend, supra note 6, at 928; see also FAFO surveys covering Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa,
Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, available at http://www.fafo.no
/liabilities/index.htm.
121. Ramasastry & Thompson, supranote 118, at 16.
122. ICC Statute, supra note 24, art. 12(2)(b). "[O]r, if the crime was committed on board a vessel
or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft." Id. art. 12(2)(a).
123. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
124. Id art. 13.
125. Ramasastry & Thompson, supranote 118, at 16-7.
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corporations, coupled with the extended jurisdictional basis of domestic laws, "fill
the impunity gap left by the ICC's focused jurisdictional approach [and] we should
expect national courts to cast a wider prosecutorial net than the ICC."l26
Therefore, the potential inclusion of corporate misbehaviors into domestic
criminal law frameworks seems significant. It has, however, not been implemented
in practice so far. Actually, the major cases involving corporate violations of IHL
have arisen primarily within the civil liability framework, and notably in the
United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
2. Domestic Civil Liability of Corporations
On paper, domestic civil liability mechanisms seem to be a more welcoming
environment than domestic criminal law frameworks for the prosecution of
corporations. In a nutshell, as pointed out by a recent report of the International
Commission of Jurists on corporate complicity in international crimes, "[i]n every
jurisdiction, despite differences in terminology and approach, an actor can be held
liable under the law of civil remedies if through negligent or intentional conduct it
causes harm to someone else."1 27 Civil liability therefore gives more latitude than
criminal liability in three main fields: (1) it applies indiscriminately to natural and
legal persons whereas criminal law often restricts the liability of legal persons; (2)
the characterization of a negligent or intentional conduct is not subject to the
principle of legality; (3) it operates on a lower standard of proof than does criminal
liability and; (4) it offers an independent source of financial redress for victims. 128
However, important drawbacks of choosing the civil liability avenue must be
highlighted: (1) ratione temporis, it is generally restricted in time and does not
benefit from the absence of statutes of limitations (imprescriptibilite)attaching to
violations of IHL in domestic law1 29 (which is of great importance considering the
frequent long time lapse between the perpetration of the crimes and the moment
when victims get organized to seek a remedy); (2) it is limited by more stringent
jurisdictional considerations and, inter alia, is not governed by universal
jurisdiction mechanisms 30 (therefore it seems impossible to sue on civil grounds in
State X for a violation of IHL perpetrated abroad on a foreign victim by a foreign
corporation, which could be possible in a criminal prosecution under certain
conditions); (3) the negligent or intentional conduct is not necessarily assessed by
the yardstick of international humanitarian and criminal law, and the standard of
causality between the conduct and the harm may differ from the one of complicity
in a criminal context1 3 1 and; (4) a civil liability claim, implicating persons with
different nationalities, or dealing with harm that occurred abroad, involves the
application of conflict of laws principles and, although the majority of countries

126. Wanless, supra note 118, at 205-06.
127. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY VOL. 3, 10
(2008).

128. Id. at 4-6.
129. Id. at 44-5.
130. Id. at 49-51.
131. Id. at 13, 21.
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apply the lex loci delecti principle (application of the law of the country where the
harm occurred), domestic courts may implement different standards (the law of the
country having the most significant relationship with the parties, the law of the
country where the damage has arisen), therefore leaving an uncertainty
surrounding the rules governing the dispute. 132
Civil and criminal avenues both have their advantages and drawbacks and
neither is a per se panacea. However, one ancient and long time dormant 1789
American federal statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), pursuant to which
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States," 13 3 deserves the utmost attention since it has combined the large
scope of application of civil claims (favoring the inclusion of corporations and the
more generous torts compensation standards), the incrimination stemming from
international humanitarian law, an absence of time limitations on claims and an
"universal jurisdiction" approach to extraterritorial reach. 13 4 These elements,
coupled with the fact that the United States hosts a large number of major
international corporations with worldwide branches and subsidiaries - thereby
facilitating personal jurisdiction as well as the satisfaction of the claim - have
generated an explosive legal mixture attracting civil litigation implicating
corporate violations of JHL.
The recent growing application of this statute has given rise to countless
literature dealing with several of the aforementioned procedural aspects. 135 The
present discussion will be limited to the issues in connection with corporate
violations of IHL and is comprised of the following points: (1) whether the ATCA
covers violations of IHL (ratione materiae); (2) whether the ATCA applies to
corporations (rationepersonae) and whether corporations can be held liable of
violations of IHL, notably as accomplices; (3) whether a parent company can be
held liable for the misconduct of one of its subsidiaries; and (4) whether the ATCA
permits an individual right of redress.
(1) Liability under ATCA depends on a violation of either "the law of
nations" or of "a treaty of the United States."1 36 The key issue, therefore, is
whether IHL can be considered as one of these two sources. In this regard, the
recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain does not
provide an unambiguous guide.137 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that

132. Id. at 51-53; see also Eric Mongelard, CorporateCivil Liabilityfor Violations ofInternational
HumanitarianLaw, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 665, 687 (2006).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991).
134. Corporations may not be prosecuted in the U.S. for international crimes considering that the
relevant federal criminal statutes apply only to individuals. See Robert C. Thompson, Survey Questions
& Responses, Laws of the United States of America, FAFO, 12-14 (2006), available at
http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCCSurveyUS06Sep2006.pdf.
135. For the most comprehensive overview see THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL

ANTHOLOGY 259 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991).
137. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-15 (2004).
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beyond the three primary offenses that were foreseen in 1789 (violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy), the room is
"open to a narrow class of international norms today."13 8 It pointed out, however,
that "federal courts should not recognize claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms familiar when § 1350 [the
ATCA] was enacted,"1 39 endorsing therefore the inclusion of several related-IHL
norms by lower federal courts which considered that genocide, 140 torture,141 war
crimes and violations of IHL (regardless of the international or non-international
dimension of the conflict) 142 fall within the scope of the ATCA.
(2) On the rationepersonaeprong, it has been admitted in Kadic v. Karadzic
that some violations of the law of nations may be committed by non-state actors,
including war crimes and violations of IHL. 143 The extension of the ATCA to
corporations was also expressly acknowledged in Doe I. v. Unocal1 44 but explained
in greater detail in PresbyterianChurch of Sudan v. Talisman Energy where the
court considered that "corporations may also be held liable under international law,
at least for gross human rights violations."1 45 Despite the absence of an
international precedent explicitly attributing a violation of international law to a
private legal person, some federal courts cited the Nuremberg "Industrial cases" 1 46
which demonstrate how certain corporations could be "[an] instrumentality of
cohesion in the name of which the enumerated acts . . . were committed."1 4 7
Relying on this authority which, as already discussed, did not recognize the actual
138. Id. at 715, 729.
139. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
140. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In the aftermath of the atrocities
committed during the Second World War, the condemnation of genocide as contrary to international
law quickly achieved broad acceptance by the community of nations.").
141. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In light of the universal
condemnation of torture in numerous international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world ... we find that an act of torture
committed by a State official against one held in detention violates established norms of the
international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations").
142. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243 ("The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Act over
appellants' claims of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law."); see also In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp.2d 7, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Although Kadic
predates Sosa, the former's reasons for recognizing civil liability for war crimes under the ATS remains
sound.").
143. Id. ("[U]nder the law of war as codified in the Geneva Conventions, all 'parties' to a conflictwhich includes insurgent military groups-are obliged to adhere to these most fundamental requirements
of the law of war ... The liability of private individuals for committing war crimes has been recognized
since World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World War II").
144. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The Court stated further that "[g]iven that private individuals are liable for violations of
international law in certain circumstances, there is no logical reason why corporations should not be
held liable, at least in cases ofjus cogens violations".Id.
146. Jacobson, supra note 39, at 170.
147. In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 57 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) (quoting United States v. Krauch
(the I.G. Farben case), 8 TRiALS WAR CRIM. 1081, 1152-53 (1952)).

224

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

criminal liability of corporations, the District Court however considered that
"limitations on criminal liability of corporations do not necessarily apply to civil
liability of corporations,"148 thereby exploiting the civil aspect of the ATCA to

extend its reach to corporations.

149

(3) Considering the "complexity of modem business structures," 5 0 another
important element of ATCA litigation over corporations lies in the possibility to
reach the parent entity when the violation has been committed by one of its
subsidiaries. Contrary to the "aiding and abetting" standard where federal courts
have eventually relied on international criminal law, courts have implemented
domestic approaches when it comes to piercing the corporate veil.'
Two
arguments may be put forward to support this approach: the incompleteness of
international law in this field, 15 2 and the necessity to respect federal due process
standards since the piercing will also permit to establish personal jurisdiction over
the defendant (usually the so-called "doing business" jurisdiction), which is a
distinct issue from the subject matter jurisdiction stemming from the ATCA.153
Federal courts are therefore more likely to apply alter-ego and agency theories in
order to decide whether a parent company can be held liable for the conduct of one
of its subsidiaries. 154
(4) The issue of compensation is of the same nature. Kadic v. Karadzic
underlined that "[t]he law of nations generally does not create private causes of
action to remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defining the
remedies that are available for international law violations,"15' recognizing
therefore the role of domestic law as a gap-filler and the use of a domestic standard
for the reparation of a violation of the law of nations. The remedy available under

148. Id. at 57.
149. Regarding the "aiding and abetting" standard, federal courts have shown inconsistency, using
both international criminal law as well as federal common law approaches of the concept. For a
comprehensive analysis, see Chimbne I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 79 (2008). However, a recent decision of the Second Circuit indicates that liability
for aiding and abetting in ATCA cases for corporations requires that the defendant "(1) provides
practical assistance to the principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and
(2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime." Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l
Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007).
150. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supranote 127, at 45 (pointing out that "[it is not uncommon for
one business enterprise to now consist of a parent company with many subsidiaries . . . . In this context,
there are a number of reasons why it may be important to consider the involvement of a parent company
in the conduct of its subsidiary, when allegations of complicity in gross human rights abuses arise.").
151. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
152. Id. ("Piercing of the corporate veil reflects the protection provided to business organizations
by domestic law. Therefore, the question of alter ego liability does not raise the same universality
concerns as does the recognition of individual torts under Sosa . .. [and] the international law of agency
has not developed precise standards for this Court to apply in the civil context. Therefore, I will apply
federal common law principles concerning agency.").
153. Id. at 277.
154. See id.at 271 for a recent application in an ATCA case.
155. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l
Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The common law thus permits the 'independent judicial
recognition of actionable international norms'.").
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the ATCA is therefore subject to the generous monetary compensations awarded in
tort disputes1 56 and claimants have been awarded relief "often including millions of
dollars in punitive damages,"157 although the damages obtained against individuals
have rarely been recovered. 158
In a nutshell, as pointed out in a recent ATCA case, "[t]he task of a domestic
court is to provide a forum, procedures, and a remedy,"15 9 that are not available in
the international arena against corporations. While the conditions of its application
are stringent and it should not be seen as an easy source of redress for victims,160
the ATCA has proven to constitute one of the mechanisms, among others, of
enforcement of IHL norms. Its uniqueness lies in the way it has operated to
encompass both IHL norms and international criminal law within the domestic law
of torts, two spheres fundamentally unfamiliar to each other but having established
their compatibility when their respective role is adequately allocated.
IV. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the responsibility of corporations for violations of IHL has
highlighted the crucial role of States. Indeed, the limitation to the rationepersonae
jurisdiction of the ICC as well as the necessity of a domestic implementation of the
UN Security Council resolutions have demonstrated that the accountability of
corporations in the international arena is still largely hypothetical and requires the
competences of national legal orders.
UN sanctions, although requiring a Security Council resolution, have
constituted an original and effective mechanism of indirect enforcement of IHL
norms with a broader scope of application potentially affecting innocent
bystanders, e.g. corporations that would have never been held liable for violations
of IHL under the ATCA even by implementing the looser "aiding and abetting"
standards.
From a judicial perspective, while domestic criminal liability of corporations
for IHL violations is in ferment and its potential has not been widely explored yet,
the civil liability framework of the ATCA has demonstrated its broad potential to
hold corporations accountable. Besides, one of the recent Ruggie reports has
implicitly advocated the development and the implementation of the ATCA model
abroad, recommending notably that "[s]tates should strengthen judicial capacity to
hear complaints and enforce remedies against all corporations operating or based
in their territory [and] should address obstacles to access to justice, including for
156. Thompson, supra note 134, at 13 ("The U.S. has a robust tort system, both at the state and
federal levels, and victims of torts connected with violations of international criminal law or
international humanitarian law may sue for damages and other relief, either individually or as part of a
class action suit.").
157. Id. at 16. Footnote 54 of the preceding source lists examples of damages awarded under
ATCA cases. Id.
158. ILARIA BOTTIGLIERO, REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-4

(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004).
159. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
160. Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth From Reality About Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 263, 269 (2004).
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foreign plaintiffs - especially where alleged abuses reach the level of widespread
and systematic human rights violations." 61
While we are witnessing an internationalization of criminal law as well as an
impressive international criminalization of violations of IHL by individuals, the
most promising future for the liability of corporations for the same violations although their involvement is usually not of same amplitude - possibly lies in an
expansion of domestic civil liability frameworks, overcoming the reluctance of
some States to recognize the criminal liability of corporations. At the same time, it
is possible that this development in the civil liability arena would constitute just
one step towards the emergence of a most comprehensive global framework for
corporate responsibility.
The international community, through the development of several soft law
instruments, has shown its will to better regulate the activities of multinational
corporations. The possible expansion and progressive customary crystallization of
domestic civil liability of corporations for JHL violations could pave the way to an
initiative for an internationalization of this process and - why not - lead to the
establishment of an international civil tribunal to this end. Just like States,
corporations have been excluded from the ratione personae jurisdiction of the
ICC1 62 and, as States, corporations are sometimes the social instrumentalities of
IHL abuses. However, international responsibility exists for the former, but it is
still at the stage of chrysalis for the latter. More comprehensive legal
accountability mechanisms for corporations would certainly be an effective tool for
implementing IHL, economic and reputational pressure and the fear of the
financial stick being the best carrots to drive corporations towards a more global

and effective compliance with IHL.

161. Protect,Respect, andRemedy, supranote 75,
162. Eser, supra note 4141, at 779.

91.

Is THE FAILURE To RESPOND APPROPRIATELY To A
NATURAL DISASTER A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY?
THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF CYCLONE NARGIS
STUART FORD

On May 2 and 3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, devastating large
portions of the Irrawaddy Delta and creating the potential for a massive
humanitarian crisis. Yet, the Myanmar government rejected aid from some
countries, limited the amount of aid entering the country to afraction of what was
needed, and strictly controlled how that aid was distributed The United Nations
and many governments criticized Myanmar's response to the Cyclone as
inadequate and inhumane, and senior politicians from a number of countries
discussed whether the situationjustified invoking the "responsibility to protect"
doctrine
This article explores several questions, including: (1) whether an inadequate
response to a naturaldisaster can constitute a crime againsthumanity and thus act
as the triggerfor the responsibility to protect; (2) whether the responsibility to
protect could have been invoked by the internationalcommunity in response to
Cyclone Nargis; and (3) what countries would have been obligated to do if it had
been invoked
In particular, assuming that the invocation of the responsibility to protect
would have been based on a finding by the Security Council that crimes against
humanity were being committed by the government of Myanmar, would the
internationalcommunity be obligated to investigate and potentiallyprosecute the
underlying violations of internationalcriminallaw? If so, what venues exist for the
investigation andprosecution of these potentialcrimes?
I. INTRODUCTION

Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on May 2 and 3, 2008.1 It wreaked havoc in
the capital, Yangon, devastated large portions of the Irrawaddy Delta, and resulted
in the immediate deaths of tens of thousands of people. 2 Most of the initial deaths
- Stuart

Ford, J.D., LLM, is an Assistant Professor at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago;
previously he was an Assistant Prosecutor at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
He has written about crimes against humanity, genocide, collective security and the use of force in
international relations.
1. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, POST-NARGIS JOINT ASSESSMENT 1 (2008), available at

http://www.aseansec.org/21765.pdf
2. The initial estimates of the death toll were very low, but quickly increased as the scope of the
devastation became apparent. See Tropical Cyclone Kills More Than 350 in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2008, at A10; Seth Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll Hits Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, May
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were caused by the storm surge, which sent a twelve-foot-high wave sweeping
across parts of the Irrawaddy Delta and submerging many villages. The storm
surge destroyed housing, 4 polluted water sources, 5 and contaminated or destroyed
food stocks.6 Many areas remained underwater for days or weeks after the
cyclone. The widespread devastation caused by the cyclone created the potential
for a massive secondary humanitarian crisis.8 Moreover, the geography of the
Irrawaddy Delta made the delivery of humanitarian aid very difficult.

6, 2008, at Al (noting that the initial death toll was reported by state-owned television as 3,934, at the
same time that some government media was indicating it could be 10,000 and the Thai Foreign Minister
indicated it could be 15,000 after meeting with Myanmar's ambassador). By May 7, 2008, the
government was estimating the death toll at 22,500 with an additional 41,000 people missing. See Seth
Mydans & Helene Cooper, Aid for Myanmar Mobilizes, Mixed with Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2008, at Al. By May 14, 2008, the official government toll was 34,273 and the United Nations
estimated that as many as 60,000 had died. See Myanmar Government Still Blocking Large-Scale
Relief Death Toll Rises Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A13.
Eventually, the Myanmar government estimated that at least 134,000 people either died or disappeared
as a result of the cyclone. See Eric Schmitt, Gates Accuses Myanmar of 'Criminal Neglect' Over Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2008, at A5; Seth Mydans, Myanmar Rulers Still Impede Access, Relief Groups
Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A8. See also THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra note 2, at 1.
According to a joint report of the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the government of Myanmar, more than 800,000 people were displaced by the storm and more than
2.4 million people were "severely affected" by it. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra note 1, at 1.
The report noted that there was "near-total destruction" of fields and housing in areas that were directly
hit by the cyclone. Id.
3. See Mydans & Cooper, supranote 2.
4. An initial assessment by the World Food Program estimated that 1,000,000 people had been
left homeless. See Mydans & Cooper,supra note 2. A joint report by the United Nations, ASEAN and
the Myanmar government concluded that 450,000 houses were destroyed and found that 57% of the
households in affected areas reported their housing totally destroyed, with another 25% reporting their
houses partially destroyed. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supranote 1, at 13-14.
5. "The storm has mixed drinking water and sewage, posing a severe risk of diarrheal diseases,
and flooding has left vast pools of standing water where mosquitoes can breed and spread malaria and
dengue fever." Andy Newman, U.N. PressuringMyanmar to End Barriersto Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2008, at Al. Prior to the cyclone, many people relied on rainwater collection systems and local ponds
for water. More than 40% of these ponds were damaged by the cyclone and the rainwater collection
systems were often destroyed along with people's housing. As a result, more than 60% of people in the
affected areas had inadequate access to clean drinking water. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra
note 1, at 15-16. In addition, the combination of unsanitary defecation practices and the increased
reliance on drinking river water after the destruction of ponds created a significant health risk. Id. at 17.
6. See TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supra note 1, at 6-7 (noting that more than half of the
households living in the most affected areas reported having lost all of their food stocks during the
cyclone). See also In FloodedDelta, a Want as Pervasive as Death,N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at Al
(noting that villagers were eating waterlogged bananas and rotting fruit because there were no other
alternatives); Weeks After Cyclone in Myanmar, Even Farmers Wait for Food, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2008, at Al (noting that the storm destroyed rice stocks and ruined rice fields).
7. On 8 May 2008, whole villages in the delta remained underwater. See Seth Mydans,
Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/world/asia/08myanmar.html.
According to the regional director
of UNICEF, a large number of villages remained inundated in early June. See Mydans, Myanmar
Rulers Still Impede Access, Relief Groups Say, supra note 2.
8. It was obvious immediately after the cyclone struck Myanmar that it had created the
possibility for a secondary crisis. International media reports quickly noted the lack of drinking water,
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It quickly became apparent that unless a major aid effort was undertaken, tens
of thousands more people could die from disease and starvation.10 Yet, it appeared
that the government was both ill-equipped to respond to the crisis" and reluctant to
expend the effort necessary to organize an effective response. 12 Initially, the junta
seemed more interested in preparations for a May 10 referendum on a new
constitution.13 There were also allegations that the government had been aware

food, power, and the widespread destruction of homes. See Tropical Cyclone Kills More than 350 in
Myanmar, supra note 2, at A10 (quoting the UN relief coordinator as saying "'[t]he Irrawaddy Delta
was hit extremely hard, not only because of the wind and rain, but because of the storm surge .... The
villages there have reportedly been completely flattened."'); Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll
Hits Thousands, supra note 2. There were also fears of an epidemic caused by the many thousands of
dead bodies that were left in the wake of the cyclone. See Mydans, Myanmar FacesPressure to Allow
Major Aid Effort, supranote 7.
9. See Thomas Fuller, Region Poses Challengefor Aid Delivery, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at
A14 ("The area worst affected by the cyclone that struck Myanmar on Saturday is a vast and populous
delta crisscrossed by canals and inlets, qualities that are likely to make the damage extensive and
delivering aid extraordinarily difficult."); Schmitt, supra note 2 (quoting U.S. Defense Secretary Robert
Gates as saying that helicopters were the only way to get assistance to many parts of the Irrawaddy
Delta that had been cut off by the storm).
10. See Mydans & Cooper, supra note 2 (quoting the U.S. head of UNICEF as saying "Our
biggest fear is that the aftermath could be more lethal than the storm itself."); Newman, supra note 6
("Aid officials and health experts warned that the slow response could lead to outbreaks of diseases like
cholera and malaria, adding substantially to the death toll. And a prolonged delay could spread
malnutrition and starvation across the vast area affected."); Warren Hoge & Seth Mydans, U.N. Leader
Tells Mlyanmar's Regime There's 'No More Time to Lose', N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at A6 (quoting
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, who said "'We are at a critical point .... Unless more aid gets
into the country very quickly, we face an outbreak of infectious diseases that could dwarf today's
crisis."'); Helene Cooper & Thom Shanker, U.S. Frustratedby Myanmar MilitaryJunta's Limits on Aid
in Wake of Cyclone, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2008, at A5; Seth Mydans, Donors Press Myanmar to Let
Aid Workers In, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at A6.
11. Groups outside Myanmar were quick to point out that the military junta was ill-prepared to
respond effectively to the crisis and would need international assistance. See Tropical Cyclone Kills
More Than 350 in Myanmar, supra note 2. See also Newman, supranote 6 (noting that Myanmar was
ill equipped to respond to a public health crisis and that the country's public health infrastructure was
crumbling); Myanmar Government Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra
note 2 (noting concerns by the British ambassador to the United Nations that Myanmar government did
not have the capacity to distribute aid to the more than 1.5 million people in need).
12. Residents of Yangon complained shortly after the cyclone struck that the military was doing
little to help victims of the storm. See TropicalCyclone Kills More Than 350 in Myanmar, supranote 2
("Some in Yangon, formerly Rangoon, complained that the 400,000-member military was doing little to
help victims after the storm ....
); Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll Hits Thousands, supra
note 2 (noting that some Burmese were complaining that the military had been slow to respond to the
emergency). By May 8, 2008, the Myanmar government had committed to using 7 helicopters and 80
ships for relief work, a number described by the World Food Program as "a very small number
considering the enormous logistical needs." See Mydans, supra note 7.
13. See Tropical Cyclone Kills More Than 350 in Myanmar, supra note 2 (noting that the
government intended to go forward with the referendum despite the cyclone); Newman, supra note 5
(noting that the government had decided to postpone the referendum in parts of the Irrawaddy Delta
affected by the cyclone but would continue with it in the rest of the country); Seth Mydans, Myanmar
Seizes U.N. Foodfor Cyclone Victims and Blocks ForeignExperts, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at A1O
("The junta's plan to go ahead with the vote while restricting aid deliveries drew widespread criticism
and concern that soldiers who could be rescuing survivors were likely to be sent to polling places
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that the cyclone would strike Myanmar and could cause considerable loss of life
but had refused to warn the population in advance. 14
The international community rushed to provide substantial humanitarian aid
to the government of Myanmar." However, the military junta rejected some of the
aid offered by countries it viewed as hostile, including aid offered by the United
States, France, and Great Britain. 16 It also strictly controlled how much aid was
admitted 17 and how that aid was distributed. " The government particularly
objected to the admission of international experts to assist in assessing the crisis
and distributing the aid. Many aid workers were simply denied visas to enter the

instead.").
14. See Mydans, Myanmar Reels as Cyclone Toll Hits Thousands, supra note 2 (noting that both
citizens of Yangon and U.S. First Lady Laura Bush complained that the Myanmar government failed to
warn people in advance so that they could prepare).
15. By 7 May 2007, the international community and aid organizations were already mobilizing
for a major relief operation and some international aid was already beginning to reach Myanmar. See
Mydans & Cooper,supra note 2. By 26 May 2008, donors had pledged more than $150 million in aid.
See Mydans, supranote 10.
16. The United States offered to use Navy warships and aircraft to deliver aid and locate the
missing but this was rejected. See Mydans & Cooper, supra note 2. By 8 May 2008, French, British,
and Indian naval vessels were in position to provide aid, but this too was rejected. See Mydans,
Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supra note 7; Newman, supra note 5; Seth
Mydans, U.N. Leader Aims to Get More Aid in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2008, at A14. On 8
May 2008, a Thai-brokered deal to allow an American C-130 to deliver aid fell apart, apparently over
suspicion of the United States' motives. See Newman, supra note 5. By 13 May 2008, the U.S. had a
dozen transport helicopters in position to assist, with another dozen set to arrive in 24 hours. Hoge &
Mydans, supra note 10. The government eventually allowed some U.S. planes carrying relief supplies
to land but refused U.S. offers to send search and rescue teams and disaster relief experts. Myanmar
Government Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2. The Myanmar
government also apparently rejected offers of search and rescue teams from a number of other
countries. Id.
17. See Mydans, Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supranote 7 ("As hungry,
shivering survivors waited among the dead for help after a huge cyclone in Myanmar, aid agencies and
diplomats said Wednesday that the delivery of relief supplies was being slowed by the reluctance of the
country's secretive military leaders to allow an influx of outsiders."). Id. ("[T]he Myanmar government
has let in little aid and has restricted movement in the delta, aid agencies say. It has not granted visas to
aid workers, even though supplies are being marshaled in nearby countries like Thailand."). See also
Myanmar Government Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2 ("Ten
days after the devastating cyclone struck, the isolationist military government has slightly eased its
restrictions on aid but is still blocking most large-scale deliveries of relief supplies, aid officials said.").
18. On 8 May 2008, the World Food Program reported that a shipment of high energy biscuits had
been delayed for a day because the Myanmar government had initially insisted that it control the
distribution of the aid. See Mydans, Myanmar FacesPressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supranote 7.
See also Aid Groups Say Some Myanmar FoodAid is Stolen or Diverted by the Military, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2008, at A12 ("The fate of the [relief] supplies after [they arrived in Myanmar], however,
remained unknown, because the junta has barred all foreigners, including credentialed diplomats and
aid workers, from accompanying any donated aid, tracking its distribution or following up on its
delivery."); Cooper & Shanker, supra note 10 (noting that four of the six plane-loads of supplies that
arrived on 16 May 2008 went to the Myanmar military and only two went directly to nongovernmental
organizations for distribution); Mydans, supra note 10 ("Until now, the military has mostly insisted that
all aid go through its hands and has even confiscated supplies from residents who tried to distribute

it.").
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country. 19 Moreover, for the first three weeks, all foreigners, including those aid
workers that had been admitted to the country, were prohibited from entering the
Irrawaddy Delta. 20 At one point, the government seized all of the food, aid, and
equipment brought into the country by the World Food Program. 21 The regime
also tried to control aid efforts by private individuals and domestic organizations,22
and there were allegations that the junta was diverting aid from those in need to its
own supporters.23

19. As early as 7 May 2008, United Nations disaster assessment officials were waiting for visas to
enter Myanmar and the government was refusing to allow entry to a team from the United States
Agency for International Development. See Mydans & Cooper, supra note 2. By 8 May 2008 there
were between 50 and 100 United Nations aid workers waiting for visas to enter the country. See
Mydans, Myanmar FacesPressure to Allow MajorAid Effort, supranote 7. See Newman, supranote 5
("Since the cyclone hit, aid officials said, Myanmar's military rulers have granted visas for aid workers
only grudgingly and have placed restrictions on supplies coming into the country . . . ."). Id. ("The
Myanmar government said Friday that it was willing to receive relief supplies but not foreign relief
workers and that it had turned back an aircraft that arrived Thursday carrying a search-and-rescue team.
. . ."). See When Burmese Offer a Hand, Rulers Slap It, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2008, at Al (noting that
many aid agencies were still waiting for visas for their staff). By 14 May 2008, the United Nations had
received visas for less than half of the more than 100 staff who had applied. See Myanmar Government
Still Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2. On 15 May 2008, the military
junta re-iterated its position that it was in control of relief operations and did not need foreign experts to
Thailand's prime minister. Aid Groups Say Some Myanmar Food Aid Is Stolen or Diverted by the
Military, supra note 18.
20. See InternationalPressure on Myanmar JuntaIs Building, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A8;
Seth Mydans, U.N. Chief Says Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/24/world/asia/24myanmar.html? r-l&scp=1&sq=U.N.%20Chieo2
OSays%20Myanmar/o2OYields%20ono2oAid%2oWorkers&st-cse.
Foreign aid workers were first
allowed into the devastated areas on 27 May 2008. See Seth Mydans, A Few Aid Workers Reach Into
Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2008, at A7.
21. Mydans, supra note 13. At the same time, other aid agencies like UNICEF, the International
Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders reported being able to deliver aid. Id.
22. See When Burmese Offer a Hand, Rulers Slap It, supra note 19; Weeks After Cyclone in
Myanmar, Even Farmers Wait for Food, supra note 6 (noting that the police operated checkpoints,
turned away foreigners without government-approved permits, and warned Burmese who passed
through the checkpoints not to distribute aid).
23. See When Burmese Offer a Hand,Rulers Slap It, supra note 19 (reporting allegations that: (1)
local military officials had received good rice from the United Nations but kept it for themselves and
distributed rotten rice to the cyclone survivors; and (2) that the military had taken relief supplies
donated by other countries and then sold it to those in need for a profit); Myanmar Government Still
Blocking Large-Scale Relief Death Toll Rises Again, supra note 2 (noting that the United Nations and
the United Kingdom were concerned that aid was being diverted to people who did not need it); Aid
Groups Say Some Myanmar Food Aid Is Stolen or Diverted by the Military, supra note 18 ("The
directors of several relief organizations in Myanmar said Wednesday that some of the international aid
arriving into the country for the victims of Cyclone Nargis was being stolen, diverted or warehoused by
the country's army."). See also Amnesty Int'l, Myanmar Briefing: Human Rights Concerns a Month
After Cyclone Nargis, Al Index ASA 16/013/2008, June 5, 2008, at 7-9, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA16/013/2008/en.
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The United Nations repeatedly criticized the slow pace of the relief effort, 24
amid concerns that large numbers of people who had survived the initial storm
surge were dying because they had not received aid.25 On May 11, the
spokesperson for the World Food Program stated that the government was only
allowing in 10 percent of the needed aid.26 Three weeks after Cyclone Nargis, aid
was still only reaching 25 percent of the 2.4 million victims of the storm. 27 For its
part, the Myanmar government insisted that things were quickly returning to
normal and that it had the situation under control.28 Senior British and U.S.
officials criticized the response of the junta as "inhuman" and "criminal neglect."29
On May 20, 2008, there was a small breakthrough, as the Myanmar
government agreed to allow greater amounts of aid from fellow ASEAN
countries.30 This was followed on May 24, 2008 by a deal brokered by U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to allow aid workers of any nationality to enter

24. The United Nations official in charge of the relief effort said that "'The situation is profoundly
worrying . . . . They have simply not facilitated access in the way we have a right to expect."' See
Newman, supranote 5. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said that the effect of the government's failure
to allow aid could be "truly catastrophic." Mydans, supra note 13. On May 13, 2008, the SecretaryGeneral expressed "deep concern and immense frustration" with the government's "unacceptably slow
response" to the crisis. Hoge & Mydans, supranote 10.
25. See Newman, supra note 5 ("Aid officials and health experts warned that the slow response
could lead to outbreaks of diseases like cholera and malaria, adding substantially to the death toll. And
a prolonged delay could spread malnutrition and starvation across the vast area affected."). Id. ("'It's a
race for time, a race to save lives,' said Henrietta H. Fore, administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development"). See Mydans, supra note 13 ("[T]he refusal of the country's iron-fisted
rulers to allow doctors and disaster relief experts to enter in large numbers contributed to the growing
concern that starvation and epidemic diseases could end up killing people on the same scale as [Cyclone
Nargis]."). See Hoge & Mydans, supra note 10 ("By keeping most foreign assistance out . . . the
generals must be ready to accept the deaths of hundreds of thousands more people, according to foreign
relief officials. At the moment, that is the choice it appears to be making.").
26. See When Burmese Offer a Hand, Rulers Slap It, supra note 19. A few days later, the World
Food Program indicated that it was only being allowed to ship in 20% of the food it needed to distribute
to keep up with the most urgent needs. See Hoge & Mydans, supranote 10.
27. See Mydans, U.N. ChiefSays Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, supranote 20; Mydans, supra
note 10.
28. See Newman, supra note 5. On 24 May 24, 2008, even though only 25% of the victims had
received assistance, the Myanmar government declared that "the emergency phase" of the crisis was
over and that the government would now focus on reconstruction. Mydans, U.N. Chief Says Myanmar
Yields on Aid Workers, supra note 20. The international community generally rejected the contention
that the emergency phase of the crisis was over. See Weeks After Cyclone in Myanmar, Even Farmers
Wait for Food, supra note 6. In response to criticism of its response to the cyclone, the Myanmar
government claimed that it had promptly delivered relief to all of the storm's victims. See Schmitt,
supranote 2.
29. The British Prime Minister described the crisis as a "man-made catastrophe [caused] by the
negligence, the neglect and the inhuman treatment of the Burmese people . . . " by the Myanmar
government. InternationalPressure on Myanmar Junta Is Building, supra note 20. U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates accused the Myanmar government of "criminal neglect" for blocking
international aid, although he ruled out any humanitarian intervention that did not have Security
Council approval. See Schmitt, supra note 2.
30. See Seth Mydans & Alan Cowell, Myanmar to Widen Neighbors'AidRole, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2008, at A10.
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the country.31 A few days later, the government eased some of the restrictions on
foreign aid workers and allowed more aid to flow into the devastated regions.32
Despite the loosening of some restrictions, aid agencies continued to report that the
government was making it difficult to coordinate and deliver aid.33 At the same
time, the government began evicting people from camps and shelters and sending
them back to their home villages, even if their homes no longer existed. 34
Tensions continued between aid workers and the Myanmar government over the
aid effort well into June.
During the crisis, Bernard Kouchner, the French Foreign Minister, famously
recommended that the international community deliver the waiting humanitarian
aid over the objections of the Myanmar government: "We are seeing at the United
Nations if we can't implement the responsibility to protect, given that food, boats
and relief teams are there, and obtain a United Nations resolution which authorizes
the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government."36 Kouchner also
suggested that the ruling junta could be guilty of crimes against humanity for
restricting the supply of aid.37 Several other senior European officials made
similar statements.38 There are also indications that the United States and some
European nations considered requesting a Security Council resolution that would
31. See Mydans, U.N. ChiefSays Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, supranote 20. Announcement
of the deal was met with cautious optimism by aid agencies. Id.
32. See Mydans, A Few Aid Workers Reach Into Myanmar, supra note 20 (noting that the
government was allowing some foreign aid workers to visit areas devastated by the cyclone).
33. Seth Mydans, Myanmar Rulers Still Impede Access, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at A8; See also
Myanmar Junta Begins Evicting Cyclone Victims From Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A5
(noting that aid groups were still being required to apply for special travel permits to enter the delta).
34. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 3-6 (noting that Amnesty International had identified
more than 30 instances of the forcible displacement of cyclone survivors but that "anecdotal evidence
from numerous sources strongly suggests a much higher number"); Monks Succeed in Cyclone Reliefas
Junta Falters,N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/3 1/world/asia/
31myanmar.html; see also Mydans, supra note 34; Myanmar Junta Begins Evicting Cyclone Victims
From Shelters,supra note 33.
35. See Burmese Endure in Spite of Junta, Aid Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, at Al
(noting that many people were still not receiving adequate aid and that the government had recently
issued a directive effectively requiring all foreign aid workers to be accompanied by government
officials).
36. See Mydans, Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort, supra note 7. The United
Nations was not particularly supportive of the idea. Id Bernard Kouchner had been a proponent of the
concept of humanitarian intervention, which had preceded the responsibility to protect doctrine. See
Gareth Evans, From HumanitarianIntervention to the Responsibility to Protect,24 WIs. INT'L L.J. 703,
706 (2006).
37. See Mydans & Cowell, supranote 30.
38. At least one French ambassador warned that the Myanmar government's refusal to allow aid
might lead "to a true crime against humanity." InternationalPressure on Myanmar Junta is Building,
supra note 20. Javier Solana, the foreign policy chief for the European Union, echoed Kouchner's
words about invoking the responsibility to protect: "'We have to use all the means to help those people.
. . . The United Nations charter opens some avenues if things cannot be resolved in order to get
humanitarian aid to arrive."' Myanmar Government Still Blocking Relief supra note 2. The British
Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, took the position that the responsibility to protect could apply to the
situation in Myanmar. The UN and HumanitarianIntervention: To Protect Sovereignty, or to Protect
Lives?, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2008, at 50.
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authorize the delivery of humanitarian aid without the consent of the Myanmar
government. This plan was apparently dropped when it became clear that China
would veto any such resolution.39
Kouchner's comments led to a vigorous debate about whether the
responsibility to protect 40 could properly be invoked in response to the
humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. 41 Some commentators have suggested that the
responsibility to protect doctrine should have been applied,42 while others have
argued that it would have been inappropriate.
In order to determine if the
39. Cooper & Shankar, supra note 10; Jonathan Marcus, World Wrestles with Burma Aid Issue,
BBC NEWS, May 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7392662.stm. See also Mydans &
Cowell, supranote 30 (noting that Chinese officials had stressed that Myanmar was a sovereign country
and that the admission of aid would depend on the consent of the government).
40. The responsibility to protect doctrine is described in more detail below in Section III. It is a
relatively recent development in international law and posits that states have an obligation to prevent
certain crimes from occurring on their territory. If a state is unable or unwilling to prevent these crimes,
then the international community may intervene to prevent them. Intervention is not mandatory and is
still dependent on the political will of the international community and the acquiescence of permanent
members of the Security Council, but the international community now generally accepts that some
form of intervention is legitimate in response to particularly egregious international crimes.
41. See Ramesh Thakur, Should the UN Invoke the 'Responsibilityto Protect'?,GLOBE AND MAIL
(Canada), May 8, 2008, at A21; Lloyd Axworthy & Allan Rock, Responsibility to Protect? Yes, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Canada), May 9, 2008, at A22; Marcus, supra note 39; Gareth Evans, Facing Up to Our
Responsibilities, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 12, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfre
e/2008/may/ 12/facinguptoourresponsbilities; Fred Hiatt, In Burma, a U.N. Promise Not Kept, WASH.
POST, May 12, 2008, at A19; Lloyd Axworthy, International Community has a Responsibility to
Protect Myanmar, EDMONTON J., May 13, 2008, http://www.canada.com/edmontonjoumal/
news/opinion/story.html?id=6056af9d-43eb-4575-81b3-9235750e3214; Ivo Daalder & Paul Stares, The
UN's Responsibility to Protect, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/05/13/opinion/13iht-edaalder.1.12841976.html; Maggie Farley, The World: How to Help
When Help is Refused?, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at 9; Robert D. Kaplan, Aid at the Point of a Gun,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A23; Editorial, Shame on the Junta, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A22;
The UN and HumanitarianIntervention: To Protect Sovereignty, or to Protect Lives?, supra note 38;
Chris Beyrer & Jared Genser, Op-Ed., Burma's Next Wave of Dying, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial opinion/oped/articles/2008/05/21/burmas next wave of
dying/; Tyra R. Saechao & Sujeet B. Rao, Op-Ed., Aid for Myanmar: Strategies for International
Relief WASH. TIMES, May 30, 2008, at A21; David Rieff, HumanitarianVanities, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2008, at MM13; W. Andy Knight & Vasselin Popovski, Putting People Ahead of Protocol,EDMONTON
J., June 4, 2008, http://www.canada.com/edmontonjoumal/news/ideas/story.html?id=0f41843-446d4fce-b650-b3c904487a93; Madeleine K. Albright, The End of Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2008,
at A23.
42. See Evans, supra note 41 (noting that "[i]f what the generals are now doing, in effectively
denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death, can itself be
characterised as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does indeed kick
in"); Lloyd Axworthy, supra note 41 (arguing that the responsibility to protect does apply to natural
disasters); Daalder & Stares, supranote 41; Shame on the Junta, supranote 41; Beyrer & Genser, supra
note 41; Knight & Popovski, supranote 41.
43. See Thakur, supra note 41; Saechao & Rao, supra note 41. The Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect also produced a report that concluded that "there is no prima facie case for
arguing that the regime's failure to provide full access to humanitarian organizations in the wake of
Cyclone Nargis triggers the Responsibility to Protect principle." ASIA-PACIFIC CENTRE FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, CYCLONE NARGIS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
MYANMAR/BuRMA BRIEFING No. 2, at 8 (2008), available at http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents
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responsibility to protect doctrine applied to Cyclone Nargis, it first must be
determined whether or not the situation in Myanmar constituted a crime against
humanity. While the situation in Myanmar did not fit easily into the confines of a
traditional crime against humanity, it more closely resembles that than a war crime,
genocide, or ethnic cleansing."
If the situation in Myanmar was a crime against humanity, then the
responsibility to protect would be applicable. First and foremost, this would
impose a burden on Myanmar to take all necessary action to ameliorate the
situation. If Myanmar was unable or unwilling to take the appropriate action, it
would impose a burden on the international community to take steps to protect the
civilian population of Myanmar. While the responsibility to protect doctrine
emphasizes the need to use peaceful means first, it also commits the international
community to taking "timely and decisive" action through the Security Council, if
necessary. 45 This could include a Security Council resolution that permitted the
delivery of humanitarian assistance by international forces on Myanmar's territory,
although coercive military action would generally be considered a last resort.
Thus, the question of whether crimes against humanity were occurring in
Myanmar was crucial to the argument that the responsibility to protect doctrine
could be invoked to override the government's resistance to the delivery of
humanitarian aid. It also gives rise to a second important issue. If crimes against
humanity were being committed, then it raises the possibility that some person or
group of persons could be held individually criminally liable for those crimes.
These are two very different kinds of responsibilities: (1) the obligations of states
(both Myanmar and the international community at large) to the civilian population
of Myanmar, and (2) the possible criminal liability of individuals for crimes
against humanity.
This article will first examine whether the situation in Myanmar could
reasonably have been described as a crime against humanity based on the
/Burma Brief2.pdf.
44. In October 2005, the heads of states present at the World Summit agreed that the responsibility
to protect applied to situations where genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing
were taking place. See infra notes 202-206. The situation in Myanmar was not a war crime because
there was no armed conflict taking place in the Irrawaddy Delta at the time. It was not genocide
because there was no evidence of a specific intent to destroy a particular racial, religious, national or
ethnical group in whole or in part. Nor is there evidence that the dead and dying were targeted because
of their membership in a protected group. Finally, it was not ethnic cleansing because there was no
evidence that the Myanmar government (or anyone else) was using force or intimidation to remove
people of a certain ethnic or religious group from the area affected by the cyclone. While there was
some evidence of forcible displacements by the Myanmar government beginning at the end of May,
those displacements did not seem to be motivated by the ethnicity or religion of the victims. See supra
note 35. Rather, the displacements seemed to be an effort to minimize the apparent scope of the crisis
by forcing people to leave shelters and government-run camps.
45. The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit specifically mentions the possibility of
acting through Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which gives the Security Council the power
to take coercive measures to ensure peace and security. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A.
Res. 60/1, 1 139, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document].
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information available to the international community in May 2008. It will examine
various legal theories that are suggested by the facts outlined above and apply the
jurisprudence of the existing international courts46 to determine whether there was
sufficient reason to believe that crimes against humanity were being committed to
justify invoking the responsibility to protect. It will then address the applicability
of the responsibility to protect doctrine and discuss what the international
community could and should have done in response to the Myanmar government's
refusal to admit aid. Finally, assuming there was reason to believe that crimes
against humanity were being committed, it will examine potential venues for any
investigations and trials.
II. WERE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN THE AFTERMATH OF
CYCLONE NARGIS?

Cyclone Nargis or its aftermath could be considered a crime against humanity
if: (1) one or more of the following acts - murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation or forcible transfer of populations, imprisonment, torture, rape and
sexual violence, persecutions, or other inhumane actS4 7 - was committed; (2) in
connection with a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population.48

46. Throughout this article, except where it is specified otherwise, the term international courts
will be used to refer to both fully international courts, including the International Criminal Court, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, and to hybrid international courts like the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
47. These crimes are usually referred to as either: (1) the enumerated crimes because these are the
crimes that are enumerated in the definition of crimes against humanity; or (2) the underlying acts
because these are the acts that underlie a finding that crimes against humanity have been committed.
The terms enumerated crimes and underlying acts will be used interchangeably in this article.
Most definitions of crimes against humanity adopt a fairly similar set of enumerated crimes. See Law
on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 5, NS/RKMI1004/006, Oct. 27,
2004 [hereinafter ECCC Law]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, Annex 1, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; The SecretaryGeneral, Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia, Annex 1, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone expands the rape component to also include sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence. Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2(g), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
The Rome Statute also contains slightly broader definitions of a number of these components. For
example, it includes forcible transfers in addition to deportations, presumably to cover situations where
the victims are not forced to cross an international boundary. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 7(d), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. It includes an
expanded prohibition on sexual violence quite similar to art. 2 of the SCSL Statute and also includes a
broader definition of persecution. Id. arts. 7(g)-(h). Finally, the Rome Statute includes two additional
physical acts, apartheid and the enforced disappearance of persons, which are not present in the statutes
of any of the other international tribunals. Id. arts. 7(i)-().
48. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7; SCSL Statute, supra note 47, art. 2; ICTR Statute,
supranote 47, art. 3; ECCC Law, supranote 47, art. 5. ICTY cases have also adopted this requirement.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, T 181 (Nov. 30, 2005). There are some
differences in how the various tribunals have addressed this element, and these differences will be
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Both elements must be present for a crime against humanity to exist. This section
will first address the necessary threshold for invoking the responsibility to protect.
Next, it will examine whether any of the underlying acts necessary for a crime
against humanity were present. Finally, it will address whether or not the cyclone
or its aftermath constituted a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population.49
A. The Thresholdfor Invoking the Responsibility to Protect
This article's determination of whether there was reason to believe that crimes
against humanity were being committed in Myanmar during and shortly after
Cyclone Nargis will be made based on the "facts" described above in Section I.
These facts are taken from contemporaneous newspaper reports and the statements
of various NGOs and United Nations agencies. The author's personal experience
in investigating and prosecuting violations of international criminal lawo suggests
that a formal criminal investigation would conclude that the facts are far more
complex and nuanced than is apparent from the sources cited above. Indeed,
nothing in this article should be interpreted as a finding that crimes against
humanity did, in fact, take place. Such a determination could only be made after a
trial that met all of the procedural safeguards required by international law.
Nevertheless, it is not necessary (or possible) at this juncture to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that crimes against humanity were committed in Myanmar. 1
The responsibility to protect doctrine does not require a conviction for crimes
against humanity before it can be invoked; 52 although it is not clear what level of
addressed below in Section II(C).
49. The enumerated crimes will be addressed first because whether or not there is an attack
depends on whether or not there is evidence of the widespread or systematic commission of crimes
similar to the enumerated crimes. See infra Section II(C)(1). Thus, the existence of the enumerated
crimes has a direct bearing on whether or not there is an attack.
50. The author spent several years working in the Office of the Co-Prosecutors at the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, where he investigated and prosecuted former
leaders of the Khmer Rouge for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in
Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.
51. The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard would be necessary to obtain a conviction against a
particular person on particular facts. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 66, para. 3; Internal Rules of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Rev. 4), Rule 87(1), Sep. 11, 2009 [hereinafter
ECCC Internal Rules]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rule
87(A), Apr. 12, 2002 [hereinafter SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence]; International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 87(A),
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 43 (July 24, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence];
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 87(A), U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/REV.1 (adopted on June 29, 1995, as amended on March 14, 2008) [hereinafter ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence].
52. To require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the doctrine could be invoked would
essentially neuter it. The whole point of the responsibility to protect doctrine is to allow "timely and
decisive" action in response to humanitarian crises. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra
note 45, 139. The threshold for action cannot be so high that the doctrine cannot be invoked in time to
save lives. See Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect": HumanitarianConcern and the
Lawfulness ofArmed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 711 (2007).
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evidence is required before the doctrine applies. One way to determine when the
responsibility to protect can be invoked is to look at international criminal
procedure. Since the responsibility to protect doctrine uses the commission of
international crimes as its trigger, it stands to reason that the standards used by
international courts to investigate and prosecute international crimes are relevant.
There are three commonly used thresholds that might be relevant: (1) the threshold
necessary to initiate a criminal investigation, (2) the threshold necessary to arrest a
suspect or place a suspect in pre-trial detention, and (3) the threshold necessary to
confirm an indictment.
All of the international courts use a system of increasing evidentiary
thresholds at each stage of the proceedings. Generally, the threshold necessary to
initiate an investigation is quite low. At the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), the decision to initiate an investigation is entirely at the discretion of the
prosecutor.53 At the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),
the Co-Prosecutors must have a "reason to believe" that crimes within the
jurisdiction of the court have been committed to initiate a judicial investigation,5 4
but the belief is subjective." The other international courts require either a
reasonable or a sufficient basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the
court have been committed.56
There is a higher standard applied to issuing arrest warrants and placing
suspects in pre-trial detention. At the International Criminal Court (ICC), the PreTrial Chamber can issue an arrest warrant and detain a person pending trial when
there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that the person has committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the court. 7

The SCSL uses a "reason to believe"

standard." The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will place a suspect in
provisional detention if there is a "reliable and consistent body of material which
tends to show" that the suspect committed a crime within the court's jurisdiction.59

53. The SCSL imposes no threshold on the initiation of an investigation. The Prosecutor is
responsible for the investigations and acts independently in fulfilling that responsibility. SCSL Statute,
supra note 47, art. 15(1). Consequently, the decision whether to open an investigation is apparently
entirely within the discretion of the Prosecutor. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A,
Judgment,
280-84 (Feb. 22, 2008) (holding that the Prosecutor had unfettered discretion to determine
who to investigate and charge).
54. ECCC Internal Rules, supranote 51, Rule 53(1).
55. The Co-Prosecutors can "decide, at their discretion," whether to accept or reject complaints.
Id. Rule 49(4). Furthermore the Co-Prosecutors may change their decision "at any time." Id. Rule
49(5).
56. At the ICC, the Prosecutor needs a "reasonable basis" to initiate an investigation. Rome
Statute, supra note 47, arts. 15(3)-(4), 53(1). Both the ICTY and the ICTR allow the Prosecutor to
initiate an investigation if there is a "sufficient basis." ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art. 18(1); ICTR
Statute, supra note 47, art. 17(1).
57. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 58(1).
58. SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, Rule 40 bis (B)(ii).
59. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, Rule 40 bis (B)(ii); ICTR Rules of
Evidence and Procedure, supranote 51, Rule No. 40 bis (B)(ii).
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The ECCC requires a "well founded reason to believe" that the charged person
committed the alleged crimes.60
The standard used to confirm an indictment and send a charged person to trial
is generally the second highest evidentiary standard used by a court, surpassed
only by the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard necessary for conviction. At the
ICC, the charges are subsequently confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber if there are
"substantial grounds to believe" that the person committed the specific crimes
charged. 6 1 At the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL, the prosecution must
demonstrate a primafacie case before the charged person is sent for trial.62 There
is no explicit standard for confirming an indictment at the ECCC, and the decision
is left to the discretion of the Co-Investigating Judges.63
The standard required to confirm an indictment is too high to trigger the
responsibility to protect doctrine. Generally, the confirmation of the indictment
comes after an extensive investigation of the facts and represents the best case the
prosecution can put forward at the close of its investigation. The time and effort
necessary to establish a primafacie case of crimes against humanity (or any of the
other crimes that can trigger the responsibility to protect) would simply be too
time-consuming 64 and difficult65 during a humanitarian crisis. The responsibility

60. ECCC Internal Rules, supranote 51, Rule 63(3)(a).
61. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 61(7).
62. At the ICTR and ICTY, the Prosecutor can issue an indictment if there is a prima facie case
that crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art.
17(4); ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 17(4). A judge of the Trial Chamber then reviews the
indictment to see whether it establishes a primafacie case before confirming the indictment. ICTY
Statute, supra note 47, at art. 19(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 47, at art. 18(1). A similar process is used
at the SCSL. SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, at Rule 47(E)(ii) (stating the
reviewing judge shall approve the indictment if "the allegations in the Prosecution's case summary
would, if proven, amount to" a crime within the jurisdiction of the court).
63. ECCC Internal Rule 67 merely states that the case must be dismissed if there is "not sufficient
evidence" against the charged person, but does not indicate a specific standard that the evidence must
meet. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 51, at Rule 67(3)(c). In the first indictment at the ECCC,
involving Kaing Guek Eav, alias 'Duch', the Co-Investigating Judges adopted the language of Internal
Rule 67 and concluded that there was "sufficient evidence" to send Duch for trial. Closing Order
Indicting Kaing Guek Eay, alias 'Duch,' Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (Public Redacted
Version), 130 (Aug. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Duch Closing Order]. Duch did not appeal his indictment.
Consequently, there was no review by the Pre-Trial Chamber to see if the evidence was sufficient.
However, it is likely that one or more of the other suspects, if they are indicted, will challenge the
sufficiency of the indictment. This might lead to the Pre-Trial Chamber setting an explicit standard by
which to evaluate the indictments. It is also possible that the Internal Rules could be amended to
incorporate a specific standard.
64. Investigations at international courts routinely take a year or more. For example, the first
formal investigation at the ECCC began on July 18, 2007. See Press Release, Extraordinary Chambers
in the Court of Cambodia, Statement of the Co-Prosecutors, (July 18, 2007). The first indictment was
confirmed almost one year later. See Duch Closing Order, supranote 63.
65. Generally, criminal investigations require extensive access to documents and witnesses. It is
highly unlikely that the international community will have access to the requisite witnesses during the
early phases of the humanitarian disaster. In the case of Cyclone Nargis, for example, one of the key
complaints of the international community was that international experts did not have adequate access
to the country to coordinate the relief effort. See supranotes 19-20. Access would probably have been
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to protect doctrine must be triggered quickly if it to be of any use, which means
that there is no time to conduct a full investigation.
On the other hand, the threshold necessary to simply open an investigation at
an international court may be too low. The SCSL and the ECCC have subjective
or discretionary standards for initiation of an investigation. 66 These are insufficient
to trigger the responsibility to protect because the doctrine would be too
inconsistently applied if it were based on a purely subjective evaluation. The
standards used at the ICC, ICTY and ICTR seem more appropriate because they
require some sort of objective ("reasonable" or "sufficient") basis. The standards
for issuing an arrest warrant or placing a suspect in pre-trial detention are also
appealing for the same reason. While there is some variation in the wording, each
international court applies an objective standard. The ICTY and ICTR require a
"reliable and consistent" body of evidence, while the ICC, the SCSL, and the
ECCC use some variation of a "reasonable belief' standard.67
Ultimately, the actual wording is probably immaterial. Whether one calls it a
"reasonable basis," "sufficient basis," "reason to believe," "reasonable grounds to
believe," or "well founded reason to believe" or requires a "reliable or consistent"
body of evidence, in practice, it is probably very difficult to find any meaningful
difference in how the different tests would be applied to the same facts. Thus, the
author proposes using a test that is an amalgam of the various tests used by the
ICC, ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ECCC to issue arrest warrants and place suspects in
pre-trial detention. Consequently, this article proposes that in order to trigger the
responsibility to protect, it is necessary to demonstrate an objectively reasonable
basis to believe that a crime against humanity has been committed. This
reasonable basis to believe will usually be based on a reliable and consistent body
of evidence.
The reporting described above in Section I is a reliable and consistent body of
evidence on many points. It comes from a variety of news sources, is internally
consistent, and is corroborated by the statements of aid organizations, human rights
organizations, and UN agencies. In short, this is exactly the sort of reliable and
consistent body of evidence that one would expect to be available in the immediate

even more limited if the international community had been seeking access for criminal investigators.
For example, investigators from the ICC have had difficulty getting access to Darfur to investigate
allegations of crimes being committed there. See International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells
Security Council Sudan's Government 'Not Cooperating' in Darfur Investigation, Massive Crimes
Continue, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2008/sc 9349.doc.htm; Alfred de Montesquiou, Sudan Announces it will Suspend Cooperation
with InternationalCriminal Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Mar. 18, 2007 (indicating that
Sudan would suspend all cooperation with the ICC in response to indictments issued against Sudanese
officials); Peter Quayle, Darfur - No Justice Without Peace?, TIMES (London), June 20, 2006, at 5
(indicating that, as of June 2006, no ICC investigator had been allowed into Sudan).
66. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment,
280-82 (Feb. 22, 2008)
(holding that the Prosecutor has unfettered discretion to determine who to investigate and change);
ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 51, at Rule 49(4) (explaining that Co-Prosecutors can "decide, at their
discretion," whether to accept or reject complaints).
67. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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aftermath of a humanitarian disaster and that one would expect the international
community to use as the basis for invoking the responsibility to protect. 68
B. The Existence of the Underlying Acts of a Crime Against Humanity
This section will discuss whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that
any of the enumerated crimes (sometimes also called the underlying acts) that form
the basis for a crime against humanity charge were committed in Myanmar in the
immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. With one notable exception,69 this section
will limit the inquiry to information that was available to the international
community within one month of the cyclone. This is being done for two reasons.
Firstly, by most accounts, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar, while still
severe, began to improve approximately one month after the cyclone, and secondly
the responsibility to protect must be invoked quickly for it to be meaningful. The
majority of the deaths probably occurred in the first month. Consequently, if the
responsibility to protect were not invoked until later, it would fail in its primary
objective - saving the lives of populations in danger. Accordingly, this section
will assume that a decision whether or not to invoke the responsibility to protect
would have been made during May 2008. Information that only became available
after that date might have exculpatory value in any eventual trials for alleged
crimes against humanity, but would not be relevant to whether the international
community could or should have invoked the responsibility to protect in the
immediate aftermath of the cyclone.
Not all of the enumerated acts that could constitute a crime against humanity
will be addressed below. The author has found no evidence to suggest that there
were widespread acts of enslavement, imprisonment, torture, or rape and sexual
violence. The discussion below will focus on the crimes of murder, extermination,
forcible transfer, persecution, and other inhumane acts. The issues of omission,
motive, and intent will be discussed first because of their importance to any
discussion of whether any of the underlying crimes were committed.
1. Intent and Motive
In order to commit a crime against humanity, the perpetrator must have the
intent to commit the underlying offense.70 Intent, of course, refers to the mental
state of the accused at the time the alleged crime was committed, but unless the
accused confesses or testifies, there is rarely any direct evidence of the accused's
mental state. For this reason, intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
68. See Joyner, supra note 52, at 713 n.73 (noting that the evidence necessary to invoke the
responsibility to protect could be "gleaned from independent human rights organizations, United
Nations observers, international media reports, eyewitness accounts of refugees, and national embassy
and diplomatic assessments").
69. See Burmese Endure in Spite ofJunta, Aid Workers Say, supranote 35.
70. Prosecutor v. Kordid & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 99 (Dec. 17, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, T 124 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid,
Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, T 37 (Nov. 29, 2002).
71. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 523 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting
that "in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number
of presumptions of fact"); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, T 387 (Sept. 1,
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Indeed, given that an accused can be convicted despite testifying that he or she did
not have the requisite intent, circumstantial evidence of intent can be more
convincing for the trier of fact than direct evidence of intent, presumably because it
is viewed as more objective than the accused's own testimony. Consequently, the
lack of "smoking gun" evidence of the intent to commit the underlying crimes
below does not mean that the requisite intent could not be established in a court.
Moreover, the concept of intent as used by most international courts does not
require proof of a deliberate purpose to commit the crimes. In many cases, courts
have held that an accused intended an act if he or she knew that the criminal
outcome was the probable result of an act or omission yet chose to commit the act
or omission anyway.72 This is similar to the common law concept of recklessness,
but has been held to constitute the requisite intent for prosecution of international
crimes. 71
Motive and intent are separate concepts and motive is generally irrelevant to
the question of criminal intent.74 Intent focuses on the question of what the
accused intended to do. Motive focuses on the question of why the accused did
something. 5 This distinction is important because the motive of the military junta,
whether it was to enrich itself, avoid scrutiny of its political system by outsiders,
hide the extent of the crisis from the world, or maintain its grip on power, is
irrelevant to the question of whether or not the junta intended the consequences of
its actions.
2. Crimes of Omission
The jurisprudence of the international courts demonstrates that crimes against
humanity can be caused either by acts of the accused or by omissions, if those
omissions are accompanied by the requisite criminal intent. For example, an
accused can be criminally liable for murder if he omits to act, while intending that
the omission will result in the death of the victim, and the victim dies as a result of

2004); International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes, General Introduction, 1 3, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part
II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes] ("Existence of intent and knowledge can be
inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.").
72. See cases cited infra notes 89-92.
73. Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 1561 (Jan. 14, 2000) ("The result is
intended when it is the actor's purpose, or the actor is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of
events.").
74. Kordi & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, at 1 99; Blaciki, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 1 124;
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 1 103 (June 12, 2002).
75. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment,
102 (Sept. 17, 2003) ("The
Appeals Chamber . . . recalls its case-law in the Jelisi6 case which, with regard to the specific intent
required for the crime of genocide, sets out 'the necessity to distinguish specific intent from motive.
The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal
economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive
does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.' It is the
Appeals Chamber's belief that this distinction between intent and motive must also be applied to the
other crimes laiddown in the Statute.") (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-A,
Judgment, T 49 (July 5, 200 1).
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the omission.76 This is a very important point because some of those who argued
that the responsibility to protect did not apply to the situation in Myanmar took the
position that the junta's acts of omission were materially different from the sort of
deliberate state-sponsored killings that allegedly should trigger the responsibility to
protect. However, legally, this is not the case. Killing by omission, so long as it
is accompanied by the requisite criminal intent, is just as much a crime against
humanity as killing by commission.
3. Possible Scenarios
There are a number of allegations that could be made based on the facts
described above in Section I that, at first glance, resemble the underlying crimes of
a crime against humanity. These include: (1) the government's allegedly
deliberate failure to warn the population of the Irrawaddy Delta of the approaching
cyclone deprived them of the ability to seek shelter and greatly increased the death
toll; (2) the government's refusal of offered aid, combined with strict limits on the
amount of aid that was allowed into the country, the refusal to provide visas to
international experts, and the insistence that the junta control the distribution of the
aid despite its demonstrated lack of capacity to do so greatly increased the number
of deaths and also created inhumane living conditions for many of the survivors;
(3) the junta's diversion of humanitarian aid that was intended for survivors
resulted in increased deaths and the creation of inhumane living conditions; and (4)
the forcible transfer of survivors out of government-run camps and back to their
villages resulted in additional deaths and the creation of inhumane living
conditions. Each of these possibilities will be explored below.
a. The Denial of Aid to Survivors
As described above in Section I, during the first three weeks of the crisis the
Myanmar government refused aid from some countries, strictly limited the amount
of aid entering the country, refused visa requests from experts in disaster
assessment and aid distribution and insisted that it control the distribution of the
aid.7' At the same time, it was alleged that the junta was ill-equipped and poorly

76. Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 556 (Jan. 17, 2005) ("In
the jurisprudence of both the Tribunal and the ICTR, murder has consistently been defined as the death
of the victim which results from an act or omission by the accused, committed with the intent either to
kill or to cause serious bodily harm with the reasonable knowledge that it would likely lead to death.");
Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1485 (Aug. 2, 2001); Blaikit, Case No. IT-9514-T, at 217; Prosecutor v. Kordid & (erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 236 (Feb. 26,
2001).
77. See Thakur, supra note 41 (suggesting that the responsibility to protect could be invoked to
"halt large-scale killings" but that it did not apply to deaths caused by a natural disaster); The UN and
HumanitarianIntervention: To ProtectSovereignty, or to Protect Lives?, supranote 38 (suggesting that
the responsibility to protect was "never intended to cope with the aftermath of natural disasters" and
distinguishing natural disasters from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic
cleansing); Saechao & Rao, supra note 41 (suggesting that a natural disaster cannot constitute a crime
against humanity).
78. This is not the first time that a country has refused aid to its own people for political reasons.
See Tyra Ruth Saechao, Note, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to
Clarity, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 663, 687-90 (2007) (describing North Korea's control over and rejection
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prepared to mount an effective response on its own, and it was well-known that the
vast majority of the victims were not receiving any aid at all. This was all
happening, despite the availability of international aid, because the government
refused to allow that aid to enter the country in sufficient amounts. There was also
a widespread belief that the junta's intransigence was resulting in the deaths of
people who had survived the initial storm surge and could have been saved if aid
had been made available promptly. 79 This is probably the strongest argument that
the actions of the military junta constituted crimes against humanity. These deaths
would most likely be treated as murder, extermination, or other inhumane acts.
Murder will be addressed first.
L Murder
Murder as a crime against humanity requires three elements: (1) the death of a
person; (2) that was caused by an act or omission of the accused, or of a person or
persons for whose acts or omissions the accused bears criminal responsibility; and
(3) the act was done, or the omission was made, by the accused, or a person or
persons for whose acts or omissions he/she bears criminal responsibility, with an
intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm or serious injury, in the reasonable
knowledge that such act or omission was likely to cause death. 0 There is no need
to produce a body so long as there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that the
victim is dead.
There seems to have been a widespread belief amongst diplomats and aid
agencies working on the crisis that people were dying in the Irrawaddy Delta
because of a lack of aid.82 The World Food Program initially indicated that it was
only being allowed to bring in 10 percent of the needed aid, and even after three
weeks the United Nations estimated that 75 percent of the survivors had received
no aid at all.83 Surveys conducted after the cyclone indicated that nearly 60
percent of the houses in the Irrawaddy Delta had been destroyed, that 60 percent of
the population did not have access to clean water, and that more than half of the
households lost all their food stocks.84 It would have been reasonable at the time
to conclude from these facts that deaths were occurring that would not have
occurred if aid had been distributed. The author has not found any estimates of
how many people died because of a lack of aid, but it is probably not necessary to
know the exact number of deaths or even to have a reliable estimate of the deaths
at the stage of invoking the responsibility to protect.
On the other hand, at least one report from late June 2008 suggested that the
death toll from the lack of aid had not been as high as initially expected. 5 This
of international aid that was offered in response to a widespread famine that occurred during the 1990s).
79. UN Frustrated at Burma Response, BBC NEWS, May 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/asia-pacific /7397012.stm.
80. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 381 (Sept 1, 2004).
81. Id. at 383-85.
82. See supranote 25.
83. See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text.
84. See supranotes 4-6.
85. See Burmese Endure in Spite ofJunta, Aid Workers Say, supranote 35.
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would not affect the question of whether or not the responsibility to protect could
have been invoked during May because that decision would depend on the
information that was available in May, and there seemed to be reason to believe at
the time that large numbers of deaths were occurring. Nor would it affect whether
murder had occurred. A single death can be murder, and even the most optimistic
reports do not suggest that there were no deaths. It would, however, have a
bearing on whether or not extermination could have occurred.
The next element of a murder charge would be evidence that the deaths were
caused by an act or omission of the government of Myanmar. The deaths were
caused by the government if an act or omission of the government contributed
substantially to the deaths. 7 As noted above, there appear to have been deaths
occurring that were caused by the lack of aid. This lack of aid was the result of an
act or omission of the Myanmar government. The international community
recognized the severity of the crisis within days and aid was quickly mobilized.
In addition to aid, the international community was also willing to provide disaster
assessment experts, search and rescue teams, experts in aid distribution, and
transportation of the aid to the areas that most needed it.8 9 Nonetheless, there
appears to have been a conscious decision taken by the military junta to reject aid
from some countries and to impose strict limits on the amount of aid that entered
the country. 90 These restrictions prevented the majority of people from receiving
aid and therefore contributed substantially to some deaths. In short, there does
seem to be a credible body of evidence indicating that some of the deaths were
caused by an act or omission of the government.
The final element of murder as a crime against humanity is criminal intent. A
plausible argument can be made that the junta intended for the deaths to occur.
First of all, the required intent for murder as a crime against humanity
encompasses both direct intent and indirect intent. 91 Direct intent is a deliberate
purpose to kill someone. Indirect intent is similar to a recklessness standard.
Accused are found to have legally intended to kill someone if they were aware that
the death was a probable consequence of their acts or omissions, they act or omit to
act anyway, and the death does occur.92 To be intended, the death must be
86. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
87. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 382 (Sept. 1, 2004).
88. See supranote 15.
89. See supranotes 16-18 and accompanying text.
90. See supranotes 18-23 and accompanying text.
91. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, 1 235 (Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor
v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgment, T 270 (July 17, 2008). Indirect intent is also sometimes
referred to by the Latin name dolus eventualis.
92. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 386 (referring to indirect intent as dolus eventualis). In
the Stakit case, the Trial Chamber described indirect intent as "if the actor engages in life-endangering
behaviour, his killing becomes intentional if he 'reconciles himself' or 'makes peace' with the
likelihood of death." Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, T 587 (July 31, 2003). The
court went on to say that even conduct of minimal risk can qualify as intentional homicide if done with
manifest indifference to the value of human life. Id. However, other courts that have addressed the
standard appear to have taken the position that a minimal risk of death is insufficient and there must be
a probability of death before the act can be considered intentional. See Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T,
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probable, not simply possible.93 In this respect, indirect intent encompasses
recklessness but not negligence or gross negligence.94
The actions of the Myanmar government in response to Cyclone Nargis
appear to be an example of indirect intent. It was widely known that hundreds of
thousands of people were in need of assistance and that some of those people
would probably die if they did not receive aid. Given the level of international
media coverage, the government can hardly argue that it was unaware of the
situation in the Irrawaddy Delta. The aid was available, yet the government either
refused the aid or limited the amount of aid that it admitted, knowing that it was
probable that deaths would occur. This is sufficient to draw a conclusion that the
government intended to cause the deaths. The junta's motive for refusing the aid,
whether it was general paranoia, a desire to control the information available to the
rest of the world, or simply a desire to retain absolute power in Myanmar, is
irrelevant. 95 Consequently, in May 2008 there was a reliable and consistent body
of evidence that established a reasonable basis to believe that murder as a crime
against humanity was occurring in the Irrawaddy Delta.
ii Extermination
It is also possible that the junta's actions constituted extermination as a crime
against humanity. Extermination requires proof of two elements: (1) that an act or
omission resulted in the death of persons on a massive scale, and (2) the accused
intended to kill persons on a massive scale or to create conditions of life that lead
to the death of a large number of people. 96 Extermination is similar in many ways
to murder, except that it occurs on a massive scale,97 and it may be proved by
evidence that victims were intentionally subjected to conditions that contributed to
their deaths, such as the deprivation of food and medicine.98 Consequently, many
of the arguments made above with respect to murder also apply to the analysis of
extermination. For example, the intent element of extermination is the same as
that for murder and encompasses both direct and indirect intent. 99
The discussion of murder as a crime against humanity has already established
that there was reason to believe that people were dying as a result of the acts or
omissions of the Myanmar government and that those acts or omissions were
at T235-36.
93. See Strugar,Case No. IT-01-42-T, at
235-36.
94. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at 1 386; Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, at 1270; Staki5, Case
No. IT-97-24-T, at T 587.
95. See Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 1 99 (Dec. 17, 2004);
see also cases cited supranote 74.
96. Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 572 (Jan. 17, 2005);
Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 388. See also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 71, at art.
7(1)(b).
97. Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 388.
98. Id. at 1 389; see also Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 503 (Aug. 2,
2001); Rome Statute, supra note 47, at art. 7(2)(b) ("'Extermination' includes the intentional infliction
of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about
the destruction of part of a population.").
99. Staki5, Case No. IT-97-24-T, at 1 642; Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-T, at T 395.
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intentional. The only additional element necessary for there to be extermination is
that the deaths occurred on a massive scale. There is no minimum number of
victims needed to satisfy the "massive" requirement, and the applicability of
extermination must be based on a case-by-case analysis of all the relevant
factors. 100 Nevertheless, in the Brdanin Trial Judgment, the court concluded that
the deaths of at least 1,669 people was sufficiently massive to be considered
extermination. 101 If less than 2,000 deaths can be considered massive, then the
apparent scope of the deaths in Myanmar should probably be considered massive
as well. As noted above, the author has found no credible estimates of how many
people died due to a lack of aid in the weeks immediately following Cyclone
Nargis. However, the United Nations estimated that 2.4 million people were
severely affected by the cyclone. 102 75 percent of them had not received any aid
more than three weeks after the cyclone.1 0 3 At the time, these figures would have
provided reason to believe that deaths were occurring on a sufficiently massive
scale for those deaths to be considered extermination as a crime against humanity.
However, reports from June 2008 indicate that the death toll from the lack of
aid seemed to be lower than initially predicted. 104 This would not affect whether
the responsibility to protect could have been invoked in May because the
information was not available at that time, but it could impact any eventual judicial
determination of whether extermination did occur. The lower the actual number of
deaths, the less likely it is that extermination occurred.
ii InhumaneActs
This section will examine whether the government's decision to limit aid
resulted in starvation, lack of housing, and lack of medical care for the inhabitants
of the Irrawaddy Delta and, if so, whether it constituted an inhumane act. While
murder and extermination focus on killings, the category of "other inhumane acts"
is a residual category of crimes against humanity which criminalizes other acts of
similar gravity to those that are specifically enumerated in the definition of crimes
against humanity.1 05 Acts are considered inhumane if: (1) the victim suffered
serious bodily or mental harm or a serious attack on human dignity, (2) the
suffering was the result of an act or omission of the accused or someone for whom
the accused bears criminal responsibility, and (3) the accused or the person for
whom the accused bears criminal responsibility intended to inflict the suffering
upon the victim. 106 The severity of the act must be of "similar seriousness" to the
100. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 1 573; Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at 391;
Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, at 1 640; Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, 716
(Sept. 27, 2006).
101. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, at
465. The Brdanin Trial Judgment also noted that
extermination had been found in other cases when as few as 733 persons had died. Id. at 381 n.926.
102. See TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supranote 1, at 1.
103. See Mydans, supranote 10.
104. See Burmese Endure in Spite ofJunta, Aid Workers Say, supranote 35.
105. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 1 624; Prosecutor v. Kordid & erkez, Case No.
IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 117 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment,
152 (Dec. 5,2003).
106. Kordi6 & Oerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, at I 11; Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-
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enumerated crimes against humanity. 107 As with murder and extermination, intent
can be demonstrated by either direct or indirect intent.108
While there is a reasonable inference that people died as a result of the
Myanmar government's decision to limit the amount of aid, 109 it is virtually
undisputedo that approximately 75 percent of the 2.4 million people severely
affected by the cyclone received no aid at all during the first three weeks of the
crisis."
As noted above, approximately 60 percent of these survivors had no
housing, inadequate access to water, and no food. 112 In addition, the cyclone
damaged almost 75 percent of the health facilities in the Irrawaddy Delta, which
resulted in a "considerable decline in health service provision."1 3 More than 65%
of households reported health problems in the weeks after the cyclone, including
fevers and diarrhea.1 14 Consequently, there is a credible body of evidence that
suggests that a very large number of people suffered a lack of shelter, food, clean
water, and medical care.
Many of the people who received no aid would have received aid if the
government had not imposed limits on the amount of aid it accepted. The exact
number of people affected by the government's decision is difficult to estimate,
although news reports suggest that it was probably hundreds of thousands of
people."' Thus, the government's decision to refuse aid caused the additional
suffering 16 of those people who would have received help if not for its decision to
refuse aid. Moreover, the government was certainly aware from international
media reports that its actions would result in the cyclone survivors being left

32-A, Judgment, 165 (Feb. 25, 2004); see also Blagojevit & Jokie, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 626;
Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, at T 152; see also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 71, at art. 7(1)(k).
107. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-A, at T 165; Blagojevit & Jokit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 627.
108. See id. at 1 628 ("It is required that the perpetrator, at the time of the act or omission, had the
intention to inflict serious physical or mental suffering or to commit a serious attack on the human
dignity of the victim(s), or that the perpetrator knew that his act or omission was likely to cause such
suffering to, or amount to a serious attack on, the human dignity of the victim(s) and, with that
knowledge, acted or failed to act."). See also Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, at 1 154; Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, T 132 (Mar. 15, 2002); Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT95-9-T, Judgment, T 76 (Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment,
236 (Nov. 29, 2002).
109. See supra Section II(B)(3)(a)(i).
110. The Myanmar government did claim that everyone had received aid, see supra note 89, but
this appears to be untrue.
111. See supranote 27; Mydans, U.N. ChiefSays Myanmar Yields on Aid Workers, supranote 20.
112. See supranotes 4-6 and accompanying text.
113. THE TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, supranote 1, at 7-8.

114. Id. at 8.
115. See Cooper & Shanker, supranote 10 (noting that French naval vessels carrying 1,500 tons of
food were denied permission to offload their cargo); see also InternationalPressure on Myanmar Junta
is Building, supra, note 20 (noting that the French vessels held enough food to feed 100,000 people for
15 days); Schmitt, supra note 2 (noting that while 1.5 million pounds of supplies had been brought in
by U.S. planes, "much more" could be brought in from the waiting U.S. naval vessels).
116. Some amount of suffering would have been caused by the cyclone itself. The government
would only be liable for that additional suffering that was caused by the lack of aid. See supra Section
II(B)(3)(a)(iii) (explaining that inhumane acts require an act or omission).
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Consequently, the government

In effect, this makes out virtually all the elements of the crime of inhumane
acts: large numbers of people suffered as a result of the government's decision to
refuse aid, and this suffering was an intended result of the refusal of aid. The only
question that remains is whether the denial of food, water, housing, and medical
care constitutes a serious bodily or mental harm or a serious attack on human
dignity. The denial of food, water, housing, and medical care, when done in
conjunction with other acts like unlawful imprisonment, physical and
psychological abuse, or beatings, does constitute an inhumane act.117 It is less
clear whether the denial of these things, standing alone, constitutes an inhumane
act, although at least one case has appeared to hold that it does."
The key question is whether the lack of food, water, housing and medical care
subjected the survivors to severe mental or physical harm or a severe attack on
human dignity. This evaluation must be done on a case-by-case basis and with due
regard for the individual circumstances of the victims.H 9 This means that whether
or not the lack of aid was an inhumane act depends on the particular circumstances
of the crisis and of the victims. In the cyclone's aftermath, many of the survivors
lost family members and almost everything they owned. In addition, conditions in
many parts of the Irrawaddy Delta were terrible. Whole villages were destroyed.
Many areas remained underwater for long periods of time, and rotting and
decomposing bodies were a common sight. 12 0 The combination of the lack of aid
and the terrible conditions appear to have inflicted severe physical and mental
trauma on some survivors.12 1 This physical and mental suffering is the hallmark of

an inhumane act. Thus, there is reason to believe that the government's actions
117. Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 155 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment,
97, 773, 775 (Oct. 17, 2003); Blagojevi6 & Jokid, Case No.
IT-02-60-T, Judgment,
605-10 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Nikolid, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S,
Judgment, TT 36-37 (Dec. 2, 2003).
118. Blaiki6, Case No. IT-95-14-A, at 1 155 ("The Appeals Chamber considers that the acts
charged in the Indictment which encompass the detention of Bosnian Muslim civilians who were killed,
used as human shields, beaten, subjected to physical or psychological abuse and intimidation, inhumane
treatment, and deprived of adequate food and water, all rise to the level of gravity of the other crimes
enumerated in Article 5.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). While the decision on inhumane acts is
limited to a single paragraph, it does seem to hold that each of the acts described, including deprivation
of food and water, individually constitutes an inhumane act.
119. See Prosecutor v. Kordid & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, T 117 (Dec. 17,2004).
120. See supra note 7. See also Mydans, Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort,
supra note 7 ("Relief workers and survivors described scenes of horror as people huddled on spits of
dry ground surrounded by bodies and animal carcasses floating in the murky water or lodged in
mangrove trees."); In Flooded Delta, a Want as Pervasive as Death, supra note 6 ("In the village of
Day Da Nam . . . residents said the remains of 28 farmers killed by the storm were still floating in the
falling floodwaters."); Weeks After Cyclone in Myanmar, Even Farmers Wait for Food, supra note 6
("'Dead bodies floating down the Pyapon river are no longer strangers to us."').
121. See Monks Succeed in Cyclone Reliefas Junta Falters,supra note 34 (describing one woman
who lost the eight other members of her family and was contemplating suicide); id. (quoting a doctor as
saying, "'Our patients suffer from infected wounds, abdominal pains and vomiting. They also need
counseling for mental trauma, anxiety and depression."').
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constituted the crime of inhumane acts.
iv. Persecution
Persecution requires: (1) an act; (2) that discriminates in fact and denies or
infringes upon a fundamental right; and (3) that was carried out with the intent to
discriminate based on political, national, racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender,
or other impermissible grounds. 122 The underlying acts that can constitute
persecution must be of equal gravity to the enumerated acts of a crime against
humanity, 12 and thus include but are not limited to the enumerated acts. 124 This
means that the acts described above that constitute murder, extermination and
inhumane acts would also constitute persecution if they discriminated in fact and
were carried out with the requisite discriminatory intent. Discrimination occurs
when the victim is targeted because of his or her membership in a group defined by
the perpetrator on any of the discriminatory grounds. 125 The victim does not have
to be an actual member of the targeted group, so long as the perpetrator believes
the victim to be associated with the targeted group. 126 The culpable act must result
in actual discrimination against the victim. 127
The facts described above do not seem to constitute sufficient evidence of
persecution to invoke the responsibility to protect. There is no reliable and
consistent body of evidence that indicates that the decision to deny aid to survivors
living in the Irrawaddy Delta was based on the government's identification of them
as being members of a particular political, national, racial, ethnic, cultural, or
religious group. Rather, it appears that all of the survivors were mistreated in a
similar fashion. There may have been instances where supporters of the
government or members of political groups affiliated with the government received
aid in situations where those who were not affiliated with the government were
denied aid. 128 If this occurred, it could be persecution because access to aid would
be based on membership in a favored political group, and the denial of aid to
disfavored groups would result in discrimination in fact. However, there is not a
reliable and credible body of evidence indicating that this was occurring regularly
or systematically. Consequently, the government's actions do not appear to have
been persecutory.

122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Deronjid, Case No. IT-02-61-A, Judgment,
109 (July 20, 2005)
(describing the elements of a persecution charge). The list of groups that can be discriminated against
is taken from art. 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1)(h).
123. See, e.g., Kordit & cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 1 102.
124. Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, T 219 (Sept. 17, 2003); Prosecutor
v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 994 (Sept. 1, 2004).
125. See Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 583 (Jan. 17, 2005).
126. Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, 1 49 (Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, T 734 (July 31, 2003).
127. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, T 113 (Feb. 25, 2004); Blagojevi
& Jokit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at 1583 (Jan. 17, 2005).
128. This seems likely given the allegations of diversion of aid to supporters of the government.
See supra note 23. One possible consequence of the diversion of aid is that supporters of the military
government received preferential treatment over those who were not affiliated with the government.
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b. The Diversion of Aid
There is some evidence that aid intended for the survivors of the cyclone was
diverted by members of the military either for their own use or so that it could be
sold to victims for a profit, 129 and this may have resulted in increased deaths and
the creation of inhumane living conditions. This scenario is being treated
separately from the refusal of aid and the junta's strict control over how much aid
was imported and how it was distributed because it is not clear that the diversion of
aid was an official policy of the government. While there are some indications that
the diversion of aid happened systematically,130 there are also instances that appear
to have been initiated by local officials or military personnel.131
Diversion of aid probably constitutes the same underlying crimes discussed
above with regard to the junta's refusal of aid for the same reasons. The diversion
of aid in a situation where people are dying because of lack of food, water, shelter,
and medical care, could constitute murder as a crime against humanity if the
person diverting the aid knew that death was a probable outcome of the act. The
diversion of aid could also constitute an inhumane act if it caused severe mental or
physical suffering for the survivors who were denied aid as a result. It would be
difficult to argue that the diversion of aid constituted extermination unless it
happened on a massive scale. If it happened only sporadically, then it seems
unlikely that the resulting number of deaths would be massive. If, however,
diversion occurred systematically across the whole Irrawaddy Delta, then it begins
to look like extermination.
The issue of whether the diversion of aid was a systematic policy of the junta
has no bearing on whether the individual acts of diversion constitutes the
underlying acts of a crime against humanity. It does, however, impact on who
might be legally responsible and whether or not they would be tried. If the
diversion was not a systematic policy of the government, then the people who bear
the criminal responsibility for the resulting crimes might be mostly local officials.
It is unlikely that the international community would attempt to prosecute such
low-level people. 132 Moreover, for purposes of invoking the responsibility to
protect, if the occurrences of diversion are sporadic, then the "attack" may not be
widespread or systematic enough to warrant the conclusion that a crime against
humanity is underway. 133 Ultimately, the evidence indicates that some acts of
diversion probably did result in the commission of underlying crimes, but the

129. See supranote 23.
130. Aid Groups Say Myanmar Food Stolen by Military, supra note 18 ("The directors of several
relief organizations in Myanmar said Wednesday that some of the international aid arriving into the
country for the victims of Cyclone Nargis was being stolen, diverted or warehoused by the country's
army.").
131. When Burmese Offer a Hand,Rulers Slap It, supra note 19 (reporting allegations that local
military officials had received good rice from the United Nations but kept it for themselves and
distributed rotten rice to the cyclone survivors).
132. See infra notes 251-256 and accompanying text.
133. See infra Section II(C)(2) (discussing the requirement that the attack be widespread or
systematic).
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evidence seems too inconsistent and too sparse to warrant concluding that the
diversion of aid was a systematic policy of the Myanmar government.
Consequently, it is doubtful whether the responsibility to protect could have been
invoked solely in response to these acts.
c. The Forcible Eviction of Survivors from Aid Camps
Towards the end of May and into early June, the junta apparently began a
policy of forcibly transferring survivors out of government-run aid camps and back
to their villages, 13 4 which may have resulted in additional deaths and the creation
of inhumane living conditions for the victims. The forcible displacements began in
late May and coincided with the government's announcement that the rescue phase
of the response was over.135 The displacements affected thousands of people,
many of whom had nowhere to go. 136
The forcible transfer of persons from one location to another can constitute a
crime against humanity. Historically, the definition of crimes against humanity
has expressly prohibited only deportations,137 which require that the person be
forced to cross an international border.138 However, forcible transfers that occur
entirely within the borders of a country are also prohibited. For example, the
Rome Statute expressly includes forcible transfer in its list of enumerated crimes in
the definition of crimes against humanity. 139 Other courts, like the ICTY, have
used their jurisprudence to extend the definition of crimes against humanity to
include forcible transfers by treating them as a special form of "other inhumane
acts." 140
The crime of forcible transfer requires: (1) the forcible displacement of
persons; (2) from an area in which they are lawfully present; (3) without grounds
permitted under international law. 14 1 For the displacement to be forcible, it must
be involuntary, but it does not have to be the result of physical force.
Displacement is forced if it is the result of force, threats of force, coercion, fear of
violence, psychological oppression, or abuse of power. 142 The perpetrator must act

134. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. It appears that the evictions occurred too
frequently for them to be uncoordinated.
135. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 3; Monks Succeed in Cyclone Relief as Junta Falters,
supranote 34; Mydans, Myanmar Rules Still Impeding Access, supranote 2.
136. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 23, at 4-5; Mydans, supranote 33.
137. Most of the constituent documents of international criminal tribunals prior to the Rome Statute
explicitly prohibited deportations but not forcible transfers. See supra note 47.
138. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 544 (Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, T 122 (Oct. 17, 2003), Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24T, Judgment, T 672 (Jul. 31, 2003).
139. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1)(d).
140. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T 544; Staki, Case No. IT-97-24-T, 1 671; Prosecutor v.
Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 523 (Aug. 2, 2001).
141. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T 544; Simit, Case No. IT-95-9-T, T 122; Stakit, Case No. IT97-24-T, 1 672; see also Rome Statute, supranote 47, art. 7(2)(d) ("'Deportation or forcible transfer of
population' means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.").
142. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T 543; Simit, Case No. IT-95-9-T, T 125; Stakit, Case No. IT-
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with intent that the victims be removed and that they not return.143 There is no
minimum number of people who must be displaced.144
The forcible removal of people from government-run aid camps, schools and
monasteries in late May looks like a forcible transfer. Although the exact nature of
the coercion is rarely described in the reports, the circumstances leave little doubt
that the displacement was involuntary. There is no indication that the people were
in the Irrawaddy Delta unlawfully, and it appears that the justification offered by
the government - the need to switch from relief efforts to reconstruction - was a
sham. 145 Finally, the removals appear to have been done deliberately with the goal
of removing the persons from the places they had congregated and not allowing
them to return. In short, it appears that all of the elements of a forcible transfer as
a crime against humanity are present.
Moreover, the forcible transfers might serve as the acts that give rise to other
crimes, including murder and other inhumane acts. Assuming that the individuals
ordering the evictions knew that there was nowhere for the survivors to go once
they were evicted and that aid was not reaching the vast majority of the survivors,
they might be liable for any deaths from disease and starvation that resulted from
the evictions. They might also be liable for the severe mental or physical suffering
of the people who were evicted but had nowhere to go. On balance, there appears
to be reliable and consistent evidence that crimes resulted from the government's
policy of forcibly evicting cyclone survivors from aid camps.
However, the timing of the forcible transfers suggests that they would not
have been useful in invoking the responsibility to protect. Most of the forcible
transfers seem to have begun in late May and continued into June. However, by
this point, the amount of aid entering the country was increasing and the crisis was
becoming less severe. In other words, even if the forcible transfers could have
been used to invoke the responsibility to protect, they occurred after the worst of
the harm had already occurred. To be effective in its stated goal of saving lives,
the responsibility to protect would have to have been invoked earlier in the crisis.
d. The Failure to Warn
Allegations have been made that the Myanmar government knew that
Cyclone Nargis was going to hit the Irrawaddy Delta but failed to notify the
population. 146 If these allegations are true, the military junta might be criminally
97-24-T, 1 682; Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-T, T 529.
143. Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-T, 1545; Stakit, Case No. IT-97-24-T, TT 686-687.
144. Staki, Case No. IT-97-24-T, T 685.
145. The international community rejected the government's contention that the relief phase of the
crisis was complete. See supranote 28.
146. See supra note 14. However, there are several news articles in the days immediately before
the cyclone struck that suggest Myanmar was making some effort to warn its population. See Cyclone
Lashes Myanmar After Missing Bangladesh, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 1, 2008, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5glRRGj6eAYhPLa8JFCEfyDvzOPgA
("Myanmar's state-run
newspapers have run warnings about the impending storm."); Nargis Gets a Move, Readies for
Landfall, HINDu BUSINESS LINE, May 2, 2005, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/2008/05/02/stories/2008050250281100.htm (noting that Myanmar had "already set into motion a
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liable for some of the tens of thousands of deaths that were caused by the storm
surge. 147 Depending on the facts, these deaths could be described as murder and
extermination because some people that died as a result of the storm surge would
have lived if they had been warned in advance. These would be the deaths caused
by the failure to wam.
On closer examination, however, there does not seem to be much substance to
the allegation. To prove the requisite intent, it would be necessary to prove that
the government either directly intended the deaths or knew that the deaths were a
probable outcome of the decision not to warn the population. While it was
relatively easy, after the fact, to claim that the deaths were foreseeable and that the
failure to warn was a culpable omission, there does not seem to have been a
widespread awareness, prior to Cyclone Nargis' landfall, of how destructive it
would be. There are many news articles that mention Cyclone Nargis in the days
that lead up to May 2,148 but none of the ones the author was able to locate
suggested that the cyclone would cause a humanitarian crisis on the scale that it
did. 149
Given that the international community apparently did not recognize the
potential destructiveness of Cyclone Nargis in advance, it would be hard to argue
that the Myanmar government knew that its failure to warn would probably lead to
widespread deaths. Therefore, it does not appear that the requisite intent for the
crimes of murder or extermination existed. On balance, there is not a reasonable
basis to believe that the failure to warn the population constituted a crime against
humanity.

disaster preparedness drill" after having been notified about the impending storm).
147. Tyra Saechao has previously argued that there is an international obligation to wam about
impending natural disasters and that states might be legally responsible for a failure to warn. See
Saechao, supra note 78, at 681-85. This is similar to but conceptually different from the question of
whether or not there is individual criminal liability arising out of a failure to wam.
148. A LexisNexis search run by the author retrieved 33 news reports that mention Cyclone Nargis
on or before May 2, 2008. Some of them describe the storm as severe with high winds and rough seas,
but none of them suggest that it will result in a humanitarian catastrophe. For a fairly representative
selection of these articles, see Cyclone Lashes Myanmar After Missing Bangladesh,supra note 146;
Tropical Cyclone Nargis Gains in Strength on Way Toward Myanmar, BLOOMBERG, May 2, 2008,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=\aROBCBZCzWs&refer-asia#; Severe Cyclone Nargis Over Bay
Moves Eastwardsin Frequent Change of Course, U. NEWS OF BANGLADESH, May 2, 2008, available at
LexisNexis; Squally Winds Reach 73 Kmph, City Gears Up for Rain, HINDU (India), April 30, 2008,
available at http://www.thehindu.com/2008
/04/30/stories/2008043059530400.htn; B'desh Raises Storm Alert, Urges Swift Rice Harvest,REUTERS,
April 29, 2008, available at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DHA224084.htm.
149. Only a few articles describe indicate concern about the storm. See B'desh Raises Storm Alert,
Urges Swift Rice Harvest,supra note 148 (noting that the government of Bangladesh had issued a storm
warning and urged coastal residents to be ready for a quick evacuation); Bangladesh Prepares to Meet
Cyclone Nargis, INDo-ASiAN NEWS SERVICE, May 2, 2008, available at LexisNexis (noting that
Bangladesh had asked fishermen to return to port and had activated its disaster management facilities
and cyclone shelters); VOA News: Bangladesh's Farmers Told Not to Panic about Approaching
Cyclone, US FED NEWS, April 29, 2008, available at LexisNexis (warning that the storm could damage
Bangladesh's rice crop).
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e. Conclusion
This section examined four factual situations that could have constituted the
underlying crimes of a crime against humanity. Upon analysis, it appears that only
two of these situations could have given rise to a reasonable belief that the
underlying crimes of a crime against humanity were being committed. Moreover,
for one of these two situations - the forcible eviction of cyclone survivors from aid
camps - it appears that the relevant acts began occurring in late May. Thus, the
forcible transfers could not have been used to invoke the responsibility to protect
during the most critical period - the first three weeks of the crisis. Only the
government's refusal of aid, limitations on how much was allowed into the
country, and strict control over the distribution of aid is supported by credible
evidence that gives rise to a reasonable belief that the underlying criminal acts of a
crime against humanity, including murder, extermination and inhumane acts, were
occurring during the critical period.
However, this is not enough by itself to invoke the responsibility to protect or
to conclude that crimes against humanity were committed. To constitute a crime
against humanity, the underlying crimes must be committed in connection with a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population,15 0 and the perpetrator
must know the attack is taking place and that his acts are part of the attack. 151 The
following section will evaluate whether the government's refusal of aid, limitations
on aid, and control over the distribution of aid occurred in the context of an attack
on the civilian population of the Irrawaddy Delta. It will also look at whether the
architects of that policy knew an attack was taking place and that their acts or
omissions were part of the attack.
C. Did an Attack Take Place?
It is now generally agreed that the customary international law definition of
crimes against humanity requires that crimes against humanity take place in
connection with a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.
Initially, as the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict was disappearing from
the customary international law definition of crimes against humanity, there was
some uncertainty about what jurisdictional requirement would take its place. 15 2
Consequently, some of the statutes of the international tribunals that were
negotiated in the early 1990s include elements different from or in addition to an

150. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1); SCSL Statute, supranote 47, art. 2; ICTR Statute,
supranote 47, art. 3; ECCC Law, art. 5.
151. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 1 190 (Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Kordi6 & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 1 100 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 99 (Jun. 12, 2002).
152. See generally Stuart Ford, Crimes Against Humanity at the ExtraordinaryChambers in the
Courts of Cambodia: Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125
(2007) (describing the early development of crimes against humanity and the transition from requiring a
nexus with armed conflict to the modem requirement of a nexus with a widespread or systematic attack
on a civilian population).
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attack on a civilian population.1 53 For example, the ICTY Statute requires the
attack to be committed during an armed conflict, 154 but ICTY jurisprudence
acknowledges the customary requirement that the crimes take place as part of an
attack on a civilian population. 155 The ICTR and the ECCC both require that the
attack be "on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,"1 56 but this
discriminatory purpose is not part of the customary definition of the attack.15 7 The
Rome Statute, which was negotiated in 1998 and has now been ratified by 108
states,1 58 is generally accepted to state the customary international law definition of
the contextual requirement: 159
'crime against humanity' means any of the following [enumerated] acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population. 160
This attack requirement is often referred to as a jurisdictional or contextual
element because the existence of the attack is a prerequisite to charging crimes
against humanity, but the prosecution does not have to prove that the accused
caused the attack or intended the attack. The prosecution only needs to show that
the accused was aware of the facts that constituted the attack and knew that his or
her acts formed part of the attack. 16 1 The motive of the perpetrator is irrelevant1 62
and it is not necessary to show that the perpetrator approved of or desired the
attack. 163 Nor does the perpetrator need to know all the details of the attack. It is
sufficient if the perpetrator knows the attack is taking place. 164

153. See id. at 173-79 (describing the lingering uncertainty in the definition of crimes against
humanity and its affect on the drafting of the Rome Statute, the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute).
154. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 5.
155. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 181; Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, T 541 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, T 130 (Sept.
1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, 1 37 (Oct. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 621 (Jul. 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-9623 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, T 410 (Jun. 12, 2002).
156. See ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 3; ECCC Law, supra note 47, art. 5.
157. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
287-292 (Jul. 15, 1999)
(discussing the customary international law definition of crimes against humanity and concluding that it
does not require a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity and that a discriminatory intent
is only required for the underlying crime of persecution); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4A, Judgment,
464-466 (Jun. 1, 2001) (concluding that a discriminatory purpose is not a component
of the customary international law definition of all crimes against humanity).
158. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties
(last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
159. See Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the
Elements of CrimesAgainst Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 73, 140-42 (2004).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(1).
161. See supranote 148.
162. See supranote 73.
163. Prosecutor v. Kordid & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 1 99 (Dec. 17, 2004)
("'[T]he accused need not share the purpose or goal behind the attack."'); Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case
No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 124 (July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment,
103 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 1548 (Jan. 17,
2005); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, T 138 (Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v.
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1. The Meaning of Attack
An attack is generally defined by the ICC and the ICTR as an unlawful act or
series of acts of the kind enumerated in the definition of crimes against
humanity. 165 In other words, the jurisdictional prerequisite for charging crimes
against humanity is proof of a course of conduct that involves the commission of
the underlying acts that constitute crimes against humanity. It may seem circular
to require proof of the commission of the underlying acts in order to try someone
for commission of the underlying acts; but it is not because the attack has to be
widespread or systematic. Thus, to charge someone for one of the underlying acts
that constitute crimes against humanity, the prosecutor must show that the charged
acts took place as part of a widespread or systematic commission of similar acts.
The purpose of the "attack" requirement is to prevent single, random, or limited
acts from being categorized as crimes against humanity. 166 While the underlying
acts that can constitute the attack are often carried out through violence, the attack
does not have to be violent1 67 and may involve other inhumane mistreatment of the
civilian population. 168
The ICTY and the SCSL adopt a somewhat different approach but ultimately
arrive at a similar result. They have held that an attack is different from an armed
conflict and that, while an attack may take place during an armed conflict, it need
not be part of the armed conflict. 169 As a result, the attack "is not limited to the use
Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 148 (Dec. 5 2003).
164. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, at 1 102; Blagojevit & Joki5, Case No. IT-02-60-T, at
548; Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, 138; Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 148; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac,
Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 1 59; see also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 71, art. 7(2)
(noting that the Rome Statute "should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had
knowledge of all characteristics of the attack").
165. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 7(2) (describing an attack as a "course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 [of Article 7]"); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 581, (Sept. 2, 1998) ("The concept of 'attack' may be defined as a [sic]
unlawful act of the kind enumerated in Article 3(a) to (I) of the Statute, like murder, extermination,
enslavement, etc."); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 1 70 (Dec. 6, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment,
205 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 1 327 (May 15, 2003).
166. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1579; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,
194 (Nov. 30, 2005) ("It has been emphasised, repeatedly, that the contextual element required for the
application of Article 5 serves to exclude single, random or limited acts from the domain of crimes
against humanity."); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 1 215 (June 10, 2007)
("Proof that the attack occurred either on a widespread basis or in a systematic manner is sufficient to
exclude isolated or random acts."). See also Ford, supra note 152, at 157-58 (noting that the
International Law Commission debated removing the contextual requirements from the definition of
crimes against humanity during the 1950s but ultimately decided that some sort of contextual
requirement was necessary to prevent too many ordinary domestic crimes from being treated as crimes
against humanity).
167. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 581 (noting that apartheid is a crime against humanity and
imposing such a system can constitute an attack, even if done without violence); Rutaganda, Case No.
ICTR-96-3-T, 170; Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, 1205.
168. Senanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, 327.
169. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, T 86; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 1 182; Brima, Case No
SCSL-04-16-T, 1 214; Prosecutor v. Fofana & Konewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 111
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of armed force; it encompasses any mistreatment of the civilian population." 170 A
line of ICTY cases suggests that an attack is a "course of conduct involving the
commission of acts of violence,"171 but this line of cases implicitly accepts that the
attack can be broader than just violence because the decisions always note that the
attack is not limited to the use of armed force and also includes any mistreatment
of the civilian population. 172 Thus the ICTY and the SCSL agree that any
mistreatment of the civilian population can constitute an attack if it is widespread
or systematic.
The definition adopted by the ICTY and SCSL - any mistreatment of the
civilian population - is arguably broader than the definition used by the ICTR and
ICC because the concept of mistreatment might well cover acts that could not be
the underlying crimes. The broadest of the underlying crimes, other inhumane
acts, still requires severe mental or physical suffering or a serious attack on human
dignity. Mistreatment generally means "to treat badly," 173 which does not seem to
require severe suffering. Consequently, the definition of attack used by the SCSL
and the ICTY may be broader than that used by the ICTR and ICC. However, it
seems possible that if the ICTY or SCSL were forced to define mistreatment that
they would conclude that it involves the commission of other inhumane acts. 174
No matter which definition one uses, the denial of aid to the survivors of
Cyclone Nargis did constitute an attack. As noted above, in May 2008 there was
reason to believe that the government's actions in refusing aid, limiting the amount
of aid, and controlling how that aid was distributed constituted murder,

(Aug. 2, 2007).
170. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, 86; see also Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
Judgment, T 623 (July 31, 2003); Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 1 214; Fofana & Konewa, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T, 111.
171. Prosecutor v. Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 543 (Jan. 17, 2005);
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, T 182; Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 131
(Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, T 141 (Dec. 5, 2003).
172. Blagojevit & Jokit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, T 543; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 182; Brdanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, 1 131; Gali, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 1 141.
There are forms of mistreatment of the civilian population that do not necessarily involve violence, like
deprivation of food, water, shelter and medical care, which suggests there is an inherent inconsistency
between the statement that an attack involves acts of violence and the recognition that mistreatment of
the civilian population can also constitute an attack. The emphasis on violence appears to be a result of
the fact that the ICTY requires that crimes against humanity take place in connection with an armed
conflict. See ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art. 5. This requirement is unique to the ICTY and does not
form a part of the modem customary international law definition of crimes against humanity. See supra
notes 152-58 and accompanying text. The ICTY is thus in the odd position of requiring two
jurisdictional elements: an attack and an armed conflict. Consequently, all of the crimes against
humanity cases that have come before the ICTY have also involved an armed conflict. This appears to
have led to the line of cases that suggests that an attack involves acts of violence.
173. See Oxford American Dictionaryand Thesaurus 957 (2003).
174. For example, a Trial Chamber at the ICTR suggested that mistreatment might have to be
inhumane when it said that an attack "could also involve other forms of inhumane mistreatment of the
civilian population." Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 1 327 (May 15,
2003).
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extermination, and other inhumane acts. 7 These actions could constitute both a
course of conduct involving the commission of the underlying acts of a crime
against humanity and the mistreatment of the civilian population of the Irrawaddy
Delta.
2. Widespread and Systematic
The attack was probably both widespread and systematic. It was widespread
because it was large-scale and it affected a large number of people. 176 According
to a report prepared by the United Nations and the government of Myanmar, more
than 2.4 million people throughout the Irrawaddy Delta were severely affected by
the cyclone.17 7 75 percent of them did not receive any aid within the first three
weeks of the crisis.178
This means that approximately 1.8 million people
throughout the Irrawaddy Delta were victims of the attack. Given the information
that was available to the international community in May 2008, there was probably
sufficient information to conclude that there was a widespread attack. 17 9
The contextual element would also be present if the attack was systematic.
There is evidence that the attack was systematic because it consisted of an
organized pattern of non-accidental repetition of criminal conduct.18 0
The
underlying crimes - denial of food, water, shelter, and medical care - occurred
repeatedly throughout the Irrawaddy Delta and were the result of a deliberate
policy of denying aid to the victims. This policy emanated from the highest levels
of the Myanmar government and was systematically enforced by officials of that
government at all levels.
3. Directed Against a Civilian Population
There is little doubt that the attack was directed against a civilian
population."' Many crimes against humanity occur in the context of armed
conflicts, and the definition of civilian is geared towards distinguishing between
civilians and combatants during an armed conflict. In general, a civilian is any
person who is not taking an active part in hostilities, even including members of
the armed forces if they are hors de combat.18 2 In the case of Cyclone Nargis,
175. See supra Section II(B)(4).
176. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, T 94 (Dec. 17, 2004);
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 183; Blagojevid & Jokid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 545.
177. See supra note 2.
178. See supra note 27.
179. Courts have previously found that attacks on much smaller groups are widespread. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, I 1, 37, 61, 482 (Aug. 2, 2001) (concluding that
the attack on the Srebrenica safe area, which held approximately 40,000 Bosnian Muslims, was a
widespread and systematic attack).
180. Kordi & cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, T 94; Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-A,
Judgment, T 101 (July 29, 2004); Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, T 183.
181. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, T 185 ("The attack must be directed against a civilian
population."); Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No. IT-98-29-T, T 143 (Dec. 5, 2003).
182. Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, T 544 (Jan. 17, 2005)
("The term 'civilian' refers to persons not taking part in hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds detention or any
other cause.").
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there was no armed conflict going on in the Irrawaddy Delta and no suggestions
that there were any people who could be called combatants among the victims.
Consequently, there is little doubt that the victims should be considered almost
entirely civilians. The attack was directed against the civilian population of the
18
Irrawaddy Delta because the survivors were the primary object of the attack.s
As
noted above, the government committed the acts that constitute the attack knowing
that it was probable they would result in the commission of crimes and also
knowing that the victims would be almost entirely civilian. There seems to be
little doubt that the attack was directed against a civilian population.
4. Natural Disasters as Per Se Attacks
The author had originally intended to argue that Cyclone Nargis was a per se
attack on a civilian population, and that natural disasters that resulted in large scale
losses of life should always be "attacks" for purposes of determining whether a
crime against humanity had been committed. However, the author has concluded
that treating natural disasters as per se attacks is both unnecessary and bad policy.
As demonstrated above, the existing definition of crimes against humanity is
sufficient to cope with the consequences of Cyclone Nargis. Although the cyclone
itself is not treated as an attack, the consequences of the government's disastrous
policy of refusing aid can be considered an attack. Thus, crimes against humanity
extends to cover the suffering that the international community was most
concerned about - that which resulted from the government's refusal to allow aid
into the Irrawaddy Delta. Given that the existing understanding of crimes against
humanity is flexible enough to be applied to the consequences of a natural disaster,
there seems to be little need for a broader definition of an attack. If the traditional

definition of an attack had been incapable of accommodating the terrible manmade consequences of Cyclone Nargis, a much stronger argument could be made
that the definition should be expanded.
Moreover, it would be bad policy to extend the definition of attack to
encompass all natural disasters that result in large scale loss of life. By focusing
on a definition of attack that depends on the commission of a widespread or
systematic pattern of crimes, the existing definition ensures that crimes against
humanity will only be applied in situations of sufficient gravity. If every natural
disaster was an attack, then many ordinary and unrelated crimes that occurred in
conjunction with natural disasters would constitute crimes against humanity. This
would vitiate one of the main purposes of the jurisdictional element, which is to
prevent random, single, or isolated acts of violence from being treated as crimes
against humanity. 184 For these reasons, the author is convinced that the existing
definition of the attack is adequate and does not need to be expanded.

183. Blaikit, Case No. IT-95-14-A, T 106; Kordi & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, T 96;
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, 191 (June 12, 2002).
184. See supranote 164.
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5. The Junta's Awareness of the Attack
One final element of a crime against humanity is the perpetrator's knowledge.
The perpetrator must be aware that the attack is occurring and that his or her
criminal acts constitute a part of the attack. 85 In this case, at least for the leaders
of the military government of Myanmar, it seems almost certain that they knew
about the attack. The denial of aid resulted in a lots of news coverage and a huge
amount of political pressure on the government to admit aid. 18 6 It would be
difficult for the leaders of the Myanmar government to claim that they were
unaware of the crisis and its effect on the civilian population of the Irrawaddy
Delta. In addition, the alleged criminal acts that give rise to the underlying crimes
- the denial of aid - are the exact same acts that give rise to the attack, and it has
already been shown that the government must have been aware of the attack.
Consequently, the leaders must have been aware that their acts were part of the
attack.
6. Conclusion
The preceding sections have demonstrated that there was reason to believe
that all of the elements of a crime against humanity were present in Myanmar in
the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. There was a widespread and
systematic attack on a civilian population, and the Myanmar government was
aware of this attack. There is also reason to believe that crimes were being
committed, including murder, extermination, and inhumane acts. In short, there
was reason to believe that the Myanmar government's response to Cyclone Nargis
constituted a crime against humanity. But what should the international
community have done about it? Could it have invoked the responsibility to
protect? If so, what actions could or should have been taken to protect the
population of the Irrawaddy Delta?
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The responsibility to protect doctrine was initially developed by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in an
attempt to lay the foundation for an international consensus on the legality of
humanitarian interventions 1 7 at a time when the legality and legitimacy of such

185. See supranote 149.
186. See supra Section I.
187. See

INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION

ON INTERVENTION

AND

STATE SOVEREIGNTY,

THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1-2 (International Development Research Centre 2001), available at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Conmmission-Report.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT].

The ICISS was a response to a call by Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the international community to
reach agreement about how to balance state sovereignty against humanitarian concerns during so-called
"humanitarian interventions." Id. at 2. As the report notes, the international community was criticized
both when it did intervene (Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia) and when it did not intervene (Rwanda). Id.
at 1. The Secretary-General identified the need for common agreement on a set of principles that would
guide the international community in deciding when humanitarian intervention would be appropriate.
Id. at 1-3. Gareth Evans provides a useful overview of the development of the responsibility to protect
doctrine. See Evans, supranote 36, at 707-08.
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interventions was a very contentious issue.188 The ICISS's major innovation was
reframing the debate from one about the right of states to intervene, which was
controversial, to one about the obligation of states to protect their own citizens,
which enjoyed far broader acceptance. 189 Thus, the ICISS concluded that the
primary responsibility to protect populations lies with the concerned state. 190
However, where a population is "suffering serious harm" as a result of war,
insurgency, repression, or state failure, and the concerned state is "unwilling or
unable" to prevent that harm, the "principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect."1 91 Although the ICISS acknowledged that
military intervention to protect populations would be an "exceptional and
extraordinary measure," it nevertheless identified situations where such
intervention would be appropriate, including large-scale loss of life and large-scale
ethnic cleansing. 192 The ICISS stressed that intervention would be a last resort1 93
and that it "should" be authorized by the United Nations Security Council. 194
The ICISS equivocated on the key question of whether humanitarian
interventions would be legal in the absence of Security Council authorization. 195
This was a very important issue that had been highlighted by NATO intervention
in Kosovo in 1999 despite the lack of Security Council authorization. 196 The
Kosovo intervention had subsequently been described by the Independent
International Commission on Kosovo as "legitimate, but not legal."1 97 The ICISS
noted that "[t]here is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations
Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes"
and stressed that Security Council authorization "should in all cases" be sought
before any military intervention occurred. 198 Although nothing in the "principles"
formulated by the ICISS expressly states that some humanitarian interventions
might be legal in the absence of Security Council authorization, the use of
"should" rather than "must" indicates that Security Council authorization may not
be mandatory. Similarly, the ICISS rather obliquely suggested that if the Security
Council does not authorize a legitimate request for humanitarian intervention,

188. See Joyner, supranote 52, at 698-700 (describing the acute failures of and bitter disputes over
humanitarian intervention during the 1990s).
189. See Evans, supra note 36, at 708; Max W. Matthews, Tracking the Emergence of a New
InternationalNorm: The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 137, 140-41 (2008).
190. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XI. See also Joyner, supra note 52,
at 708.
191. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XI.
192. Id. at XII.
193. Id. at XII ("Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for
prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored . . . .").
194. Id. at XII ("Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military
intervention being carried out.").
195. See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?,
101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 99-100, 104 (2007).
196. See Evans, supranote 36, at 711-12.
197. See Evans, supranote 36, at 707.
198. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XII.
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"concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency"
of the situation. 199
In the substance of the report, the ICISS addresses this question in slightly
more detail. Although the text once again stresses the desirability of prior Security
Council authorization, it also suggests several alternatives. One suggestion is that
a General Assembly resolution in favor of intervention "if supported by an
overwhelming majority of member states, would provide a high degree of
legitimacy for an intervention." 200 This is essentially a suggestion that the General
Assembly ratify unilateral interventions as a way to provide political cover for
states that intend to act without Security Council authorization. Next the report
suggests that action could be taken by a concerned regional organization with the
Security Council authorizing the intervention after the fact. 20 1 There is some
precedent for this approach. For example, the Security Council authorized the
intervention in Sierra Leone by ECOWAS forces after the fact.202 Finally, the
report avoids offering an opinion on whether a state can intervene unilaterally and
simply asks which would be worse, a unilateral intervention which may or may not
be legal or allowing large numbers of people to die because the Security Council is
unable to act. 203
The concept of the responsibility to protect went through several iterationS204
before a narrower version was unanimously adopted by the United Nations at the
2005 World Summit.2 05 The language of the responsibility to protect has
subsequently been used by the Security Council206 and one of the co-founders of
the doctrine suggests that it is now a "broadly accepted international norm."207
The heads of states and governments present at the Summit acknowledged that

199. Id. at XIII. This is probably a reference to NATO's intervention in Kosovo. See Evans, supra
note 36, at 711-12 (describing the situation in Kosovo as a "clear case" for the application of the
responsibility to protect that was blocked by the threat of a Russian veto in the Security Council).
200. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at 53.
201. Id. at 54.
202. See generally Lee F. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention
Doctrine: The ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 605, 622-23
(2001).
203. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at 55.

204. See Evans, supra note 36, at 713-14 (describing the appearance of the responsibility to protect
doctrine in the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 and again in
the Secretary-General's 2005 report entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, which served as the basic working document for the 2005 World Summit);
Stahn, supra note 195, at 99-101, 105.
205. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45. Stahn discusses the debates that
occurred prior to the World Summit about the inclusion of the responsibility to protect. See Stahn,
supranote 195, at 108.
206. See Matthews, supra note 189, at 148-50 (arguing that the Security Council implemented
some aspects of the responsibility to protect in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur); Stahn,
supranote 195, at 100.
207. Evans, supra note 36, at 715. But see Matthews, supra note 189, at 147-48 (arguing that the
responsibility to protect is on its way to becoming a binding international norm but that it has not
reached that stage yet); Staln, supranote 195, at 110-116 (arguing that while parts of the responsibility
to protect rest on traditional legal concepts, other parts are radical and largely unaccepted).
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"[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 208 and crimes against humanity. 209 This is
a narrower understanding of the responsibility to protect than that articulated by
the ICISS because the responsibility only arises in response to specific crimes,
rather than to large-scale human suffering.210 While it is certainly true that the four
crimes listed are often accompanied by large-scale human suffering, it is not true
that every case of humanitarian disaster constitutes one of the enumerated crimes.
Consequently, the inclusion of the enumerated crimes limited the application of the
responsibility to protect during humanitarian disasters.
The UN's articulation of the responsibility to protect was also narrower than
the ICISS's proposal because it rejected the possibility that interventions could
occur without the approval of the Security Council. The document produced by
the World Summit noted that the international community also has the
responsibility to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity, but stressed that the duty would be
implemented "through the United Nations." 211 The international community also
indicated that it was prepared to take collective action, but only "through the
Security Council, in accordance with the [United Nations] Charter, including
Chapter VII." 2 12 This is a rejection of the possibility that states could unilaterally
act to enforce the responsibility to protect.213
The use of international crimes as the trigger for the responsibility to protect
was probably intended to limit its application. However, it might have had an
unintended consequence. The broader criteria proposed by the ICISS were vague
and political.

concept.

The idea of a large scale loss of life is not an inherently legal

This would have left the international community with considerable

208. The inclusion of ethnic cleansing in the list of crimes that can trigger the responsibility to
protect doctrine is somewhat odd. While ethnic cleansing was a hallmark of the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, it is not generally considered a separate crime under international law. Rather, it is a series
of physical acts that can constitute different crimes, depending on the circumstances under which they
are committed. Forcible deportations or transfers of protected persons are prohibited as grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Similarly, deportations or forcible
transfers of populations can be a crime against humanity. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 5(d); Rome
Statute, supra note 47, 7(d); ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 3(d). No international tribunal has
jurisdiction over ethnic cleansing as a separate crime, although its inclusion in the World Summit
Outcome Document may be the first step on its journey to becoming a separate crime. 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document, supranote 45,
138-39.
209. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, TT 138-39.
210. The ICISS had proposed that the threshold for military intervention be either large scale ethnic
cleansing or "large scale loss of life." RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supranote 187, at XII.
211. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, T 139.
212. Id. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter governs the use of coercive force. In particular,
Article 42 gives the Security Council the power to authorize the use of force to maintain or restore
international peace and security. See U.N. Charter art. 42; Joyner, supra note 52, at 701-02 (describing
the operation of Chapter VII of the Charter).
213. But see Stahn, supra note 195, at 109 (indicating that some states took the position that the
Outcome Document did not preclude humanitarian interventions in the absence of Security Council
authorization).
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discretion when invoking the responsibility. The use of explicit crimes as triggers
may have narrowed the scope of the doctrine's application, but it made its
application turn on an inherently legal concept. There are well-established legal
rules that are applied regularly by international courts to determine whether a
particular situation is a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide. 214 This
has effectively removed some of the political "wiggle room" and may ultimately
serve to constrain the actions of the international community. One important
consequence is that international criminal law experts can now make reasoned
arguments about when the criteria for the application of the responsibility to
protect are present.
A. Applying the Responsibility to Protectto the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis
"Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes ...
Once there is reason to
believe that a crime against humanity is occurring, the first duty falls on the state in
which the crime is occurring to protect its own population by preventing the
commission of the crimes. The international community is supposed to encourage
and help states exercise this responsibility. 216
This paradigm works in cases where the government is not at fault for the
situation that leads to the invocation of the responsibility to protect, but is less
effective in situations where a state itself is committing the triggering acts. It
seems futile to rely on the state to prevent crimes that it is committing, and
encouragement by the international community is unlikely to be of much use
either. Indeed, in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, there was reason to believe that
the crimes against humanity were being committed by the state against its own
population.
Nevertheless, despite immense political pressure from the
international community, the government persisted in refusing aid in the weeks
immediately after the cyclone.
When the state fails in its responsibility to protect, the burden shifts to the
international community. The 2005 World Outcome document indicates that the
international community should first try to use "diplomatic, humanitarian and
peaceful means" to help protect the targeted population.2 17 The international
community did this. A humanitarian response was organized quickly by the
United Nations, and both the United Nations and many of the individual member
states used diplomatic means to try and convince the Myanmar government to
accept the humanitarian aid.2 18 However, these methods were initially unable to
overcome the Myanmar government's intransigence.

214. See, e.g., supra Sections II(B) and II(C).
215. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, T 138.
216. Id.
217. Id. T 139 (noting that the international community will use "appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means" to protect populations at risk).
218. See supra Section I.
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When peaceful means are "inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations," the international community has committed
itself to "tak[ing] collective action, in a timely and decisive manner," including use
of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 219 The aftermath of Cyclone Nargis
appears to be the sort of situation that the member states of the United Nations had
in mind when they signed the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and agreed
to the responsibility to protect. Peaceful means had proven to be inadequate, the
Myanmar government was manifestly failing to protect the cyclone survivors, and
it appeared that the lives of millions of survivors were at risk. Yet the Security
Council was unable to act. Some Western states discussed the introduction of a
Security Council resolution that would compel Myanmar to accept the
humanitarian aid, but it was clear that China would veto any Chapter VII
resolution.220
This left the international community in exactly the situation that the
responsibility to protect was supposed to avoid. A crime against humanity was
apparently occurring, a civilian population was being harmed, and the government
was manifestly unwilling to prevent it; however, the international community did
nothing because the Security Council was paralyzed by the threat of a Permanent
Member veto. 22 1 According to the version of the responsibility to protect adopted
by the United Nations, this effectively ends all chance of coercive action. The
World Summit Outcome Document does not contemplate any fallback position if
peaceful means are inadequate and the Security Council fails to act.
The only option remaining would be for a state or group of states to intervene
unilaterally without Security Council authorization, one of the things that the
codification of the responsibility to protect was meant to prevent. But as the ICISS
noted, "where lies the most harm: in the damage to international order if the
Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are
slaughtered while the Security Council stands by."222 This is an implicit
suggestion that, in some cases, the consequences of a unilateral humanitarian
intervention would be a lesser evil than doing nothing. However, in the aftermath
of Cyclone Nargis, no state was willing to engage in unilateral intervention, even
though several countries had military forces in position, 22 3 and the intervention
probably could have been done while limiting the scope of any direct conflict with
the Myanmar military.224
219. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 45, T 139.
220. See supranote 39.
221. This outcome is not surprising. As the ICISS noted when it first proposed the responsibility to
protect, "[m]any of our interlocutors regarded capricious use of the veto, or threat of its use, as likely to
be the principal obstacle to effective international action in cases where quick and decisive action is
needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis." RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra
note 187, at 51. See also Evans, supra note 36, at 716 (noting the potential for Security Council
paralysis); Joyner, supranote 52, at 715.
222. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at 55.
223. See supranote 16.
224. Although some commentators raised the specter of Western militaries fighting their way into
Myanmar, it is unlikely there would have been much direct confrontation. See Thakur, supra note 41
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Three factors seemed to prevent such intervention. First, if there had been a
unilateral intervention, the Myanmar government would probably have terminated
the United Nations-run relief effort. While the relief effort was only reaching a
small percentage of the population of the Irrawaddy Delta, that small percentage
still represented hundreds of thousands of people. Those people would probably
have stopped receiving aid.
Intervention might actually have made the
humanitarian situation worse. Second, it is not clear how effective a unilateral
intervention would have been. At most, it would have involved dropping off relief
supplies by helicopter or boat. It is unlikely that any of the countries with military
forces in position would have established a permanent presence in the Irrawaddy
Delta because of the risk of armed conflict with the Myanmar military. 225
However, it was not clear how much aid could actually have been delivered
without the cooperation of the Myanmar government, nor was it clear how the aid
could be coordinated if the Myanmar government expelled all of the United
Nations staff members who were managing the U.N. aid effort. 226 Finally, there
was a lack of political will on the part of the United States, Great Britain, and
France.227
The decision not to intervene unilaterally may well have been the correct one
under the circumstances because of the risk that the hundreds of thousands of
people receiving aid through the UN-run relief effort would actually have been
228
worse off if that aid was cut off following an intervention.
It is possible, but by
no means guaranteed, that some sort of intervention would have taken place if the
Myanmar government had been blocking all aid. At that point, there would have
been little downside to bringing in relief supplies by helicopter from the waiting
US, French, and British ships, particularly if the risk of confrontation with the
Myanmar military could be minimized. However, the Myanmar government let in
just enough aid to make risking the interruption of that aid during a unilateral
intervention too risky.
(suggesting that Bernard Kouchner was advocating "Western soldiers fighting in the jungles of
Southeast Asia again."). Given the geography of the Irrawaddy Delta, much of the area was
inaccessible except with helicopters. See supra note 9. Thus, it seems likely that those nations with
military forces in the area, like Great Britain, France and the United States, could have delivered
humanitarian aid to the Irrawaddy Delta while largely avoiding confrontations with Myanmar forces.
225. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 41 (noting that "an enormous amount of assistance can be
provided while maintaining a small footprint on shore, greatly reducing the chances of a clash with the
Burmese armed forces").
226. See Evans, supra note 41 (noting that efforts to drop relief supplies by helicopter would
probably be "hopelessly inefficient").
227. The problem of lack of political will always be an obstacle to taking decisive action, including
non-military action, in support of the responsibility to protect. See Evans, supra note 36, at 720-2 1;
Joyner, supra note 52, at 721-22 (discussing ways to build political will).
228. As the ICISS and others have argued, no implementation of the responsibility to protect
should make the situation worse. Any state or group of states considering military intervention should
always ask whether the consequences of the intervention are likely to be worse than the consequences
of inaction. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT REPORT, supra note 187, at XII; Evans, supranote 36, at

711, 719; Joyner, supra note 52, at 714-15 ("Armed intervention cannot be justified if ... the action
appears likely to produce adverse consequences or suffering greater than if there were no intervention at
all.").
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B. Successes and Failuresofthe Responsibility to Protect
Ultimately, the responsibility to protect did not live up to its primary goal of
saving lives during a crisis. In this sense, the responsibility to protect was a
failure. Nor has it been the only failure of the responsibility to protect since the
doctrine was adopted by the United Nations in 2005.229 Nevertheless, there is
some reason for hope for the future. The Security Council has begun adopting the
language of the responsibility to protect and will, hopefully, continue to use it as a
guide for its actions in the future. In addition, the use of international crimes to
trigger the application of the responsibility to protect creates an opening for
international criminal law experts to make reasoned legal arguments about when
the responsibility to protect should be used. This may lead to a more systematic
application of the principle in the future.
The situation in Myanmar exposed a weakness in the responsibility to protect
created by the international community's desire not to make the situation worse by
intervening. Unscrupulous states could manipulate the severity of the crisis as a
way to prevent coercive intervention. Although the author has found no
suggestion that Myanmar deliberately calibrated the amount of aid it was willing to
accept in order to make sure that the benefits of intervention were outweighed by
the risk that Myanmar would terminate the UN-led aid effort, this possibility
exists. States that are responsible for creating the situations that necessitate the
application of the responsibility to protect may be able to game the system by
finely calibrating the scope of the violence or by creating a situation that ensures
The international
that the intervention would make the situation worse.
community must be alert to this possibility and act decisively against states that try

to manipulate the system.
Moreover, the situation in Myanmar also highlighted a known weakness in
the reliance on the Security Council to take action to prevent the commission of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. The Security
Council is an inherently political body and there is no guarantee that it will act,
even if a legal basis exists. However, the Security Council's failure to act gives
new impetus to the concept of humanitarian intervention. While no country was
willing to intervene unilaterally in Myanmar, when tens or hundreds of thousands
of people are dying, there is certain to be public pressure for some countries to act.
If one of the Permanent Members uses a veto or threat of veto to paralyze the
Security Council, it increases the likelihood that one or more states will act
unilaterally.
The only way to truly eliminate the need for unilateral humanitarian
intervention would be for the Security Council to act in every situation where the
legal basis for acting exists. Until such time as the Permanent Members accept
some limitations on the use of the veto power, the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is likely to persist. An agreement on the limitation of vetoes does not
229. While the United Nations used some of the mechanisms of the responsibility to protect in
responding to the crisis in Darfur, ultimately the Security Council was unwilling to authorize coercive
military action and the crisis continued unabated. See Matthews, supranote 189, at 148-150.
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appear likely soon.230 Consequently, in the short term, there are likely to be
situations where such interventions occur and are considered legitimate, even if not
everyone agrees they are legal.231
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CRiME AGAINST HUMANITY
The existence of crimes against humanity is not simply a predicate for the
invocation of the responsibility to protect. They are international crimes in their
own right, for which individuals can be held criminally liable. If the Security
Council were to invoke the responsibility to protect to authorize coercive action
during a future crisis, this would act as a finding that one of the triggering crimes
was occurring. What consequences would flow from this finding? Does the
invocation of the responsibility to protect doctrine impose on the Security Council
an obligation to find some way to investigate and prosecute the "crimes" that form
the basis for the Security Council's action? Are there other entities that could
initiate investigations, either with or without Security Council approval?
This section will examine the possible consequences of a determination that
there is reason to believe that crimes against humanity were committed. It will
discuss the possible venues for any trials, including the possibility of creating a
new hybrid tribunal for Myanmar. It will also briefly discuss the proposed scope
of such a hybrid tribunal.
A. Possible Venues for Trials
As noted above, there is reason to believe that crimes against humanity were
committed in Myanmar in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.232 This reason to
believe is sufficient to initiate a criminal investigation at any of the international
criminal tribunals.233 One implication of the linking of the responsibility to protect
doctrine and international criminal law is that any resolution by the Security
Council that invokes the responsibility to protect to justify coercive action
constitutes a finding that sufficient evidence exists to initiate a criminal
investigation of the acts that triggered the resolution. But this raises the question:
who could or would investigate these alleged crimes? Usually, when crimes are
committed, the state where the crimes occurred has the first claim on prosecuting
them.234 The government of Myanmar could initiate investigations and prosecute
people. However, it is extremely unlikely that the present government of
Myanmar will investigate because the evidence suggests that senior members of
the government are the individuals most likely to be investigated.
230. See Evans, supra note 36, at 716-17 (noting that the reference to criteria for when intervention
was appropriate was removed from the World Summit Outcome Document in part because certain
members of the Security Council did not want any constraints on their decision-making).
231. See supranotes 195-199.
232. See supra Section II(C)(6).
233. See supra notes 53-57 (discussing the threshold necessary to initiate an investigation). The
threshold this article has used to determine whether the responsibility to protect should be invoked is a
higher threshold than any of the international courts use to initiate an investigation.
234. See KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 38 (2001) ("Jurisdiction
over criminal matters is primarily territorial."); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 712-13 (2003).
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There is universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, 235 which means
that theoretically any country could investigate and possibly try the leaders of the
Myanmar government for their actions in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.
However, there are significant practical limitations on the application of universal
jurisdiction. Some countries, including Belgium, have attempted to implement
universal jurisdiction,236 but this has not been a smooth process.237 In practice, few
countries have attempted to charge people with international crimes that are
unrelated to the country in which the person is being charged.238 In addition, there
is always a problem obtaining the suspects. Most countries are reluctant to enforce
arrest warrants directed against heads of state or senior government officials.239
Obtaining the necessary evidence for a formal investigation would also be
extremely challenging.240 Consequently, universal jurisdiction seems an unlikely
mechanism to investigate the leaders of the Myanmar government.
The next possibility is an international court of some kind. The ICTY, SCSL,
ICTR and ECCC are all limited in their jurisdiction and could not exercise
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Myanmar. 24 1 The ICC is a possibility
because the crimes were committed after the Rome Statute entered into force.242
However, Myanmar is not currently a member of the Assembly of States Parties,243
which means that the ICC could only obtain jurisdiction over the alleged crimes if
the Security Council referred the matter to the ICC244 or Myanmar voluntarily
245
Neither is likely to happen. The
accepted ICC jurisdiction over the crimes.
Security Council could not pass a resolution ordering the Myanmar government to
accept humanitarian aid because of the threat of a Chinese veto, and it seems
unlikely that the Security Council would agree to conferring jurisdiction on the

235. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 234, at 39.
236. See id. at 62, n.72 (discussing Belgium's attempts to use universal jurisdiction to try "grave
violations of international humanitarian law" irrespective of whether Belgium has any direct connection
to the crimes); BASSIOUNI, supranote 234, at 713 n.158.
237. See generally Malvina Halberstam, Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law: Vindication of
InternationalJustice or Pursuit of Politics?, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 247 (2003) (describing Belgium's
difficulties in attempting to implement universal jurisdiction in the face of charges that the process was
being abused to bring politically-motivated charges against heads of state).
238. Usually, countries only exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed in another
country if nationals of the prosecuting country were victims of the crime, the crime was carried out by
nationals of the prosecuting country or it affects the security of the prosecuting state. KITTICHAISAREE,
supranote 234, at 39.
239. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 234, at 39-41 (discussing the many difficulties in obtaining
custody over the accused); see also id. at 62 n.72 (noting that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
filed a request before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) asking the ICJ to discharge a Belgium
arrest warrant for the arrest of the DRC's Minister for Foreign Affairs).
240. See supranote 64.
241. See ECCC Law, supra note 47, art. 2; ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 1; SCSL Statute, supra
note 47, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supranote 47, art. 1.
242. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 11(1).
243. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supranote 158 (listing the current States Parties to
the Rome Statute).
244. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 13(b).
245. See Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 12(3).
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ICC. It seems just as unlikely that the current Myanmar government would
voluntarily agree to ICC jurisdiction. Moreover, the ICC appears to have reached
the limits of its capacity with the criminal investigations it already has
underway.246 It does not seem to have the capacity to take on the situation in
Myanmar in the near future.
However, even if there is little likelihood that the ICC will investigate the
situation in Myanmar, the responsibility to protect doctrine still has important
implications for the ICC. If the Security Council were to use the responsibility to
protect doctrine to authorize coercive action, it could and should simultaneously
refer the situation to the ICC under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. Of course,
there is no way to compel the Security Council to refer a situation to the ICC.
Nevertheless, if it has made a finding that one of the triggering crimes for the
responsibility to protect is occurring it has at least a moral obligation to also refer
that matter to the ICC for investigation.
The analysis is a little different if the situation that is the subject of a Security
Council resolution invoking the responsibility to protect doctrine is taking place on
the territory of an ICC member state. In that case, the Security Council resolution
should be viewed as primafacie evidence that the Prosecutor should initiate an
investigation on his or her own authority under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. It
would also probably constitute primafacie evidence that Article 17 of the Rome
Statute is satisfied and that the target of the resolution is unable or unwilling to
genuinely carry out an investigation or prosecution of the matter on its own.
Finally, there is the possibility of creating a new ad hoc international tribunal
or hybrid tribunal 247 to investigate serious violations of international law in
Myanmar. A new ad hoc tribunal is unlikely. The ICTY and ICTR have proved to
be extremely expensive and very slow, and there appears to be little appetite in the
international community to create new ad hoc tribunals.248 Hybrid tribunals will
probably be preferred going forward because they are perceived as being cheaper
and quicker than fully international tribunals, while still meeting international
standards. 249 A hybrid tribunal could only be created in Myanmar with the

246. The ICC only has the capacity for three simultaneous investigations and two or three trials per
year. See William W. Burke-White, ProactiveComplementarity: The InternationalCriminal Courtand
NationalCourts in the Rome System ofInternationalJustice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J., 53, 54, 66-67 (2008);
see also Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 303, 308 (2003)
(predicting that the ICC would be able to try only a "handful" of the most egregious cases and that the
number of possible cases was likely to "far outstrip" the ICC's ability to try them).
247. Hybrid tribunals combine elements of national and international courts in their structure,
procedural rules and subject matter jurisdiction. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 297-300. The bestknown examples of hybrid tribunals are the SCSL and the ECCC, although courts that have combined
some national and international elements have also taken place in Kosovo and East Timor. See id. at
296-301.
248. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 303 (noting that "calls for a [fully] international court in
Sierra Leone were resisted because such a tribunal would be too expensive and time-consuming to
create.").
249. See Suzannah Linton, New Approaches to InternationalJustice in Cambodia and East Timor,
84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 93, 113 n.845 (2002) (noting that hybrid tribunals have the potential
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cooperation of the Myanmar government. It would be staffed by a mix of
international and national staff and would probably be largely funded by the
international community. It would likely have subject matter jurisdiction over
violations of international law plus any violations of domestic law that seem
appropriate.250 Like all of the suggestions discussed previously, this is unlikely to
happen while the current government is in power.
The obvious drawback to all of these proposals is that they require the
cooperation of the Myanmar government, and the current government is unlikely
to cooperate with any investigation of its own activities. Consequently, any
prosecutions for crimes against humanity are not likely to occur until there is a
change in the government of Myanmar. The current regime is not particularly
popular, and the last time there was an election the people voted overwhelmingly
in favor of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, which won
the 1990 election by a "landslide." 25 1 Therefore, it seems possible that a regime
change will occur at some point in the future. There is no statute of limitations for
crimes against humanity, 25 2 so the international community and the people of
Myanmar could wait until a more accountable government comes to power.
B. The Scope of a Hybrid Tribunalfor Myanmar
Of the venues discussed above, a new hybrid tribunal seems to be the most
likely location where investigations and trials could take place, although it would
still depend on some sort of regime change in Myanmar. Apart from being quicker
and cheaper than fully international courts like the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, 253
hybrid tribunals are also thought to: (1) be perceived as more legitimate by the
local population than either distant international courts, which usually have their
headquarters and trials far away from where the atrocities occurred, or discredited
domestic courts, which may well have been complicit in the atrocities; (2) offer
useful opportunities for capacity-building for local legal staff, including judges,
to be more cost-effective and expeditious than ad hoc international tribunals while operating in
accordance
with
international
human
rights
standards),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/3e02cd6224ce0af6012568b20048a62f/7b6428d7e40dd0d3c1
256ba7003477ce/SFILE/093-120 Linton.pdf; but see Sarah Williams, The Cambodian Extraordinary
Chambers - A Dangerous Precedentfor InternationalJustice?, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 227, 243-44
(2004) (discussing the difficulties that hybrid tribunals have in meeting international standards).
250. See ECCC Law, supra note 47, arts. 3-8 (giving the ECCC jurisdiction over certain violations
of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code and various international crimes); SCSL Statute, supranote 47, at
arts. 2-5 (giving the SCSL jurisdiction over certain national and international crimes).
251. See Defeated Pro-GovernmentParty Calls Myanmar Elections a Fraud,L.A. TIMES, June 16,
1990, at A20; Opposition Claims Wide Lead in Myanmar Elections, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1990, at A7.
The military junta initially indicated that it would step down after losing the election. Myanmar Junta
Vows to Step Down, TORONTO STAR, May 29, 1990, at A13. However, later that year, the military
government "outlawed" the National League for Democracy. Party Outlawed, GLOBE & MAIL
(Canada), Dec. 21, 1990. It has remained in power ever since.
252. See Ford, supra note 152, at 159-69 (describing the 1968 Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutes of Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and the 1974
European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes).
253. See supranote 249.
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lawyers, and court clerks; and (3) do a better job of embedding international legal
norms regarding mass atrocities in the local consciousness.254 These potential
benefits, combined with a lack of capacity at the ICC, suggest that a new hybrid
tribunal would be the best choice.
There are two issues related to the scope of a possible hybrid tribunal for
Myanmar that are worth considering: the tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction and
its personal jurisdiction. When the ICTY and the ICTR were created in the early
1990s, their personal jurisdiction was written quite broadly. They were given
jurisdiction over "persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law" that were committed in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda.255 However, the trend has been to narrow the jurisdiction of international
trials and focus on those senior leaders who are responsible for planning and
implementing large scale international crimes.256 This trend has carried over into
the jurisdiction of hybrid tribunals as well. The ECCC is limited to prosecuting
"senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible"
for the crimes, 25 7 while the competence of the SCSL is described as covering only
"persons who bear the greatest responsibility."258 Clearly, the trend is towards
prosecuting a narrower and narrower group of people and to focus on those most
responsible for the crimes. It is likely that this trend would be carried over into
any hybrid tribunal for Myanmar.259 Thus, the trials would likely focus on those
individuals who planned and implemented the Myanmar government's policy of
denying aid to its own population. Low-level perpetrators would probably not be
pursued.260
The tribunal's subject matter would obviously include the aftermath of
Cyclone Nargis, but there is no reason to limit it to only those crimes committed in
254. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 306-07; Helen Horsington, The Cambodian Khmer Rouge
Tribunal. The Promise of a Hybrid Tribunal, 5 MELB. J. INT'L L. 462, at 480-82 (2004); Linton, supra
note 249, at 118 (noting that "[m]eaningful local involvement in the process is one of the potential
strengths of' hybrid tribunals); Williams, supra note 249, at 245.
255. ICTY Statute, supranote 47, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supranote 47, art. 1.
256. For example, the ICTY has been instructed to concentrate on the prosecution of "the most
senior leaders suspected of being most responsible" for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. See
S.C. Res. 1534,
5-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (March 26, 2004); see S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). It now transfers cases that do not meet this criterion to national
jurisdictions. See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 51, Rule 11 (describing the
process for transferring cases to competent national courts).
257. ECCC Law, supranote 47, art. 2.
258. SCSL Statute, supra note 47, art. 1.
259. In 2003, Laura Dickinson suggested that hybrid tribunals might focus on low-level
perpetrators while the ICC would focus on high-level perpetrators. In practice it appears that the ICC
simply cannot handle even all the high-level perpetrators that could be referred to it, and that there
exists a niche for additional hybrid courts to supplement the limited capacity of the ICC. These new
hybrid courts are likely to focus on high-level perpetrators as well because all trials that comply with
international standards are expensive and time-consuming and it does not make sense to devote a hybrid
tribunal's limited resources to low-level perpetrators. See Dickinson, supra note 246, at 309.
260. This also means that charges arising out of the alleged diversion of aid would probably not be
pursued unless it could be shown that they were part of a systematic policy of diverting aid. There is
some evidence this may have occurred, but it is not certain. See supraSection II(B)(3)(b).
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connection with the cyclone. The Myanmar government has been accused of a
number of gross human rights violations in recent years that might constitute
violations of international criminal law, including the brutal crackdown on
Buddhist monks that occurred in September 2007.261 Since any new tribunal is
only likely to come into existence after the current Myanmar government is no
longer in power, the scope of any tribunal should be broad enough to investigate
any serious violations of international criminal law committed by the military
junta. The temporal jurisdiction of this hypothetical tribunal should probably run
from the date the junta lost the 1990 election 262 until whenever it eventually
collapses.
V. CONCLUSION

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this article. The
first is that the modem understanding of crimes against humanity can be
seamlessly applied to a government's failure to respond appropriately to a natural
disaster. Crimes against humanity started as an adjunct to the laws of war and for
much of its early history could only be committed in the context of an armed
conflict. 263 Doctrinally, it has been separated from the nexus with armed conflict
for some time, but the majority of crimes against humanity charges are still
brought in situations that are marked by armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the modem
understanding of crimes against humanity is clearly broad enough to be applied in
many situations that have no connection with armed conflicts, including the
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. It should be noted that no expansion of the doctrine
of crimes against humanity is being advocated in this article. All of the arguments
that have been made fall well within the existing jurisprudence of the modem
international courts.
This conclusion highlights the flexibility and utility of crimes against
humanity in comparison to war crimes or genocide. War crimes, by definition, are
261. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Myanmar Monks' Protest Contained by Junta's Forces,N.Y TIMES,
Sep. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/asia/28cnd-myanmar.html (noting that the
government had broken up protests led by tens of thousands of Myanmar's monks amid brutal attacks
by government forces on monasteries and protesting civilians); Amnesty Int'l, Crimes Against
Humanity in Eastern Myanmar, ASA/16/011/2008,
June
5, 2008,
available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/011/2008/en/d80827fl-3248-1 ldd-adb0a55f274fla5a/asal60112008eng.pdf (arguing that the government of Myanmar committed crimes
against humanity during the course of a military campaign against ethnic Karen civilians in Eastern
Myanmar);
Human
Rights First, Burma:
Crimes Against Humanity
in Burma,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/cah/burma/index.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2008) (accusing the
government of Myanmar of involvement in a number of crimes against humanity, including forced
displacements of ethnic minorities, forced labor, the recruitment of child soldiers, rape, enforced
disappearances and torture); Belgium Reopens Myanmar Humanity Crimes Probe Against Oil Giant
Total, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5g84fzhRA8Y6IvW-gmt7YmonfEBKg (noting that the oil company Total was accused of
crimes against humanity for using forced laborers provided by the military government during the
construction of a gas pipeline).
262. See supranote 247.
263. See generally Ford, supra note 152 (describing the evolution of crimes against humanity
during the 20th century).
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limited in their application to armed conflicts.264 As this author has noted
elsewhere, genocide is exceptionally difficult to prove because of the specific
intent requirement and genocide convictions are relatively rare.265 Crimes against
humanity, in contrast, can be applied to a much broader range of situations
including many that have not traditionally been prosecuted as violations of
international criminal law. It is the most versatile of the three major international
crimes and may well become the most frequently used. Genocide will continue to
be the "crime of crimes," but crimes against humanity will probably be used more
often. For example, crimes against humanity is the best way to invoke the
responsibility to protect during man-made humanitarian disasters that are not
marked by armed conflicts.
A second conclusion relates to the efficacy of the responsibility to protect. It
is tempting to view the responsibility to protect as a failure. It has been cited by
the Security Council, but Security Council paralysis has prevented any Chapter VII
enforcement actions to protect civilian populations in the years since the 2005
World Summit. If the primary purpose of the responsibility to protect is to save
lives, then it is hard to point to any group of lives that has been saved. Bernard
Kouchner was one of the few senior politicians calling for the application of the
responsibility to protect to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, and no country was
willing to intervene unilaterally once it became clear that the Security Council
would not act, even though the forces were in the right place at the right time to
make such intervention possible.
However, there are other ways to measure success.

Even though the

responsibility to protect was not applied, the argument was primarily about

whether it was appropriate to apply it given the facts in Myanmar. All of the
commentators accepted that the responsibility to protect does exist and does
require states to protect populations at risk. Thus, it appears that the responsibility
to protect has achieved significant acceptance in a few short years. The debate has
now shifted from whether the responsibility to protect exists to how to apply it in
specific cases.
In this respect, the United Nation's decision to make the application of the
responsibility to protect depend on the existence of violations of international
criminal law may prove a blessing in disguise when it comes to determining when
to apply the responsibility to protect. International criminal lawyers are wellequipped to offer reasoned advice on whether crimes against humanity, war
crimes, or genocide are occurring because there are well-established criteria for the
application of international criminal law in the jurisprudence of the international
courts. This should result in a much more systematic analysis of when the
responsibility to protect should be invoked. Of course, this will not guarantee that

264. It should be noted that crimes against humanity can also be used to capture much of the
mistreatment of civilian populations that has been the hallmark of internal armed conflicts.
265. See Robert Petit, Stuart Ford & Neha Jain, Exploring CriticalIssues in Religious Genocide:
Case Studies of Violence in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat,40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 163, 212-14 (2008).
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the international community will act on the advice, but it does inject an element of
legal reasoning into what is otherwise an overtly political process.
The use of international criminal law as the triggering mechanism for the
responsibility to protect also has important implications for the ICC. In order to
invoke the responsibility to protect and use its coercive authority under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council must make either an
explicit or implicit finding that violations of international criminal law are
occurring. One consequence of this is that the Security Council then has, at the
minimum, a moral obligation to refer that situation to the ICC so that the crimes
can be investigated. Of course, there is no guarantee that the Security Council will
accompany every invocation of the responsibility to protect doctrine with a referral
to the ICCC. But this will not always prevent the ICC from acting. If the situation
that is the subject of the Security Council resolution is taking place on the territory
of an ICC member state, then the Security Council resolution will act as prima
facie evidence that the Prosecutor should initiate an investigation on his or her own
authority.
Finally, the use of international crimes to trigger the responsibility to protect
may actually save lives. While the majority of the debate has focused on the
questions of when the Security Council should authorize intervention, what form
the intervention should take, and whether unilateral intervention is legal, this is not
the most important aspect of the responsibility to protect. The most important
aspect is the duty to prevent the crimes from occurring in the first place. It is far
easier to protect the lives of civilians by preventing a crisis than it is by intervening
to try and stop the crisis.
The use of international criminal law to trigger the responsibility to protect
may help prevent crimes from occurring in the first place. One of the goals of
international criminal law is prevention through deterrence. If a head of state is
ever tried and found guilty of crimes against humanity arising out of the denial of
international aid to his or her own people, then other leaders in a similar situation
might think twice before refusing international aid. This would fulfill the primary
goal of the responsibility to protect - saving lives. Thus the pursuit of
accountability for violations of international criminal law also helps to promote the
underlying goals of the responsibility to protect.

THE GLOBAL COMPACT, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AND
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
AFSHIN AKHTARKHAVARI*

Unlike rules, international lawyers commonly ignore the potential that
environmental principles have to create change in internationallaw and politics.
Transnational actors do not easily conform to abstract and open-textured
environmentalprinciples because they do not prescribe a specific way of behaving
and compliance with them is difficult to enforce. The Global Compact initiative of
the United Nations relies on principles to create a regime applying to
transnational corporations.It is structured around encouraging corporations to
socially learn rather than to comply with norms. In this context environmental
principles within the Global Compact have the potential to create significant
change in internationalpolitics but one that is better assessed in terms of how they
frame ideas during the interactions of participants and stakeholders within the
regime. This interplay between environmentalprinciples and the social influence
of ideas is an important steering mechanism for the kind of learning that
potentially is taking place within the Global Compact. It also distinguishes the
Global Compact from other attempts to consider the role of internationally
developed voluntary codes as a common frame for multinationalcorporations to
self-regulate themselves. Notably, it highlights an important role andfunction for
environmental principles, which are often discounted in their potential to
contribute to change at the internationallevel.
I. INTRODUCTION

In December 2005, the 191 Member States of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) officially endorsed the Global Compact (GC) initiative that the
former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, established within his office in 2000.1 In a
much generalized but useful summary of its mission, the GC seeks to establish
"corporate citizenship among companies" in the world.2 The GC is now a complex
BSc/LLB , LLM, PhD. Senior Lecturer, Griffith Law School. I wish to thank Professor Donald
Rothwell for his comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. United Nations, General Assembly, Towards Global Partnerships,U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess.,
Agenda Item 61 at 3, U.N. Doc A/C.2/62/L.33/Rev.1 (Dec. 3, 2007); GEORG KELL, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, LETTER TO GLOBAL COMPACT STAKEHOLDER 1, (2006) available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about the_gc/stakeholder letter 2006.pdf.
2. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, ASSESSING THE GLOBAL COMPACT'S IMPACT 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/9.1 news archives/2004 06 09/impass.pdf. This
study is a "comprehensive impact assessment" of the GC that was commissioned by the Global
Compact Office (GCO) in 2004 and completed on May 11, 2004. It does not actually define what it
understands "corporate citizenship" to mean in the context of the GC. On this point, see Surya Deva,
Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.'s "Public-Private" Partnershipfor Promoting Corporate
Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 111-113 (2006) (discussing the possible definitions
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initiative that is coordinated by the Global Compact Office (GCO) and is part of
the Secretary-General's Office at the United Nations (UN). As of September
2007, the GC had 4600 participants and stakeholders from around 120 countries in
the world. This compares with 2900 participants and stakeholders in March 2006
when the GCO last reported on the growth of the initiative. This is not to suggest
that the GC is without its challenges or criticisms.6 The "symbolism of the Global
Compact's creation and its established brand as a major initiative of the SecretaryGeneral" is, however, "surprisingly influential."
The core idea behind the GC initiative is to establish a set of ten principles
that aim to influence the values of corporations in relation to human rights, labor,
the environment, and corruption, and "give a human face to the global market."
The environmental principles that are a part of the GC are listed as: the
precautionary approach to environmental challenges; promoting greater
environmental responsibility; and encouraging the development and diffusion of
environmentally friendly technologies.9 In 2004, McKinsey & Company were

of "corporate citizenship" and "corporate social responsibility"). For the use of this terminology, refer
to the recent report produced by the GCO and the Barcelona Centre for the Support of the Global
Compact on Loack Networks, BARCELONA CENTER FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT,

LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, (UN Global Compact Office 2007) available at http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8.1/LNReport FINAL.pdf [hereinafter LOCAL NETWORK
REPORT]. Others have summarized the purpose of the GC in different ways. For instance, King has
suggested that "in its simplest form" it is about the "dissemination of and adherence to good business
practices." Betty King, The UN Global Compact: Responsibilityfor Human Rights, Labor Relations,
and the Environment in Developing Nations, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481, 482 (2001).
3. The review and actual changes to the GC framework are good illustrations of this complexity.
See KELL, supranote 1, at 2.
4. LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. But cf David Weissbrodt, Business and
Human Rights, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 70 (2005) (asking "[w]hat about the other 59,000 companies that
are not covered by the Global Compact?").
5. KELL, supranote 1.
6. See Deva, supranote 2, at 128-29; See also Maria Gjolberg & Audun Ruud, The U.N. Global
Compact-A Contribution to Sustainable Development?, 7 (Ctr. for Dev. and Env't, Univ. of Oslo,
Working Paper No. 1/05,2006); See also David M. Bigge, Bring on the Bluewash: A Social
Constructivist Argument Against Using Nike v Kasky to Attack the UN Global Compact, 14 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. 6, 12-14 (2004), (summarizing the major early criticisms of the GC, particularly in
relation to companies and human rights).
7. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2, at 13. It is arguable that its success is partly because
many corporations use the GC as a branding exercise and for networking opportunities. For instance, in
a report compiled in 2007 by the GCO, it was noted that 6 3 % of the 400 companies surveyed indicated
that they had joined the GC to increase trust in their company. This is compared to 52% highlighting the
fact that they wanted to address humanitarian concerns. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT ANNUAL REVIEW 2007 LEADERS SUMMIT 9,
11 (2007), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/8.1/GCAnnualReview2007.pdf
[hereinafter
ANNUAL REVIEW 2007].
8. Press Release, Secretary General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour,
Environment, in address to World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html.
9. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC
/TheTENPrinciples/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). The other seven principles of the GC are:
(1) "Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights";
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commissioned by the GCO to complete an "impact assessment" of the GC
initiative.10 This study singled out as the main focus for its empirical investigations
the adoption by companies of the nine principles as they were in 2004.11 It found
that in the four years since its establishment, the:
Global Compact has had noticeable, incremental impact on companies,
the UN, governments and other civil society actors and has built a
strong base for future results. The Compact has primarily accelerated
policy change in companies, while catalyzing a proliferation of
"partnership projects," development-oriented activities that companies
undertake with UN agencies and other partners. The Compact has also
developed a solid participant base and local network structure,
establishing itself as the largest voluntary corporate citizenship network
of its kind. 12
Figure 1, which is from the McKinsey & Company study, provides more
perspective on these comments in that 51% of those surveyed said that the GC
initiatives helped them to make the decision to engage with the principles easier as
opposed to initiating their interest in them. Despite this, the study highlights that
the principles used by the GC have the potential to socialize individual actors into
changing their preferences in some way.

(2) "make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses"; (3) "Businesses should uphold the
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining"; (4) "the
elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour"; (5) "the effective abolition of child labour";
(6) "the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation"; and (10) "Businesses
should work against corruption in all of its forms, including extortion and bribery." Id.
10. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supranote 2, at 1.
11. A tenth principle dealing with anti-corruption was added to the other nine in 2004. See U.N.
Global
Compact,
Transparency and Anti-corruption, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
abouttheGC/thetenprinciples/anti-corruption.html (last visited November 15, 2008). As a secondary
focus, the study by McKinsey & Company also examined the "increased efficacy of the UN through a
more collaborative approach to the private sector, support for governments seeking to spur a more
effective role of business in society, and the convening of a unique multi-stakeholder network."
McKiNSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2, at 2.
12. McKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2, at 2. They also note criticisms, such as that the
"inconsistent participation and divergent and unmet expectations limit the impact on companies and
continue to threaten the Compact's long-term credibility with participants." Id. at 2.
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Figure 1 Impact of Global Compact on Company Reform13

Percent of company respondents
Were any of these [policy] changes helped by your organization's participation in the Compact?
The changes would not
Change would have been difficult to implement
without being a participant

Changes would have
happened anyway, but
participation made it

have happened without being a
participant

Participation had no
significant impact

significantly easier or bmught
change torward signiicantly

Percent of respondenis who indicated sonme
change made since Joinkig Compact ( who made up 67% fall)
Source: Survey of GC partlits
For most of the survey respondents who report that their companies nde changes to implement the Compacts
principles, particiuation in the Compact accelerated, ratier than instigated the change.

The difficulty of studying principles by simply asking whether companies or
other stakeholders have complied with or internalized them is that it is easy to
ignore the abstract and open-textured nature of these norms. 14 Whether
corporations have been socialized into adopting them does not actually mean that
different corporations associate with the norm in the same way. In other words, we
are no better off knowing what function or role norms play within the Global
Compact itself because of the variety of different ways that companies can
interpret them.
Instead of assessing the significance of the principles in terms of how well
actors comply with them or feel obligated to change their behavior based on their
normative pull, this article takes a different perspective on such issues." It

13. Id. at 4.
14. An alternative criticism of the McKinsey & Company study might relate to how it singled out
the impact that the principles of the GC had on the corporations and stakeholders without taking into
account other international initiatives. See also William Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the
UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 501, 504 (2001) (discussing the
abstract nature of the human rights provisions of the GC in the context of other measures
internationally).
15. The ability of the GC to encourage compliance with its principles has already been studied by
others. Importantly, see VILJAM ENGSTROM, REALIZING THE GLOBAL COMPACT (U. Helsinki Faculty of

Law 2002); Meyer & Stefanova, supra note 14; Elisa Morgera, The UN and CorporateEnvironmental
Responsibility: Between InternationalRegulation and Partnerships, 15 REv. EUR. CMTY. & INT'L
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examines whether the GC framework coordinated through the GCO is potentially
changing and instantiating a collective culture globally whereby environmentally
conscious approaches to consumption and production constitute the way
corporations will view their relationship with nature. 16 This is not a normative
argument about whether the initiative is good or bad for the environment, but
rather an expression of the kind of deeper cultural change in international politics
that this initiative potentially is creating if it continues to develop.17 It is argued
that in this sense the role and function of environmental principles within the GC is
better assessed in terms of how they frame ideas during the interactions of
participants and stakeholders within the regime. This interplay between
environmental principles and the social influence of ideas is an important steering
mechanism for the kind of learning that potentially is taking place within the GC.
It also distinguishes this discussion from other attempts to consider the role of
internationally developed voluntary codes as a common frame for multinational
corporations to self-regulate themselves.1 8
This article begins by describing the GC, highlighting the way some of the
initiatives of the GCO give structure to the engagement of corporate participants
and stakeholders. The GC was selected for this study because, through it,
transnational and other kinds of corporations directly and diffusely engage with
each other and stakeholders at the international level using environmental
principles. It is also because it embeds the principles within an institutional
structure that relies more on social influence than coercive mechanisms that
emphasize immediate gains. The environmental principles of the GC are examined
as abstract and open-textured norms. The article then argues that collective
learning is in fact possible for multinational corporations at the international level.
It examines what it means for them to instantiate a collective culture of responding
in an environmentally responsible way to consumerism and production. The
following sections discuss two different social processes facilitated by the GC to
influence corporations to act in a way that will instantiate the collective learning of
a culture of stronger environmental stewardship by corporations. This article
concludes by discussing how, through social influence, environmental principles
ENVTL. L. 93 (2006). Gjolberg & Ruud have also observed based on interviews with some Norwegian
members of the GC that the companies felt they would "benefit from the legitimacy of the UN/GC
while the voluntary nature and the abstract ten principles of the GC" would "make it hard to evaluate
compliance." Gjolberg & Ruud, supra note 6, at 12.
16. For a different consideration of this question in the broader context of sustainable governance,
see Surya Deva, Sustainable Good Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries , 18
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 707 (2006).
17. For other attempts to situate the work of the GC in international relations topics, see Meyer &
Stefanoya, supra note 14. See also, Bigge, supra note 6, at 7-8 (attempting to situate the GC within
social constructivist work in international relations).
18. On corporate responsibility through codes of conduct, see Sean D. Murphy, Taking
MultinationalCorporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2005);
Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Convergence, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate
Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1090 (2002); Ilias Bantekas, Corporate
Social Responsibility in InternationalLaw, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 322 (2004); DEBORAH LEIPZIGER,
THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY CODE BOOK (2003).
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can help instantiate a collectively understood culture that moves away from
excessive consumerism and production. This type of change deeply influences the
nature of international cooperation amongst states and corporations, as well as
normative developments in the system.
II. THE GLOBAL COMPACT, THE UNITED NATIONS,

AND ENVIRONMENTAL

PRINCIPLES

As far back as 1974, the UN, through the Commission on Transnational
Corporations, took initiatives to develop a Code of Conduct for transnational
corporations to establish a legal framework of some form to regulate what they
do. 19 It has been argued that the "UN's attempt to regulate transnational companies
through its Code of Conduct produced 20 years of debate and negotiations, but
yielded no results."20 The failed attempts to agree on how to manage corporations
are seen as the reason for an absence in the international political economy
literature of discussions of codes of conduct for transnational corporations of any
sort between the 1980s and 1990s.21 Only in the late 1990s, with the resurgence of
discussions on corporate responsibility built around the Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights,22 did UN bodies develop a renewed interest in
international codes of conduct. The GC initiative needs to be viewed in this
19. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33-34, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/1 1
(1974), available at http://unctc.unctad.org/data/e74iia6a.pdf The Commission on Transnational
Corporations was asked by UN ECOSOC to "evolve" a "set of recommendations, which, taken together
would represent a code of conduct for governments and TNCs to be considered and adopted by the
Council." On this topic, see Barbara Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of InternationalHuman Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 166
(1997); Sidney Dell, The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, in
EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION: CASE STUDIES IN CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY 53 (Johan Kaufann, ed. 1989).

Peter T. Muchlinski, Attempts to Extend the Accountability of TransnationalCorporations:The Role of
UNCTAD, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Menno

T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi, eds., 2000).
20. Georg Kell, The Global Compact, Selected Experiences and Reflections, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 69,
73 (2005).
21. Kathryn Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the
WHO/UNICEF Code, 40 INT'L ORG. 815 (1986).
22. See the 2003 revised version, UN ESCOCOR, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business
Enterpriseswith Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 13, 2003).
Although this initiative has so far failed, the ideas contained within the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of TNCs contributed, for instance, to a consultation paper that the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the GCO produced in conjunction with the 2005 Business
Leaders Initiative on Human Rights. BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, AND OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A GUIDE

FOR INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (2005) available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues doc/human rights/Resources/guide hr.pdf.
For
a
discussion of the UN Norms and Responsibilities of TNCs in terms of the role of the UN and states in
developing it, see Larry C. Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United
Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsas a Harbinger of Corporate
Social Responsibility in InternationalLaw, 73 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 288 (2006).
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context, particularly its adoption of the softer approach through the ten principles
mentioned earlier. The overall mission and objectives of the GC are defined
broadly as follows: "[To] be the world's most inclusive voluntary initiative to
promote responsible corporate citizenship, ensuring that business, in partnership
with other societal actors, plays its essential part in achieving the United Nations'
vision of a more sustainable and equitable global economy."23
Two objectives which the GCO seeks to pursue in giving shape to this
mission are stated as:
*

*

Making the Compact and its principles on human rights, labor,
environment, and anti-corruption an integral part of business
operations and activities everywhere.
Encouraging and facilitating dialogue and partnerships among key
stakeholders in support of the ten principles and broader UN goals,
such as the Millennium Development Goals.24

The mission statement and the objectives of the GC confirm the fact that it
seeks to do more than just identify ten principles with which corporations must
comply. Although at first glance the GC initiatives appear to be a code of conduct
or a "third-party" "principled code, the broader governance framework,26 which
is coordinated by the GCO, is also relevant when it comes to differentiating this
initiative from others at the international level-such as the Guidelines for
27
This is important because the GCO seeks to involve
MultinationalEnterprises.
corporations in its work in direct and diffuse ways rather than assume that they are
passive recipients of an international code of practice. It is therefore this broader
framework established by the GC that engages and manages the external relations
of corporations with other participants, stakeholders, and the ten core principles as
the pivot around which the governance structure of the GC is built.
The GC has sought to develop from the beginning as an initiative with a
variety of different participants and stakeholders. It brings transnational and other
kinds of corporations together with UN agencies, labor, civil society organizations,
and governments in an effort, to use the words of the GCO itself, "to advance
universal environmental and social principles in order to foster a more sustainable

23. U.N.

GLOBAL

COMPACT

OFFICE,

WHAT

IS

A

LOCAL

NETWORK?

1,

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/networks-around world doc/What is a Local Network.pdf
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
24. United Nations, supranote 1.
25. See, Christopher Wright & Alexis Rwabizambuga, Institutional Pressures, Corporate
Reputation, and Voluntary Codes of Conduct: An Examinationof the Equator Principles, 111(1) BUS.
Soc. REV. 89, 93 (2006).
26. The term "governance framework" was more recently coined by the GCO to describe the
range of activities that it coordinates to "foster greater involvement in, and ownership of, the initiative
by participants and other stakeholders." ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 7, at 16.
27. THE ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (OECD 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

56/36/1922428.pdf.
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and inclusive world economy." 28 Corporations are referred to as participants in the
GC and as of 2007 over 3,000 corporations from 116 countries were members of
the GC.29 The term "stakeholder" refers to anyone else who is a member of the
GC.3 0 Figure 2 represents the increasing percentage of non-business stakeholders
in the GC initiative. It also suggests that the multi-stakeholder approach has
developed across the globe, given that the increase in both business and nonbusiness participation matches the increase in the number of countries involved in
the GC. Although in a useful critique of this development, it has been suggested
that there is a regional imbalance in both participants and stakeholders in the GC.31
Figure 3 represents the diversity of the stakeholders other than corporations that
have engaged with the GC initiative. This suggests that the engagement of nonbusiness stakeholders with the GC is very diverse and potentially strong as a result.
Figure 2 Stakeholders in the Global Compact32
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28. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: ADVANCING

CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 1 (UN Global Compact Office 2005) available at http://www.unglobal
compact.org /docs/about the_gc/2.0.2.pdf.
29. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 8.
30. Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.'s "Public-Private"Partnershipfor
PromotingCorporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 115 (2006) (discussing the
obligations of a "stakeholder").
31. Id. at 134-36.
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Figure 3 Non-Business Participants by Type 33
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The GCO spearheads the GC. It is located within the executive office of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations because of the way it networks itself
through various "core agencies" of the UN.3 The placement of the GC within the
UN means that it is ultimately backed by states. In fact, Kell identifies some
governments as playing a very strong role in the formation of the GC. 5 Their
continuing involvement with the GC has been characterized as auxiliary in nature
"through outreach support, advocacy, and funding." 36 In an official communication
from the GCO, the role of states is also described as giving the "essential
legitimacy and universality to the principles of the Compact." 37
The GCO has identified three ways that it seeks to engage with corporate
participants, the range of stakeholders represented in Figure 3, agencies of the UN,
and the ten core principles of the GC.38 They include: (1) getting commitment from
the leadership of companies who are participants of the GC; (2) developing and

32. ANNUAL REVIEW2007, supranote 7, at 7.
33. Id. at 13-15.
34. These include the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), the
International Labor Organization (ILO), The UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Id. at 16; Kell, supranote 20, at 75.
35. Kell, supra note 20 at 74 (noting that the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, and Germany
provided practical and financial support in forming and initially developing the GC).
36. Georg Kell & David Levin, The Global Compact Network: An Historic Experiment in
Learningand Action, 108(2) Bus. Soc. REv. 151,153 (2003).
37. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: ADVANCING

CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 4 (UN Global Compact Office
.unglobalcompact.org /docs/about the_gc/2.0.2.pdf
38. ANNUAL REVIEW2007, supranote 7, at 9-10.

2005)

available at http://www
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implementing policies relating to the ten core principles and ensuring that the
relevant people at the grassroots engage with them; and (3) ensuring that
participants communicate their progress in relation to the principles. 39 The GCO
has a variety of established practices that seek to enhance the engagement of the
different groups with the core principles. To help develop and implement policies,
two strategies supported by the GCO stand out.
The first is the establishment of the GC Local Networks (GCLN), which are
defined as "clusters of participants who come together to advance the Global
Compact and its principles at the local level." 40 The GCO has managed to establish
a very large number of GCLN to support its work within countries around the
world.41 Since 2000, when the first four GCLN were established, they have now
multiplied to over sixty-one with another twenty-five apparently in development.42
In an overview of GCLN, the GCO has said that they are meant to be "moving
innovative solutions upstream for global replication and multiplication, or... taking
global dialogue issues down to the level of implementation." 43 This means that
GCLNs help companies to implement the ten core principles and to facilitate their
reporting obligations as participants in the GC.4
The second strategy is the idea that the GCO supports the learning process for
all involved through a variety of activities such as conferences and workshops that
seek to enhance the understanding of participants and stakeholders in relation to
the core principles. 45 Through these activities, the GCO has, for instance, published
a number of case studies and analysis to enhance the engagement of different
groups.46 Other UN agencies have also worked with stakeholders to develop
materials to support the learning environment for corporations. For instance, in

2005, the UNDP, along with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, produced a
practical guide for companies operating in developing countries.47 The guide aimed
to assist companies with implementing the principles into their business operations
in developing countries. Although the initiatives in this area appear very strong,
whether or not corporations actually engage with the learning process is yet to be
tested empirically.48

39. Id. at 9.
40. LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
(2003),

Id. at 15.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 8.
See LOCAL NETWORK REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
Id.
See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTANABILITY
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/8.1/expman.pdf; See also

U.N.

GLOBAL

COMPACT,

FROM

PRINCIPLES

TO

PRACTICE

(2003),

available

at

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/8.1/princ-prac.pdf.
47. KPMG, IMPLEMENTING THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT: A BOOKLET FOR INSPIRATION (2005),
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8.1/dk book e.pdf.
48. Gjolberg & Ruud, supra note 6, at 11-12 (discussing the hesitation of corporations to engage
in the GC learning process).
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An important dimension of engaging corporations with other participants and
stakeholders is the requirement that all corporations produce an annual
Communication on Progress (COP) which they must share with stakeholders and
also post on the official website of the GC. 49 As a voluntary and non-legally
binding arrangement, the reporting process of the GC is the only compulsory
aspect of membership for corporations. To remain an "active member" of the GC,
a corporation must submit its COP annually. 50 A COP must contain a statement
that shows the continued support of the corporation for the core principles,
describes what actions they have taken to implement the principles and whether
they have engaged in partnership projects that support the goals of the UN more
generally, and indicates how they have succeeded in meeting their goals using
indicators or metrics available to them.5 1 The GCO has reported that it has made
600 companies "inactive" for not having submitted their COP in the manner
required by the GCO.52 The main reason given for deactivating the membership of
companies who do not report is to maintain the integrity of the initiative. June
2005 was the first time that all corporations who had been members of the GC for
more than two years had to officially report.54 The GCO reported that 87% of the
102 Global 500 companies had reported. 5 However, only 25% and 11% of the
medium-sized and small companies, respectively, had reported in 2005.56 The
reporting carried out by the larger companies is impressive to say the least. What it
says about smaller and medium sized companies is that the benefits of membership
might not warrant the need to support the GC's initiatives. Alternatively, the costs
of reporting might be high. Whatever the reason, it appears that the types of
corporations reporting are predominantly the larger transnational corporations,
which might benefit from the kind of citizenship that is established through the

GC.
A. EnvironmentalPrinciplesof the Global Compact
A study by the Trade Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2000 compared 246 voluntary codes of
conduct that corporations of the OECD's twenty-nine member states could adopt.
49. U.N.GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, POLICY FOR "COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS (COP)" 2-3

(2009),

available

at

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication

on_progress/COP

Policy.pdf [hereinafter POLICY FOR COP]; U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, LEADING

THE WAY IN

COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS 4 (2006), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs
/communication onprogress/4.3/leading the way.pdf [hereinafter LEADING THE WAY].
50. This requirement kicks in two years after joining the GC, ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note
7, at 51.
51. POLICY FOR COP, supra note 49.
52. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 51.
53. POLICY FOR COP, supra note 49, at 2-3.
54. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, THE GLOBAL COMPACT COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS: A STATUS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS 1 (2005), available at http://www.unglobal
compact.org /docs/news events/9.1 news archives/2005_07_15/statrep cop2.pdf.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id.
57. Trade Committee and the Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises, Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of their Contents 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-
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The study found that "environmental stewardship" was "one of the most heavily
cited of the areas in the extended inventory." 8 It noted that 145 out of the 246
codes dealt with environmental issues, and twenty-four were exclusively dedicated
to them. 59 However, given that a majority of these 246 codes discussed in the
Codes of Corporate Conduct Study are developed by companies themselves, or by
associations of various kinds, it is fair to presume that they deal with either product
or process standards. 60 Research suggests that directly regulating particular
activities of transnational corporations is achieved more effectively through
"narrowly defined issues" within codes of conduct. 61 This suggests that, although
there is nothing novel about another voluntary code, the fact that the GC adopts
just three environmental principles to apply to corporations is somewhat unique.
Much has been made of the inability of the general and short statements that
make up the principles of the GC to provide a detailed and potentially useful frame
62
for regulating corporate activities. This is the case even amongst participants of
the GC who have commented on how the brevity of the principles has little effect
in terms of regulating what they do. 63 The principles of the GC have been referred
to by those involved in its design as aspirations,64 or shared values.65 The GC's
documents themselves refer to the principles as a value-based platform.66 Whether
or not they are aspirations or values of transnational or local corporations is an
empirical question that does not seem as important as identifying how they might
function as abstract and open-textured norms within the GC framework.
The three principles as abstract and open-textured norms rely on international
environment law, defined broadly, for their meaning. Based on the origin of the
three environmental principles, it is apparent that the GC constructed these

principles in an abstract and open-textured way. The three principles are drawn
from the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,67 and Agenda
operation and Dev., Working Paper No. 2001/6, 2001), [hereinafter Trade Committee] available at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/24/1922656.pdf.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id.
60. The distinction between product and process standards is from Philipp Pattberg, The Influence
of GlobalBusiness Regulation: Beyond GoodCorporate Conduct, 111 Bus. Soc. REv. 241, 244 (2006);
Trade Committee, supra note 57, at 5 (identifying that 48% of the voluntary codes were developed by
companies; 37% through associations; 13% as partnerships of stakeholders; and 2% by international
organizations).
61. Sikkink, supranote 21, at 816.
62. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 425; Klaus M. Leisinger, Opportunitiesand Risks of the United
Nations Global Compact, 11 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 113, 114, 116 (2003); Deva, supra note 2, at 12933.
63. Gjolberg & Ruud, supranote 6, at 14-16.
64. John G. Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain-Issues,Actors, and Practices, 10
EuR. J. INT'L REL. 499, 516 (2004).
65. Kell & Levin, supranote 36, at 152.
66. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 9.
67. Conference on the Environment and Development, Rio De Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992,
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992); See David Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa, 29 GA. L. REv. 599 (1995)
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21,68 which were developed for the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED). 69 As a result, the GC uses ideas from within the
broader international environmental legal framework that states have been
responsible for developing since 1992 in applying the environmental principles to
corporations.
The differences between the three principles are noteworthy. Principle 7 of
the GC requires that "business should support a precautionary approach to
environmental challenges."70 The fact that the GC adopted the term "precautionary
approach" from Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, instead of the term
"precautionary principle," which is also commonly used in the general literature,71
suggests that it sought to draw on the legitimacy of the document for the origin of
the norm. 2 The more detailed definition of the precautionary approach in Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration is also used in the GC documents to support the
abbreviated way that it is stated as Principle 7 of the GC itself.73 Put in this way,

(commenting on the Rio Declaration); Ileana M. Porras, The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for
InternationalCooperation, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Philippe Sands ed., 1993); Marc
Pallemaerts, InternationalEnvironmental Law From Stockholm to Rio: Back to the Future?, in
GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, supra.
68. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS, AGENDA 21, [hereinafter AGENDA 21]available
at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21. AGENDA 21 was designed to clarify the scope
of the environmental principles in the Rio Declaration but also contained principles of its own right.
NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES
312 (2005).
69. U.N. Global Compact, Environment, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC
/TheTenPrinciples/environment.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (listing the environmental principles
and describing their origins); See David Freestone, The Road from Rio: InternationalEnvironmental
Law after the Earth Summit, 6 J. ENVTL. L. 193, 209-16 (1994) (discussing the impact of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development from the perspective of environmental norms).
70. U.N. Global Compact, supranote 69.
71. Importantly, Art. 14 of the 2003 revised version of the Norms on the Responsibilities of
TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights adopts the
term "precautionary principle," U.N. ECOSOC 55th Sess., 22d mtg., U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
72. There are a variety of different views on the difference between a precautionary principle and
a precautionary approach. See Jacqueline Peel, Precaution-A Matter of Principle, Approach or
Process? 5 MELB. J. INT. LAW 483 (2004). As to the concept of the precautionary principle, See Arie
Trouwborst, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in General InternationalLaw: Combating the Babylonian
Confusion, 16 REv. EUR. COM. & INT. ENv. LAW 185, 186-87 (2007); ARIE TROUWBORST,
PRECAUTIONARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (2006).
73. Principle 15 of the RIO DECLARATION states that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.
A/CONF 151/26, 31 ILM 874 (June 13, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD= 1163.
This
exact definition is also adopted by the GC as the definition of the precautionary approach for
businesses. See U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles Principle 7, http://www.
unglobalcompact.org /AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle7.html (last visited Nov.15, 2009).
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the precautionary approach appears more as a heuristic device that is stated in an
abstract way as one of the GC principles. As a heuristic device, it refers to an
articulation of an established set of ideas, which are stated in more open-textured
fashion in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.
Principle 8 of the GC requires that "businesses should undertake initiatives to
promote greater environmental responsibility." 74 Unlike the precautionary
approach, this principle is extracted from Chapter 30 of Agenda 21, which is more
generally dedicated to the role of businesses and industry. 5 First, the GC draws
from two different places to develop the potential intersubjectivity around the
vague idea of assuming greater environmental responsibility. 76 The GC refers to
Chapter 30.26 of Agenda 21 which requires that transnational corporations:
[s]hould ensure responsible and ethical management of products and
processes from the point of view of health, safety and environmental
aspects. Towards this end, business and industry should increase selfregulation, guided by appropriate codes, charters and initiatives
integrated into all elements of business planning and decision-making,
and fostering openness and dialogue with employees and the public.7 7

Secondly, the documents of the GC refer to Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, which requires that states take "responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."7 8 The
combination of these two very different expectations means that Principle 8 is still
very open-textured and vague despite the connections that the GC tries to develop
between it and international environmental soft law more generally. This is
because the link it has with the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 are constructed
without them being apparent, as is the case with the precautionary approach, for
instance. The lack of an apparent intersubjective framework means that the
vagueness inherent in the concepts in Principle 8 has different functional
implications for social learning than Principle 7.
Principle 9 requires that "business should encourage the development and
diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies." 79 Given the reliance of the
other two principles on Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, this principle appears
to have been directly adapted from Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration, which
requires that:
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for

sustainable development by improving scientific understanding through

74. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles-Principle8, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle8.html (last visited Nov.15, 2009).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. AGENDA 21, supranote 68, at 130.26.
78. Rio Declaration,supranote 73.
79. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles Principle 9, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle9.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing
the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies,
including new and innovative technologies.80
The idea that states should adopt the "best available technology" or "best
practical means" for doing something is a common requirement of many
multilateral agreements, and therefore more could have been added to the
provisions of these principles had the GC chosen to do so. 81 Compared with
Principles 7 and 8, this principle is arguably more defined but still remains open
textured in the direction it gives to actors.
This discussion highlights the possibility that these environmental principles,
which have developed out of qualitative concepts like "precaution" or
"responsibility," might encourage a range of actors with a variety of beliefs to
internalize their meaning for themselves. Actors have different values and beliefs
behind why they might protect and preserve the natural environment and resources.
These values and beliefs elicit not only different responses from actors, but the
depth of reaction to the same problem might also vary significantly.8 2 For instance,
a state might preserve a rainforest for its biodiversity but may also do so because
of the aesthetic, spiritual, historical, or symbolic value that it has for all or
particular parts of its current or future population. The diversity of values in the
context of a regime like the GC, where corporations and other stakeholders like
governments, civil society, and labor organizations are involved in different ways
is bound to be significant.
Additionally, the GC has generated principles in terms that presume their
relevance for what corporations might value. This suggests that identifying what
relevance the principles have for corporations is in itself a function of the GC
governance framework rather than something to be presumed. It also means that to
view the GC environmental principles as a norm that requires compliance
constitutes approaching their role and function in potentially unproductive ways. In
fact, Kell and Ruggie, as two main architects and drivers of the GC, have noted
that it was not designed as a code of conduct. They write that: "Instead, it is meant
to serve as a framework of reference and dialogue to stimulate best practices and to
bring about convergence in corporate practices around universally shared
80. Rio Declaration,supranote 73.
81. See Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art 6, openedfor signatureNov.
13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983) (requiring that
states adopt the "best available technology"); The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art.
194, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No., 103-39 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994) (requiring that states adopt what are practically the best available means at their
disposal to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment). Other treaties reference
the principles in water pollution agreements. See Convention of the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, openedfor signature Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M
1312 (entered into force Oct. 6, 1996); Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic, openedfor signature Sept. 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1069 (entered into force on Mar.
25, 1998) [hereinafter OSPAR Convention].
82. This point has been used for criticizing the use of abstract principles within the GC
framework. See Deva, supranote 2, at 129-33.
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values." 83 In other words, the participation of corporations is important for creating
meaning from the environmental principles used in the GC and it cannot be
presumed that they are values to which corporations naturally relate.
The relevance of the abstract and open-textured style of Principles 7, 8, and 9
in the GC as discussed can also be contextualized by comparing them with other
voluntary codes developed internationally for transnational corporations. For
instance, the OCED Guidelines also provides recommendations for how
international businesses should conduct themselves in relation to a range of areas,
including the protection of the environment.8 4 In comparison, for instance, the
OECD Guidelines do not use an abstract abbreviation of the precautionary
principle but instead define it in full and in a way that has subtle and important
differences to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 5 In other words, they seek to
specify in a more precise way how the precautionary principle has to be interpreted
by the international business community. This does not appear to have provided
effectively for the application of the precautionary principle to corporations, as is
apparent for instance in the issues raised during the 2004 Annual Meeting which
reviewed the OECD Guidelines.8 6 This is because certain concepts-like risk-are
open textured and potentially applicable to all sorts of instances of corporate
activity. More importantly, what constitutes an acceptable approach to risk was
identified as important for the public sector to define rather than individual
corporations, which might vary significantly in their approaches. 87 It appears from
83. Georg Kell & John Ruggie, Global Markets and Social Legitimacy: The Casefor the "Global
Compact" 8(3) TRANSNAT'L CORPS. 101, 104 (1999).
84. In particular, Ch. 5 of the OECD Guidelines provides eight different, fairly detailed
recommendations for international business. The Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications, at 28-29,
OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL (2001).
85. The OECD Guidelinesprovides that:
Consistent with the scientific and technical understanding of the risks, where there are threats of serious
damage to the environment, taking also into account human health and safety, not use the lack of full
scientific certainty as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent or minimize such
damage.
Id. at 28.
86. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, ROUNDTABLE ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: ENCOURAGING THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS TO
ENVIRONMENT THROUGH THE OCED GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES-SUMMARY OF
THE ROUNDTABLE DiscussioN (June 16, 2004), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/24/33805553.pdf. See also

Elisa Morgera, An Environmental Outlook on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
ComparativeAdvantage, Legitimacy, and Outstanding Questions in the Lead Up to the 2006 Review, 18
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 751 (2006) (discussing the environmental provisions of the OECD
Guidelines).
87. In the report of the 2004 meeting it was noted that:
[W]hereas the question of where to draw the line between government and corporate responsibility is an
important cross-cutting issue, it is, particularly pertinent in the context of risk management. As a
corporate representative said, few, if any activities are risk-less and so it is unrealistic to expect
companies to shun all environmental risks. This is one reason why companies cannot be left alone
managing risk; there needs to be a degree of involvement on the part of government and civil society to
discuss inter alia what constitutes acceptable risk levels.
OECD DIRECTORATE, supranote 86, at 8.
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this that spelling out particular formulations of the ideas contained within
abstractly defined environmental principles does not necessarily predispose them
to being applied more easily by corporations.
The next section discusses the potential of corporations to actually share a
culture at the international level, one which values anything in particular that is
traditionally of concern to the public at large and to states in particular. This
argument seeks to position the environmental principles as norms that have
significance for how corporations might be learning to collectively identify with a
particular culture rather than to regulate how they should act in particular ways.
III. COLLECTIVE LEARNING THROUGH THE GLOBAL COMPACT
An important criticism of the GC discussed above relates to whether the
objectives of the UN expressed through the principles and the GCO can be
reconciled with the needs and preferences of private enterprise. 8 As an alternative,
Ruggie has argued that, although the principles established as part of the GC were
developed by states, their adoption by corporations suggests that they are also able
to "encompass the sphere of transnational corporate activity." 89 Part of the
difficulty with this debate is the presumption that the principles are values and that
the GC is being built on a value-based platform. As discussed above, the
environmental principles of the GC are open-textured or abstract norms that
require actors to engage with them in order to create meaning from them.
The important question seems to be whether corporations are capable of
"genuinely political activity" within the international order, either within or "apart
from" the system of states. 90 States engage in politics because they might be trying
to solve cooperation problems by creating norms and transacting together.
Ideational and normative structures develop, for instance, out of needing to solve
issues that require the cooperation of actors such as preventing the depletion of the
ozone layer. Whether the direct or diffused interactions of corporations with each
other are capable of generating shared culture or intersubjectivity is an important
issue. The potential of abstract and open norms like environmental principles to
generate meaning for a group of corporations should not necessarily be presumed.
Traditionally, it has been the ability of corporations or civil society
organizations to pressure states, intergovernmental negotiations, and international
agencies that has dominated research agendas. 91 This research agenda is a
reflection of a dominant and persistent ideology that still sees states as "the
88. See ENGSTROM, supranote 15, at 46-48.
89. Ruggie, supranote 64, at 516.
90. Id. at 502. See also Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and
World Civic Politics, 47(3) WORLD POLITICS 311 (1995) (for a discussion of world civil politics as
practiced by NGO's, TEAG's & environmental activists and how this discussion is relevant to the study
of world politics). Some have in fact turned these issues around and have investigated the potential role
of private actors to compensate for the lack of initiative shown by states to fix or provide public goods,
See Christoph Knill & Dirk Lehmkuhl, PrivateActors and the State: Internationalizationand Changing
Patternsof Governance, 15 GOVERNANCE 41 (2002).
91. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
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primary form of political organization." 92 There are different ways in which the
role of transnational corporations and civil society organizations are being
rationalized within the international order in relation to public matters like the
environment. Wapner, in 1995, developed the idea of "world civic politics" to
argue that, at the international level, there was political activity apart from the
state.93 A second idea points out that there are "deeper processes of globalization at
work that are producing a disengagement of law and state."94 This liberates other
entities, including individuals and transnational corporations, to have a significant
say in the processes of globalization.95 Importantly, Cutler has argued that the main
problem with questions about the political activity of entities like transnational
corporations is that "conventional theories of international relations and
international law are incapable of capturing" private authority.96 She argues that
the "analytical, theoretical and ideological orientations" of these disciplines render
such authority "non sequitur." 97 In the case of many approaches to international
relations, states are still the primary actors responsible for change within the
international order.98 Public international law is even more explicitly state-centric,
as it provides that only states can create law. 99 These ideas suggest the potential
difficulty with transnational corporations shaping their own collective
understanding of culture or norms relating to public issues.100
There is also the challenge of basing discussions of the political activities of
corporations around norms. This is captured by Sol Picciotto, who highlights the
"complex and multi-layered interactions between laws, codes and guidelines,
operating locally, nationally, transnationally, regionally, and internationally."10 1
Santos also makes similar points in stating that: "Our... life is constituted by an
intersection of different legal orders, that is by interlegality. Interlegality is the...

92. Ruggie, supranote 64, at 502.
93. Wapner, supra note 90. See also Ruggie, supranote 64 (considering this idea in the context of
the GC).
94. A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 33 (Rodney H. Bruce &

Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
95. See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 181-82 (2d

ed., LexisNexis Butterworths 2002) (discussing how these transnational identities are affecting and
deepening the process of globalization through their global influence).
96. CUTLER, supra note 94, at 2.

97. Id.
98. See Ronen Palan, Recasting Political Authority: Globalization and the State, in
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS: PERSPECTIVES FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY

139, 140 (Randall

Germain ed., 2000).
99. For instance, the I.C.J. only recognizes the role of civilized nations in creating general
principles of law. See Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38(1)(c) (1946).
100. For a good survey and examination of the role of "multinational enterprises" in governance,
see Lee Tavis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487
(2002).
101. Sol Picciotto, Introduction: What Rules for the World Economy?, in REGULATING
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND LIBERALIZATION 17 (Sol Picciotto and Ruth Mayne eds., 1999),

(citing Scott H. Jacobs, Regulatory Co-operationfor an Interdependent World: Issuesfor Government',
in Regulatory Cooperationfor an Interdependent World, OECD, Paris (1994)).
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key... post-modem conception of law."1 02 These ideas suggest that, even if we are
able to observe change in corporate behavior toward a more socially responsible
approach, ascertaining its cause in a complex world is difficult if not impossible.
On the other hand, Cutler has argued in her scholarship on private authority that
"the mercatocracy [actually] functions to provide a unity of purpose and a
coherence in regulation... ."10 She suggests that this is "obscured by notions of
pluralistic or fragmented governance." 104 That is, concepts and ideas used in public
international law make the mercatocracy appear more fragmented and pluralistic
than they are.105 Cutler's views imply that the approaches of corporations to issues
are not that seemingly fragmented to prevent its study or even to suggest that they
can potentially instantiate cultures of particular kinds. 106 The issue of concern is
more in terms of the indeterminate nature of how corporations come to prefer
certain things, as highlighted by Santos and Sol Picciotto in the above references to
their work, rather than whether they can collectively identify with something in
particular.
A. Engagement and the Instantiation of a Collective Culture Through the Global
Compact
It is therefore arguably important to consider why corporations might work
together or participate in collectively organized initiatives, as well as whether they
can or will engage in political activities at the international level-in other words,
why corporations might wish to interact directly or diffusely through, for instance,
the GC. In a 2007 study, McKinsey & Company, who interviewed around 391
chief executive officers (CEOs) and top executives of corporations who were at
that time participants in the GC, noted the following: "Most businesses are facing
overwhelmingly large ESG issues that span regions and industries, and threaten
their long-term viability. More and more, businesses are collaborating to level the
playing field-working in multi-sector partnerships with civil society
organizations, governments, and each other."10 7 This comment highlights both the
pressure to take responsibility for environmental stewardship and the need to level
the playing field as reasons why corporations might collaborate through the GC.
McKinsey & Company also asked leaders within corporations to select
"developments linked to accelerated global patterns of growth as the three most

102. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 95, at 473.

103. CUTLER, supra note 94, at 31.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Peter T. Muchlinski, "Global Bukowina" Examined: Viewing the Multinational
Enterprise as a TransnationalLaw-Making Community, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 79-108
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
107. McKINSEY & COMPANY, SHAPING THE NEW RULES OF COMPETITION: UN GLOBAL COMPACT

PARTICIPANT MIRROR 2, 24 (2007), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/
summit2007/mckinseyembargoed until020707.pdf. The abbreviation ESG used in this quote refers to
"environmental, social and governance," id. at 6. In this same study, McKinsey & Company report that
95% of the 391 CEOs of companies they spoke to "agreed that society has greater expectations for
business to take on public responsibilities than it had 5 years ago," id at 7.
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important trends that are influencing society's expectations on businesses."1 0 8
From their responses, represented in Figure 4, corporations understand the severity
of the pressure on them to deal with environmental concerns. In this same 2007
study, McKinsey & Company also reported that many of the corporate leaders they
surveyed indicated that they viewed the GC as "one example of a coalition
organized around a wider set of ESG issues."1 09 Arguably, the GC is seen, amongst
other things, as giving corporations the chance to establish a level playing field in
terms of the social responsibility that is increasingly called for.
Figure 4 Trends influencing society's expectations of business

110

Percent of resporlents that believe the follawing trends are most
impatmnt in irdluencing society's expectations on business
Increasing environmental concern.

61

38
37

Greater demand for, and limited supply of, natural resources
Emergence of China ard Irdia in the global marketplace
Increasing

33

ichnological comnectivity

Decreasing rust in business
Grawing iluence af, and pressure fmm, NGOskinprfis

14

Backlash againstglabeaolion

12

Overburdened public sectar

12

Offshing

12

Protnctiwnism
NDOftr

None f

5
I

pse

Bure: Feb2M7 MCdfle mwy dillt UNGkifl Cuirpbd pct CMfl

Whether this belief is driven by "microeconomic imperatives," or whether it
emerges from a sense of wanting to take socially and environmentally responsible
actions cannot easily be separated."' From the beginning, however, the UN
partnership with corporations through the GC was driven by the ideology that free

108. Id. at 10.
109. Id. at 24. There are many other ways to conceptualize why corporations might choose to join
the GC. For instance, during an interview Norwegian companies said that the GC gives their companies
"a 'social licence to operate'; It is beneficial to the companies' reputation management, brand image,
employee satisfaction, recruitment, stakeholder relations, customer satisfaction etc." Gjolberg and
Ruud, supra note 6, at 11.
110. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 107, at 11.
111. See, Kell, supranote 20, at 74.
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trade and open markets would be enhanced through more socially responsible
behavior. 112 That is, the GC sought to encourage changes in the way money was
made rather than to create growth by adopting restrictions on corporate
behaviour.1 13 This rhetoric plays itself out in a variety of ways within the work of
the GC. For instance, the GCO has encouraged corporations to place importance
on the cost-effectiveness of protecting the environment. In one of its guides to the
GC, it has suggested that the precautionary approach to doing business means
avoiding damage to the environment because it is cheaper than remedying it in the
future.114 They note that an investment in environmentally safer production
methods saves money in the long term. 115
The culture the GC is seeking to promote appears to encourage an approach to
markets that is encapsulated by ideas developed within ecological economics. 116
According to Daly, who is arguably amongst the pre-eminent scholars in this field,
sustainable or ecological economics is based on distinguishing between the ideas
of development and growth. 1 7 Daly has written that:
To grow means to "increase naturally in size by the addition of material
through assimilation or accretion." To develop means "to expand or
realize the potentialities of; to bring gradually to a fuller, greater, or
better State." When something grows it gets bigger. When something
develops it gets different. The earth ecosystem develops (evolves), but
[it] does not grow. Its subsystem, the economy, must eventually stop
growing, but can continue to develop. The term "sustainable
development" therefore makes sense for the economy, but only if it is
8
understood as "development" without growth.11

112. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 11. Engstrom notes that this dimension of the GC has been
criticized as giving in to the realpolitik of the balance of power internationally. Id at 11. See in
particular the comment from the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his statement at the
launch of the GC in 1999 suggesting that the UN should "help make the case for and maintain an
environment which favours trade and open markets." Press Release, Secretary General, SecretaryGeneral Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/6881(Feb.
1,
1999),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/
19990201.sgsm6881.html.
113. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 11.
114. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT: A PRACTICAL
UNDERSTANDING
OF THE
VISION AND
NINE PRINCIPLES
54
(2002), available at

http://www.cosco.com/en/pic/research/7573381391844063.pdf

[hereinafter GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL

COMPACT].

115. Id.
116. This discussion aims to illustrate the idea of a cultural shift rather than defend it. As a result,
the discussion of ecological economics is not particularly detailed. For more information, see e.g.
Herman Daly, Sustainable Growth: An Impossibility Theorem, in VALUING THE EARTH 267 (Herman
Daly and Kenneth Townsend eds., 1993), available at http://dieoff.org/page37.htm; JOSEPH R.
DESJARDINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 87

(Thomson Wadsworth 4th ed. 2006). For an insightful and powerful critique, see MARK SAGOFF,
PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 177-200 (2004).
117. See DESJARDINS, supranote 116, at 87; see also Daly, supranote 116.
118. Daly, supra note 116, 267-68.
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To illustrate, ecological economics can usefully be contrasted to alternative
ideological approaches to consumption and production. The first of these is the
traditional market economics model, which deals with the allocation of resources
by giving priority to those who are willing to pay the most for them. 119 Also,
whether a particular resource is developed and distributed is based simply on
conceptions of consumer demand for that resource. 120 In contrast, through
ecological economics, the use of resources is "only at a rate that can be sustained
over the long term and one that recycles or reuses both the by-products of the
production process and the products themselves."1 21 Amongst other things, a
culture driven by the ideas behind ecological economics would, for instance, not
produce goods simply because there is consumer demand for them. The production
of particular goods would be limited by the potential renewal of those natural
resources needed for the process. 122
An alternative ideological and cultural approach to ecological economics
examines the lifestyle that society is seeking to sustain while we become more
aware of the impact we have on the environment and our resource use. Ecological
economics is critical of the idea of sustaining our current consumption and
production patterns. 121 One approach comes from Sagoff, who criticises the
emphasis on "scarcity and overconsumption."1 24 His arguments are complex, and a
summary would not do justice to them. This approach is based on a critique of
using the concept of scarcity to drive our understanding of consumption and
production in ecological economics because we then value nature as a resource.125
Instead, Sagoff emphasizes spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical approaches to valuing
goods, nature, and the environment. 126 These alternative approaches to ecological
economics are presented here to illustrate the other end of the spectrum on which
the standard model of market economics lies.
Generally speaking, the idea that people in any society would accept
restrictions on their consumer preferences is visionary, given current standards of
living in the developed world in particular. This suggests that the structural power
of the kind of culture for which ecological economists argue is yet to dominate
general consumption and production patterns around the world. Although there
will be natural exceptions, the culture defended by traditional market economics is
generally taken for granted. More importantly, it is difficult to see how
corporations will support an alternative culture to consumerism. In fact, it was
argued back in 1962 that our corporations were not designed or created to support
social responsibility for protecting the environment. 127 Fitzmaurice has also argued

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

DESJARDINS, supranote 116, at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 89.

124. Id. at 90; See e.g., SAGOFF, supranote 116, at 175.
125. DESJARDINS, supranote 116, at 90.
126. SAGOFF, supra note 116, at 1-3.
127. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (49th anniversary ed., 1962).
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that environmental norms have not had much of a binding influence on the
transnational mercatocracy.128
The point being made here is that a corporation's preferences and wants vary
significantly from those of other actors, whose deeper values and beliefs are not
entirely shaped by approaches to consumption and production. For corporations to
adopt preferences in favor of environmental ideals that protect future generations,
or for them to restrain how they respond to potential consumer demands, is in itself
a normative shift in behavior. This is because the more familiar environmental
concerns of corporations are with liabilities and damage to current populations
rather than restraining production on the basis of the belief that it is better for the
environment. The suggestion, therefore, that corporate behavior and culture could
change as dramatically as required by ecological economics is difficult to foresee.
This discussion does not suggest that the shift in culture or the way
corporations view and approach their business is likely to be swift. The
instantiation of a particular culture is in itself a collective learning experience. It is
arguable that corporations are beginning to take steps to instantiate a collective
culture globally where the approaches of ecological economics within business
might become the norm rather than the exception. In a survey of 400 companies
completed by the GCO in 2007, it was illustrated that an important proportion of
the businesses surveyed had some kind of environmental policies or practices in
place. 129 The findings are presented in Figure 5.

128. Malgosia Fiztmaurice, The ContributionofEnvironmentalLaw to the Development of Modern
InternationalLaw, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 12ST CENTURY:
ESSAYS INHONOUR OF KRYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 909 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
129. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 7, at 9, 33. From the 400 companies that responded to the
GCO survey, 28% had more than 10,000 employees; 41% had between 250 and 10,000 and 32% had
fewer than 250 employees. Id. at 9.
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Figure 5 Implementation of Environmental Policies and Practices by
Corporations Across Countries and Regions130
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According to the research presented in Figure 5, a significant proportion of
those corporations that have adopted environmental policies or practices have more
than 10,000 employees, which often means that they are large transnational
corporations.1 3 1 This is important because of their capacity to locate production
across national borders, to trade across frontiers, exploit foreign markets, and
organize managerial structures in a way that affects the international allocation of
resources. 132 Also, because the production and distribution networks of
transnational corporations usually span across many jurisdictions, they are more

130. Id at 33.
131. Id
132. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 5; see also PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 15 (Oxford University Press 2nd ed., 2007) (1995).
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likely to have an influence on a variety of different stakeholders.133 As a result, a
shift in the practices of transnational corporations is likely to be a much stronger
instantiation of an emerging global culture driven by an ecological approach to
issues of production and consumption.
In the 2007 McKinsey & Company report referred to earlier in relation to
Figure 4,134 it was noted that "many CEOs recognize the underlying tension
between business models wedded to increasing patterns of consumption, and the
reality of limited natural resources." 35 The findings of the McKinsey & Company
report and those of the GCO discussed above strongly suggest that companies have
started to rethink their approach to how they drive consumption of certain goods
and their involvement in the extraction of natural resources for their production.
This discussion does not suggest that the GC can of itself achieve the cultural shift
of corporations taking ecological approaches to consumption and production. In
fact, given the earlier references to the work of Santos and Sol Picciotto, it would
be inaccurate to identify a likely cause for such a cultural shift in the global
patterns of growth. Despite this, the framework of the GC and the environmental
principles within it can potentially shape and manage the interactions of
corporations, particularly the 100-plus transnational corporations which are
members of it, to instantiate or provide support for the development of such a
cultural shift. For instance, the diffusion of ideas amongst corporations and the
type of identity that the COP policy of the GCO creates are potentially capable of
establishing an important measure for instantiating a collective culture at the
international level.
IV. DIFFUSION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT

Not all ideas relating to how corporations should behave are socially
influential enough for them to be adopted or internalized. The scholarship on social
leaming and socialization in international relations has developed a focus on the
concept of diffusion because it explains one of the reasons why actors might
internalize particular ideas or intersubjective structures like normS. 136 The diffusion
of ideas, things, practices, norms, or policies is another way of referring to a
process whereby innovations are "communicated... over time among members of

133. ENGSTROM, supra note 15, at 5. See also, MUCHLINSKI, supra note 132, at 15. See, DAVID
HELD, ANTHONY
McGREw,
DAVID
GOLDBLATT &
JONATHAN
PERRATON,
GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 237 (1999) (discussing the role of
transnational corporations and global production).
134. MCKINSEY & COMPANY, supra note 107, at 11.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Kai Alderson, Making Sense of State Socialization, 27 REV. INT'L STUDIES 415, 424-25
(2001). On the idea that international organizations teach and diffuse norms, see Martha Finnemore,
InternationalOrganizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organizationand Science Policy, 47 INT'L ORG. 565, 585-86 (1993); Alexandru Grigorescu,
European Institutions and Unsuccessful Norm Transmission: The Case of Transparency, 39(4) INT'L
POLITICS 467, 467 (2002). For a more general review of diffusion in the context of international
relations, see Emily Goldman & Leslie Eliason, Introduction: Theoretical and Comparative
Perspectives on Innovation and Diffusion, in THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND IDEAS 1,

11-22. (Emily Goldman & Leslie Eliason eds., 2003).
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the social system." 1 37 Not all ideas that are diffused, however, are subsequently
adopted or utilized in particular instances. 3 Becoming aware of an idea does not
necessarily suggest that actors will adopt or internalize it within their practices. 139
The idea that actors like corporations might emulate or model themselves on
what they see in others is a concept used in the scholarship on diffusion to describe
how ideas spread across the globe. 140 The main rationale for emulating someone or
modelling what they do is the importance often placed on ideas that are readily
available and have been tried elsewhere to solve or deal with similar problems or
issues. 141 Braithwaite and Drahos distinguish modelling (or emulation) from
imitation by suggesting that it is a process with cognitive content because ideas are
communicated to others using words or images.142 As a result, emulation might
mean that a policy will only be used to shift agendas rather than that actors will do
exactly what others have done in the past. 143
Emulating or modelling as a social process is even more likely to be the case
when actors like corporations exist in a competitive global business environment.
Although Ikenberry, in the following quote, is writing about states, the ideas share
a degree of resonance with transnational and other corporations:
It appears that emulation will be most pervasive when international
competition is most intense, inasmuch as competition provides a
powerful incentive to monitor and respond to innovations developed
abroad. In cases of intense competition, the costs of failing to innovate
are highest. Moreover, the diffusion of policy practices is most likely to
occur when states share underlying cultural or social settings (although a

137. See EVERETT ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed.1995), quoted in Helge Jorgens,
Governance by Diffusion: Implementing Global Norms Through Cross-national Imitation and
Learning, in GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE CHALLENGES OF ADAPTING FORM

TO FUNCTION 246, 252 (William Lafferty ed., 2004).
138. This conceptual distinction is emphasized by Goldman & Eliason, supra note 136, at 12.

Goldman & Eliason point to the following research as shaping this idea that they summarize in their
work: Colin Bennett, How States Utilize Foreign Evidence, 11(1) J. PUB. POLICY 31, 32-33 (1991);
Colin Bennett, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It? 21 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCIENCE 215, 22223 (1991); Colin Bennett, Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross-National Adoption of Policy
Instrumentsfor BureaucraticAccountability, 10(3) GOVERNANCE 213, 214 (1997).
139. Bennett, How States Utilize ForeignEvidence, supra note 138, at 32-33 (arguing that there is
a difference between "knowledge of a foreign program, utilization of that knowledge, and the adoption
of the same program").
140. On emulation and diffusion, see in particular John Ikenberry, The InternationalSpread of
Privatization Policies: Inducements, Learning, and Policy Bandwagoning, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 88, 90 (Ezra Suleiman & John Waterbury

eds., 1990). On modelling and diffusion, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 539 (2000).

141. Kurt Weyland, The Diffusion of Innovations: A Theoretical Analysis, paper presented at the
97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, (Aug. 29 - Sept. 1, 2002),
quoted in Jorgens, supra note 124, at 252.
142. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 140, at 25.

143. Bennett, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, supranote 125, at 221.
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highly competitive environment might serve to transcend obstacles
presented by divergent cultural or societal circumstances). 144
In a competitive environment, corporations are likely to be looking for ideas
and innovations that might enhance their goals and objectives. Given that
corporations generally aim to increase their annual profits, a competitive
environment would strongly favor emulating successful initiatives or modelling
themselves to be like their peers.145
This is not to suggest that competition and the pressure for corporations to
emulate or model themselves on success have to be viewed in one-dimensional
terms. The pressure to be more socially responsible in protecting the environment
from harm and depletion of natural resources is also likely to influence
corporations to emulate others who have done this successfully. 146 As a result,
companies feeling pressure from shareholders, consumers, distributors, or the
general public would identify with other corporations who have strongly
performed in taking responsibility toward environmental stewardship. This
suggests that they are more likely to emulate or model themselves on others
because their competitive position in the market could easily be impacted in the
long run if they do not take appropriate steps in this direction.
Modelling or emulating what others do is also more about identifying with
others than simply making a rational choice to pursue a particular end. 147 This idea
can be illustrated by reference to a study of Samarco Salvamar (which produces
iron ore pellets), published through the GCO. 148 The authors of the study note that
in 1990 the company analyzed 250 profitable corporations and selected twenty-five
149
to emulate or on which to model its own operations.
Samarco Salvamar
developed projects and integrated management models into its practices, including
environmental ones, by drawing from the experiences of the twenty-five
companies it had selected for study. 150 This suggests that, although Samarco
Salvamar was rational in how it approached its operations, its decisions were
constructed by what it observed in the twenty-five corporations it studied.
The potential for ideas to diffuse amongst corporations who are participants in
the GC is likely to be strong. This is because of the pressure they must feel not
only to perform competitively to increase profits, but also to act in more socially
responsible ways-particularly in relation to the environment. The demonstration
of successful innovations in relation to environmental initiatives that can generate
income for corporations is likely to have an important causal effect on them. There
are at least three arguments as to how corporations, as participants of the GC, are
144. Ikenberry, supranote 140, at 103, quoted in Goldman & Eliason, supranote 136, at 15-16.
145. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 140, at 539.
146. See discussion supra Figure 4 (summarizing some of the findings of the 2007 McKinsey &
Company report, particularly in relation to the pressures on CEOs to be socially responsible).
147. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 140, at 30.

148. Cldudio Bruzzi Boechat & Fundaglio Dom Cabral, One Company, One Idea: Samarco
Salvamar Project, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 46, at 37, 37-38.

149. Id. at 38.
150. Id.
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likely to increase the potential for the diffusion of ideas through emulation or
modelling because of the social influence that others might have directly or
diffusely on the participants:1 5 1
1. In the 2007 survey completed by the GCO, it was reported that 63%
of the companies that had joined the GC did so to encourage the
general public to "increase trust" in them. 152 In addition, 53% were
there to network with others.153 This compares with 20% who
wanted to improve their market access to their business. 154 This
suggests that the potential of social influence during their
interactions in any GC initiatives is more likely than not because
otherwise
their engagement with others might prove
counterproductive. For instance, misrepresentations by companies
might lead certain stakeholders like NGOs to label them as bluewashing their image, which might in turn impact their image
internationally. 1 5
2.

The GCO has reported that, in 2007, 69% of their participants were
actively communicating with them on the progress they were making
toward implementing the core principles of the GC. 15 6 As previously
discussed,15 7 these reports are publicly available for comments from
GC stakeholders, and are published on the official Web site of the
GC for the general public to view. Competitors of corporations that
submit a COP can easily view their reports and assess how they
perform in terms of implementing the environmental principles.

3.

Some corporations themselves take an active role within the GC
framework in diffusing ideas and innovations that are consistent with
the core principles. For instance, the BMW Group has put itself
forward to share its work through case studies on how its operations
and those of its subsidiaries implement the GC principles. 58 A case
study produced by Designworks, a subsidiary of BMW in the United
States, highlights its sustainability management system. It points out
that it produced the study to "share its practices with other

151. This is not to suggest that there are not any other opportunities for diffusion of ideas and
innovations within the GC framework. These are just three important ones that an analysis of the GC
framework reveals as potentially useful for the purposes of diffusion.
152. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 11.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Bigge, supranote 6, at 7.
156. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 51.
157. See McKiNSEY & COMPANY, supra note 2.
158. The first case study was produced by the Center for Responsible Business at the University of
California, Berkeley. Kellie McElhaney, Michael Toffel & Natalie Hill, Designing Sustainability at
BMW Group: The Designworks/USA Experience 2 (Ctr. for Responsible Bus., Univ. of Cal., Working
Paper
No.
4,
2002),
available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/responsiblebusiness/
documents/BMW.pdf. The second report is part of a case study series produced by the Global Compact
Office, From Principlesto Practice, supranote 46, at 1.
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companies interested in the Global Compact." 159 Importantly, in
another case study, a medium-sized company in Poland, Yawal
System, highlighted how showing leadership had potential to
contribute to diffusion. Yawal System sees the dissemination of
"information and experiences gained with other local companies" as
acting in an environmentally responsible way. 160
In these direct and diffuse interactions that corporations might have with
others, the role and function of principles as part of the social process of diffusion,
and the emulation or modelling of what some do, become more apparent. Ideas or
innovations are more socially influential and will potentially diffuse across the GC
framework because they are meaningful to actors who might view them through
the cognitive frame established by either the abstract nature of the principles or
because they fit within their understanding of the qualitative dimensions of the
open-textured concepts in the principles. The social responsibility of corporations
for the environment is bound to be a relative rather than an absolute idea for
corporations, given their limited practices in this area as discussed earlier in this
chapter.161 As a result, they are more likely to engage with ideas and innovations
that fit within a cognitive frame that establishes a level playing field for themselves
and their peers. This doesn't suggest that the environmental principles of the GC
harmonize or necessarily bring about a convergence of practices.162 Actors who
actively engage with the principles give meaning to them by adopting practices
that are more consistent with their own corporate image and profile. The cognitive
frame established by the principles is more likely to cause a range of ideas and
innovations that might suit a greater diversity of corporations to emulate than if
rules and standards, which are more defined, were used as part of the GC. In fact, it
has been suggested that "diffusion appears far less deterministic and much more
vulnerable to local conditions than the systemic view suggests."1 63 That is, the
practices of corporations are less likely to imitate the exact ideas and innovations
that others promote, yet remain within the frame established by environmental
principles. This potentially engages a greater diversity of participants in a process
that is no less likely to instantiate a collective culture of the kind described above.
It is possible to illustrate the strength and significance of this interplay
between environmental principles and diffusion in terms of how it promotes a
diversity of social practices through two different examples of innovative practices
of corporations. Both of these examples fit within the frame vaguely established by
Principle 8 relating to corporations taking responsibility for the environment.
159. Id. at 15.
160. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT OFFICE, supranote 114, at 61.
161. See discussion supra Part 3 and Figure 5.
162. Although this article discusses diffusion in the context of collective culture and learning, it
must be pointed out that this is not the same as suggesting that corporations, through the GC, are
harmonizing their approaches to environmental issues. Harmonization assumes that all actors will
internalize the same norm, which means the same things to all of them. Given the need for actors to
participate in generating meaning from environmental principles, this article does not argue that
corporation's views are being harmonized by them.
163. Eliason & Goldman, supranote 136, at 8.
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These two examples have been distributed through one of the structured learning
environments created by the GCO.
The first is in a case study distributed by the GCO relating to British
Petroleum (BP), which in 1998 committed itself to reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (GGE) to 10% below 1990 levels by 2010.164 Each of the Business
Units (BU) of BP are given annual emission allocations. In 2000, one of its BU
upgraded its activities, which would cause it to exceed its allocated GGE. It bought
allowances from another BU of BP that had recently upgraded a furnace, which
had given it some spare allowances. 161 In this example, the potential for growth did
not push BP to adopt an alternative preference of increasing its GGE.
In a different case study, also distributed by the GCO, Eskom (the largest
supplier of electricity in Africa) is noted in 2000 to have introduced a demand-side
management (DSM) system giving customers the option to use less electricity
during peak periods and to save money as a result. 166 With drops in consumption,
this would significantly delay the need for Eskom to upgrade its networks and
build additional power plants.167 Eskom established a DSM department to educate
the community about the potential to consume electricity in a sustainable way. 168
In reducing electricity consumption, Eskom also reduced the total GGE from
power stations. 16 9 The environmental gains from this initiative would have been
significant, given that the electricity sector in 2003 contributed to 15% of South
Africa's gross domestic product.17 0 Its corporate identity would probably have
matured into a consumer-oriented transnational corporation. Other corporations
may not only model themselves on Eskom when faced with problems that require
financial solutions, but might proactively consider developing practices that would

enhance their market presence.
Comparing the above two examples highlights the different approaches taken
to reducing GGEs. Although their reasons for doing so were different, both
companies are able to claim greater relative responsibility for protecting the
environment. BP made internal changes to the way it managed its business units
whereas Eskom sought to change consumer demand for its products. This suggests
that both activities would be meaningful to different corporations because Principle
8 is able to accommodate a variety of ways in which ideas might diffuse across to
other corporations who, like them, are seeking to modify their practices.
Some might argue that the cognitive frame is too broadly established through
the environmental principles because they encourage diffusion that might be only
164. GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supranote 114, at 62.

165. Id.
166. M. Moshoeshoe & D. Sonnenberg, Eskom and the Flexible Hot Water Load Management
Control System, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supranote 46, at 65, 66-67.
167. Id. at 72-74.
168. Id. at 66.
169. Cornis Van Der Lugt, Introduction, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY,
supranote 46, at 5, 9.
170. Moshoeshoe & Sonnenberg, in EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra
note 166, at 72.
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weakly connected to the kind of stewardship that matters for protecting the
environment and depletion of natural resources. That is, corporations might use the
breadth of the principles to legitimize emulating practices that are less costly to
them. In the context of collective learning of a new culture described above, this is
not necessarily an issue for a longer term view of the kind of role or function that
environmental principles play within the GC. This argument, however, doesn't
deal with the potential that the specific properties of innovations have to cause
diffusion of certain ideas and innovations.1 7 1 That is, the presence of certain
characteristics in ideas and innovations predisposes them to being more easily
diffused than others. In this way, environmental principles are able to frame certain
types and kinds of ideas that more actors want to emulate or model themselves on.
The example discussed in this next section relates to this point because it shows
how the characteristics of an idea can socially influence others not just because
they are cognitively framed by the environmental principles of the GC.
A. SeparatingInnovationfrom the Local Context
It has been argued that diffusion is most successful when policy innovations
can be separated from the "specific national contexts in which they evolved."1 72
This is likely to be even more important in the case of the GC, which engages
corporations from 116 countries around the world. 173 In such cases, the ideas in
themselves can socially influence corporations whether or not they are financially
beneficial to them in the short term. For instance, this can be seen through a
number of case studies conducted for the purposes of distributing them through the
GCO, where there are strong references to transnational and other kinds of
corporations

working

with

external

stakeholders

like

consumers,

non-

governmental organizations, and local communities. For instance, Skanska (a
Swedish construction company), when operating in Sri Lanka, realized that its
success in achieving compliance with ISO 14001 meant that it had to run
"awareness-training program for all employees from the beginning of the
project."1 74 However, in the same case study Skanska is criticized by comments
171. See Jorgens, supra note 13737, at 254-55. The following are important for diffusion:
(1) the existence of international or transnational channels of communication through which
information on policies in other political constituencies can be communicated;
(2) the specific properties of policy innovations;
(3) the specific structure of the problem that a given policy innovation is expected to deal with; and
(4) the national capacities for adopting particular policy innovations.
172. Jorgens, supra note 13737, at 256; See also Paul DiMaggio & Walter Power, The Iron Cage
Revisited: InstitutionalIsomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields,48 AM. Soc.
REV. 147, (1983); David Strang & John Meyer, InstitutionalConditionsfor Diffusion, 22 THEORY AND
Soc'y 487, 491 (1993).
173. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supranote 7, at 8.
174. Hans De Geer & Daniel Stridsman, In Search of Ecological Excellence: Skanska's
Environmental Management at the Kukule Ganga Hydropower Project, in EXPERIENCES IN
MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 46, 13, 19. For information on ISO 14001 as an
environmental management tool, see International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14000
Essentials,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso catalogue/management standards/iso 9000 iso 14000/iso 14000 essential
s.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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through interviews suggesting that "Skanska could have ensured greater credit for
its environmental work had it engaged more with local communities and NGOs in
dialogue."1 7 5 It cannot be assumed that corporations would necessarily pay
attention to the details of this kind of case study published on the GC website.
However, those interested in implementing ISO 14001 will find this criticism of
Skanska useful for their own management practices.
In an alternative case study, the efforts of Shell International Ltd are
highlighted by the GCO in the way it consulted with local and international nongovernmental organizations and indigenous peoples during an appraisal and
exploration operation in the Camisea region in Peru. 176 Shell also used the
Smithsonian Institute, a corporate/nongovernmental organization-funded body, to
conduct the biodiversity assessment required for the area.17 7 Shell International is
quoted as seeing these measures as building trust between different groups to better
deal with operational issues and to make "positive contribution to conservation."s1 7
This level of engagement with local communities is also clearly visible from other
companies, such as those in the oil and gas industry whose impact on biodiversity
loss is most significant.
As abstract concepts, both the precautionary approach and the need to
promote greater environmental responsibility point to an episteme requiring that
1 79
companies manage "'human beings in their interaction with the environment."'
In the case of the precautionary principle or approach, engaging with local
communities and non-governmental organizations will allow accurate
environmental impact assessments to be prepared before a project begins. It will
also assist with monitoring and precautionary measures to be taken during a

project. In the case of the principle relating to environmental responsibility, the
GCO has pointed out that corporations which have decided to adopt this principle
must "contribute to environmental awareness in company locations" and
"communicate with the local community." 8 o Agenda 21, which is referred to by
the GC in giving its environmental principles a degree of intersubjectivity,
confirms this view by identifying the need for business to foster "openness and
dialogue with employees and the public.""' From these case studies, it would not
be difficult to see how corporations entering new jurisdictions could benefit from
engaging with local communities, delegating responsibility for aspects of the
environmental assessment work to them, and collaborating with local NGOs to
ensure that appropriate precautionary measures are taken based on local knowhow. Both case studies discussed above would serve as useful models for
companies to consider while ensuring they engage with the environmental
principles of the GC.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Van Der Lugt, Introduction,supra note 169, at 7.
GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supranote 114, at 56.
See id.
Id.
Van Der Lugt, Introduction,supra note 169, at 6.
GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supranote 114, at 59.
AGENDA 21, supranote 68, at 130.3, 30.26.
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This discussion highlights the potential of the environmental principles to
cognitively frame the advantages that come with corporations emulating or
modelling themselves on what others do. The potential breadth of ideas and
innovations that corporations can adopt while they remain engaged with the
principles is clearly an issue. However, this notion is tempered by the idea that
diffusion is in itself a much more complex process that can lead corporations to be
socially influenced to adopt practices that might require more from them than if
they were left to their own devices.
V. IDENTITY AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT

In addition to diffusion, it is also arguable that, through its mandatory
requirements for reporting, the GCO is also helping to define the type of social
identity that some corporations might be willing to adopt as participants of the GC.
Wendt, in his Social Theory of International Politics, describes the potential for
types of identities to develop internationally. 18 2 For instance, an agent could be
typified as a corporation because of the behavioral traits that it might share with
other entities like it. A type of identity exists because actors share certain
characteristics with other actors, which have a social meaning in particular
contexts. The social meaning of a particular type of identity may develop in a
variety of ways-including, for instance, "less formal membership rules that define
what counts as a type identity and orients the behaviour of [o]thers toward it."1 83
To identify something as a particular type of agent does not mean that it operates
in that way under all circumstances. If a type of identity is defined culturally, then
all agents including corporations can identify with different cultural forms in
varying ways and at different times.184 It is the cultural form that an agent takes up
as its identity that also shapes its interests and preferences. 8
The idea that the GC seeks to create "corporate citizenship" through the UN is
consistent with generating a type of a corporation that is a participant in the
developing framework. 18 6 The GCO, in a 2006 study, highlighted that "the
percentage of companies communicating progress increases with the length of their
participation in the Global Compact."187 In this report, the GCO produces figures
that show that 95% of corporations have submitted a COP when they have been
participants in the GC for six years.188 This is comparable to the 27% who submit a
COP after having been a member of the GC for two years. 189 These figures suggest
that membership in the GC is taken more seriously the longer the corporation

182. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 225 (1999). Wendt's

book is primarily concerned with states, but the theories of symbolic interactionism he draws on
originate from a variety of different sources in the literature on social psychology and arguably have
equal relevance to other corporate actors like transnational and other corporations.
183. Id. at 226.
184. Id. at 230.
185. Id. at 231.
186. On the use of the idea of "corporate citizenship," see discussion supra note 2.
187. LEADING THE WAY, supra note 49, at 5.

188. Id.
189. Id.
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remains a participant in the framework. It also indicates that citizenship or the type
of identity for corporations seems to matter, given the higher percentage of
established members completing a COP. From this, it is arguable that the COP
creates a citizenship test for corporations who wish to remain active participants in
the GC.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a COP must state what a company has
done in support of the GC.1 90 It must describe practical actions it took in the
reporting year to implement its core principles. It must also measure outcomes or
specify what it expects them to be. Finally, the chief executive, chairman or some
other senior executive of the company must cover the COP that is publicly
distributed and put it on the GC website with a letter or a statement giving the GC
its continuing support. 191 For instance, in the covering letter of the COP submitted
by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), 192 the largest engineering and
manufacturing company in India, the Director for Human Resources wrote the
following:
BHEL is an environment[al] friendly company in all its activities,
products & services, beside[s] providing safe and healthy working
environment to all its stakeholders....The company reiterate[s] its
commitment to United Nation's Global Compact Programme and the set
of core values enshrined in its ten principles on human rights, labour
standards, environment and anti-corruption and intent [sic] to advance
G.C. principles within the company's sphere of influence and has made
it part of the strategy, culture and day-to-day operations.193
It might be argued that the process of committing to the GC and having to
reaffirm this annually seems like a performance. This process is important,

however, in the symbolic effect it has in creating a particular type of a corporation.
Importantly, for companies that have set out their COP in this way it is apparent
that their commitments and how they have implemented them are framed through
the core principles. 194 What this discussion suggests is that the type of corporation
that is created through the GC is managed by environmental principles, creating
for them the terms of their identity within the particular framework. This type of

identity is important for instantiating a collective culture that values the future
through shifts in attitudes to consumerism and production.

190. In relation to the COP, see discussion supra note 49 and accompanying text.
191. POLICY FOR COP, supranote 49, at 1.
192. ANIL SACHDEV, BHEL's COMMITMENT IN SUPPORT OF U.N.G.C. PROGRAMME (June 17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/search
participant.htnl?submit_ x page (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
193. S. K. JAIN, BHEL's COMMITMENT IN SUPPORT OF UN'S GLOBAL COMPACT PROGRAMME
(2007), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/data/ungc cops resources/6D688856-BCEB4600-AB86-3F27657C9EAB/COP.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
194. For example, in a study compiled by the GCO to highlight samples of what other corporations
do, the style of COP used by Grupo Pao de Agicar suggests that principles shape how their reporting is
done, and presumably the way their goals are also established for the following year. See LEADING THE
WAY, supranote 49, at 18, 19.
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VI. CONCLUSION: FUNCTION AND ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES, SOCIAL
LEARNING AND THE GLOBAL COMPACT
From a survey of around 100 Fortune Global 500 companies, Ruggie notes
that "companies generally do not 'adopt'... verbatim" any of the human rights
norms in voluntary codes of conduct developed internationally including the GC
principles. 19 5 "Several indicated in their optional responses that[,] while they were
'influenced by' or 'support[ed]' these instruments, their policies do 'not explicitly
adhere' to or 'explicitly reference' them." 196 This study did not extend to the
environmental principles of the instruments used for the survey, but it is highly
likely that a similar response would be given for the environmental principles of
the GC which, as discussed above, are abstract and open-textured. Given this
possibility, an examination of the ability of environmental principles to interplay
with processes that emphasize social influence might reveal more about their
potential role and function within the GC framework. This is important given the
success of the initiative in establishing a strong membership base amongst
corporations and other stakeholders. It means that less focus needs to be placed on
compliance which might discount the value of the long-term nature of collective
learning and macro-cultural change in international politics, and regulation of the
behavior of actors resulting from it.
Importantly, it cannot be presumed that environmental principles have
established the requisite intersubjectivity to determine corporate practices. This is
so particularly because the international community has not successfully engaged
corporations in shaping how issues of public concern are dealt with. Despite this,
the environmental principles of the GC framework might, through social influence,

give corporations the opportunity to create meaning from them rather than
intersubjectively share in their understanding of protecting the environment from
particular patterns of consumerism or production. That is, as abstract or opentextured norms, they might not establish the precise logic for what is the
appropriate thing to do; however, this does not suggest that initiatives to shift
corporate approaches in favor of taking precautionary measures, for instance, are
not useful. Changes in the individual preferences of corporations of whatever kind
are an instantiation of an emerging culture at the international level. That is, to
shift a particular cultural understanding of consumerism and production,
corporations have to engage in collective learning experiences that can only begin
by socializing them into changing their preferences in favor of taking initiatives
toward environmental stewardship.
It is in the context of this approach to collective learning that this chapter has
explored the role and function of environmental principles within the GC
framework. In focusing on social practices of particular communities of actors, the
particular role and function of environmental principles are more concretely

195. JOHN G. RUGGIE, HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OF FORTUNE

GLOBAL 500 FIRMS: RESULTS OF A SURVEY 5 (2006), available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-survey-Fortune-Global-500.pdf (last visited May 15, 2008).
196. Id.
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defined and examined. The characterization of environmental principles as
cognitively framing the diffusion of ideas and innovations, and the type of ways
that corporations might identify themselves in relation to others, explains how they
might collectively learn to take ecological approaches to consumerism and
production.
Modelling and emulating what others do can happen because of the social
influence that competition has on corporations that are judged in comparison to
others like them. Also, certain ideas and innovations have greater potential to be
diffused because of their particular qualities which might influence some
corporations. This is because they can be abstracted from the local environment
where they were learned in the first place. Environmental principles can frame how
corporations might react to social influences by making certain things appear
rational or useful to them. For instance, competition might be established on a
more level playing field if corporations know that it is their interpretation of the
three environmental principles of the GC on which they might be judged by the
increasingly sensitive attitudes that the general public has to environmental
stewardship. Alternatively, a particular idea might appear even more useful to a
corporation that can see how the international community has come to
contextualize it in terms of protecting the environment. Engaging local
communities in a project and in environmental impact assessment studies, for
instance, might seem even more rational or useful because it is consistent with
taking a precautionary approach.
Further, the abstractness or the open-textured nature of the environmental
principles means that corporations that do not identify exactly with how others

view stewardship can still engage with and be part of the GC framework. The
greater the number of participants who accept the citizenship test of submitting
COPs will also be instantiating the cultural change discussed above. This is
because of the way that the terms for the type of identity that the GC seeks to
encourage emerge from the corporations interpreting the environmental principles
for themselves. The public nature of the submissions of COPs exposes
corporations to the social influence that others can have on them. The abbreviated
and abstract presentation of the precautionary approach in Principle 7, for instance,
means that stakeholders and the general public can potentially draw from a much
wider range of knowledge areas to influence corporations. Similarly, the opentextured nature of the term "responsibility" in Principle 8 means that the entire
gamut of Chapter 30 of Agenda21 can be deployed in ways that might help to
socially influence corporations through analysis of their COPs. This is not to
suggest that the environmental principles cannot provide the basis for abuse.
However, by establishing the basis for their interplay with particular kinds of
social influence, the GC framework provides a valuable opportunity for
corporations to take seriously the idea of instantiating a culture, which may exert
structural pressure on others that might never align themselves toward taking
social responsibility.
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CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT SOVEREIGNTY
RACHEL DENAE THRASHER* AND KEVIN P. GALLAGHER"

This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world tradingregime
leaves nations the "policy space" to deploy effective policy for long-run
diversification and development and the extent to which there is a convergence of
such policy space under global and regional trade regimes. We examine the
economic theory of trade and long-run growth and underscore the fact that
traditional theories lose luster in the presence of the need for long-run dynamic
comparative advantages and when market failures are rife. We then review a
"toolbox" of policies that have been deployed by developed and developing
countriespast andpresent to kick-start diversity and development with the hope of
achieving long-run growth. Next, we examine the extent to which rules under the
World Trade Organization(WTO), trade agreements between the European Union
(EU) and developing countries, trade agreements between the United States (US)
and developing countries, and those among developing countries (South-South, or
S-S, agreements) allow for the use ofsuch policies. We demonstrate that there is a
great divergence among trade regimes over this question. While S-S agreements
provide ample policy space for industrial development, the WTO and EU
agreements largely represent the middle of the spectrum in terms of constraining
policy space choices. On the far end, opposite S-S agreements, US agreements
place considerablymore constraintsby bindingparties both broadly and deeply in
their trade commitments.
I. INTRODUCTION

Development is a long-run process of transforming an economy from
concentrated assets based on primary products, to a diverse set of assets based on
knowledge. This process involves investing in human, physical and natural capital
in manufacturing and services and divesting in rent seeking, commerce, and

* Rachel Denae Thrasher is a research fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the
Longer-Range Future at Boston University. Her work focuses on international trade agreements and
their implications for economic development in the developing countries of Latin America. She holds
both a law degree and a master's degree in International Relations from Boston University.
Kevin P. Gallagher is an associate professor of international relations at Boston University and
faculty fellow at the Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. Most recently he is
editor of the book Putting Development First: The Importance of Policy Space at the WTO and IFIs,
and the co-author of The Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin American
Industrialization.
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unsustainable agriculture.' Imbs and Waczairg 2 have confirmed that nations that
develop follow this trajectory. They find that as nations get richer, sectoral
production and employment move from a relatively high concentration to
diversity. They find such a process is a long one and that nations do not stabilize
their diversity until they reach a mean income of over $15,000.4 For many years it
has also been known that as countries diversify they also undergo a process of
deepening whereby the endogenous productive capacities of domestic firms are
enhanced through forward and backward linkages.
This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world trading regime
leaves nations the "policy space" to deploy effective policy for long-run
diversification and development, and the extent to which there is a convergence of
such policy space under global and regional trade regimes. Part I of the paper
examines the economic theory of trade and long-run growth and underscores the
fact that traditional theories lose luster in the presence of the need for long-run
dynamic comparative advantages and when market failures are rife. We then
exhibit a "toolbox" of policies that have been deployed by developed and
developing countries past and present to kick start diversity and development with
the hope of achieving long-run growth but also stress that tools alone are not the
recipe for development, that "getting the political economy right" is also of vital
importance. In Part II, we examine the extent to which rules under the World
Trade Organization (WTO), trade agreements between the European Union (EU)
and developing countries, trade agreements between the United States (US) and
developing countries, and developing country-developing country trade
agreements (or South-South, S-S) allow for the use of such policies. Part III of the
paper summarizes our findings and offers conclusions for policy and future
research. This paper is intended to assist policy-makers as they choose trade
partners that affect their ability to design long-run development strategies.
A. Trade Theory and the Long Run
The traditional trade theory that provides the backdrop and justification for
the majority of trade treaties is limited in terms of long-run growth for developing
countries. Such theories assume a static approach to technological change and
assume that there are no market failures among trading partners,6 two assumptions
that do not hold in the developing country context. This section of the paper
provides an overview of trade theory and its limitations and shows how some

1. ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE REST: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE
INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter AMSDEN].
2. Jean Imbs & Romain Waczraig, Stages of Diversification, 93 AM. EcoN. REV. 63, 83, Mar.

(2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.at 69.
5. See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1988)
[hereinafter HIRSCHMAN]; PAUL KRUGMAN, DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY
(1995) [hereinafter KRUGMAN]; AMSDEN, supra note 1.
6. See RICHARD CAVES, JEFFREY A. FRANKEL & RONALD JONES, WORLD TRADE AND
PAYMENTS 13-30 (2007) [hereinafter CAVES].
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countries have used various tools to correct for the theoretical limitations
identified.
Neo-classical trade theory demonstrates that liberalizing trade can make all
parties better off. The economist David Ricardo showed that because countries
face different costs to produce the same product, if each country produces and then
exports the goods for which it has comparatively lower costs, then all parties
benefit. The effects of comparative advantage (as Ricardo's notion became
called) on factors of production were developed in the "Heckscher-Ohlin" model.
This model assumes that in all countries there is perfect competition, technology is
constant and readily available, there is the same mix of goods and services, that
factors of production (such as capital and labor) can freely move between
industries, and there are no externalities. 9 In other words, this model is "static" and
not "dynamic" and there are no market failures.
Within this rubric, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem adds that international
trade can fetch a higher price for the products (and hence lead to higher overall
welfare) in which a country has a comparative advantage. 10 In terms of foreign
direct investment (FDI), multinational corporations (MNCs) moving to another
country) can contribute to development by increasing employment and by human
capital and technological "spillovers" where foreign presence accelerates the
introduction of new technology and investment." In theory, the gains from trade
accruing to "winning" sectors freed to exploit their comparative advantages have
the (Pareto) possibility to compensate the "losers" of trade liberalization.
Moreover, if the net gains from trade are positive there are more funds available to
stimulate growth and protect the environment. In a perfect world then, free trade
and increasing exports could indeed be unequivocally beneficial to all parties.
To some, static comparative advantage poses problems for countries who
want to sustain long-run growth. Some countries may only have a static
comparative advantage in a single commodity where prices are very volatile and
where longer-run prices are on the decline relative to industrial goods. What's
more, small initial comparative static advantages among countries in the short-run
may expand into a growing technology gap between rich and poor nations in the
longer-run. 12 If the developed world has a static comparative advantage in
innovation, it can continually stay ahead by introducing new products, even if the

7. DAVID RICARDO, ON PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 116-117 (1911).
8. See B.G. OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-27 (1967).

9. Id.
10. See Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, Protectionand Real Wages, 9 REV. OF ECON.
STUD. 58, 65 (1941).
11. See, e.g., Tiru K. Jyaraman & Balgeet Singh, Foreign Direct Investment and Employment
Creation in Pacific Island Countries: An Empirical Study of Fli, ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH AND
TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE, Working Paper Series No. 35, at 2, May 2007,
http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp3507.pdf.
12. Robert Lucas, On the Mechanisms of Economic Development, 22 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 3,
15 (1988), http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/LucasMechanicsEconomicGrowth.pdf.
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developing world eventually catches up and gains a comparative advantage in lowcost production of each old product over time. 13
In the longer-run then, what matters most is not static comparative advantage
at any one moment in time, but the ongoing pattern of dynamic comparative
advantage: the ability to follow one success with another, to build on one industry
by launching another, again and again.
Since the process of technology
development is characterized by increasing returns, many models will have
multiple equilibria. It is easy to specify a model in which the choice between
multiple equilibria is not uniquely determined by history; rather, it becomes
possible for public policy to determine which equilibrium will occur. 14 If, in such
a model, the multiple equilibria include high-tech, high-growth paths as well as
traditional, low-growth futures, then public policy may make all the difference in
development.
Neo-classical trade theory also assumes that there are no market failures
among trading partners." However, four key market failures plague nations
seeking to catch up to the developed world: coordination and information
externalities, dynamism and technological change, and human capital formation. 16
"Diversification by definition can mean the creation of whole new industries in an
economy and sometimes may require linking new industry to necessary
intermediate goods markets, labor markets, roads and ports, and final product
markets. For fifty years economic theorists have demonstrated how markets fail at
'coordinating' these efforts." 17
"Coordination failures and the asymmetric
distribution of world income has led economists to argue that the nation state
should provide 'big push' investments to build scale economies and enhance the
complimentary demand and supply functions of various industries" over the long
U .18
1
run.

While historically such efforts took the form of large industrial planning
efforts and infant industry protection, more recently industrial clustering has taken
place where nations focus on the development of specific technologies or sectors in
specific geographical regions-especially when facing scale economies. 19
Clustering and export processing zones have been created to attract foreign firms,
link them to domestic input providers, and serve as exporting platforms. 20 To
support these efforts, nations (most successfully in Asia) provide tax breaks and
drawbacks to foreign firms but required them to source from domestic firms and
13. Paul Krugman, A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the World Distributionof
Income, 87 J. OF POL. ECON. 253, 254 (1979).
14. Paul Krugman, History Versus Expectations, 106 Q. J. OF EcoN. 651, 666 (1991).
15. CAVES, supra note 6.
16. Nagesh Kumar & Kevin P. Gallagher, Relevance of 'Policy Space' for Development:
Implications for Multilateral Trade Negotiations, RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, Discussion Paper # 120, at 6, Mar. 2007, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/ Pubs/
rpRISDiscPaperl20Apr07.pdf [hereinafter Kumar & Gallagher].
17. Id.
18. Id. at 7.
19. See AMSDEN, supranote 1, at 74.
20. Id. at 75.
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transfer technology.2 1 In tandem, the state provides an educated labor force, public
R&D, tariff protection, and subsidized credit to support the domestic firms, and
provided export subsidies to the domestic firms until they could produce products
at the global technological frontier.
Markets also fail at providing the socially optimal amount of "information" to
producers and consumers as well-such phenomena are termed information
externalities.23 Technological experimentation through research and development
and the inquisitive process of entrepreneurship involve the a process of "selfdiscovery" regarding which economic activities and product lines will be the most
appropriate for a domestic economy. 24 These experimenters who tinker with
establishing or inventing new technologies to adapt to local conditions provide
enormous social value to a national economy but solely bear the course of failure
(and success). 25
These entrepreneurs need to be compensated for their
experimental nature through subsidization of exports and credit, temporary tariff
protection, patent rewards, and marketing support. Without such incentives,
entrepreneurs will be more apt to invest in historically profitable industries in the
primary product sectors.26
As hinted earlier, related to coordination and information externalities is that
trade liberalization and comparative advantage tends to produce static gains but
make dynamic gains through technological change more elusive.27 The static
models of the gains from the trade suggest that a country such as Brazil should
dismantle its industrial sector in favor of specializing in soy and meat production,
and that India should de-emphasize services and heavy manufacturing in favor of
textile and apparel specialization.2 8 These models, if deployed twenty years ago
would have told South Korea and China to focus on rice production. However,
following the lead of Japan, the United States, and Europe before them, many
nations in East Asia and Latin America fostered more diversified and higher value
added sectors over time. 29 Thirty-five years ago if South Korea and China had

21. Id. at 88.
22. See Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Industrialization and the Big Push,

97(5) J. OF POL. ECON. 1003, 1025 (1989); John Weiss, Export Growth and IndustrialPolicy: Lessons
from the East Asian Miracle Experience, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE, Discussion Paper No.
26, at 10, 21, 23, Feb. 2005, http://www.adbi.org/files/2005.02.dp26.eastasia.govt.policy.pdf.
23. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 104-7 (2007).
24. Id. at 105.

25. Id.
26. See ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
127 (1966); HIRSCHMAN, supranote 5, at 183-201; KRUGMAN, supra note 5, at 53.
27. Frank Ackerman & Kevin P. Gallagher, The Shrinking Gains from Global Trade

Liberalizationin Computable GeneralEquilibrium Models:A CriticalAssessment, 37 INT'L J. OF POL.
EcoN. 50, 70 (2008), http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/IJPEShrinkingGains.pdf.
28. Id. at 55-56; Kym Anderson & Will Martin, Agriculture Trade Reform and the Doha
Development Agenda, 28 WORLD BANK 1319, 1319-24 (2005)..
29. HA JooN CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 60-61 (2002) [hereinafter CHANG]; DANIEL OKIMOTO, BETWEEN MITI AND THE
MARKET: JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY 51 (1989).
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relied on comparative advantage we might not be driving Kias and Hyundais,
using Haier appliances or typing on Lenovo laptops.
In enabling the technological capacity of new industries, markets do not give
the correct investment signals when there are high and uncertain learning costs and
high levels of pecuniary externalities.30 In other words, technological dynamism
that leads to diversification is not guaranteed by market reforms alone. For many
of the reasons described earlier: weak capital markets, restrictive intellectual
property laws, lack of information, and poor coordination, imperfect competition
and the need for scale economies, under-investment in technologically dynamic
sectors can occur.31 Historically, to correct for these market failures nations have
encouraged joint venturing with technological transfer agreements with foreign
firms to learn technological capabilities, in addition they have invested heavily in
higher education and publicly funded research and development.32 What is more,
nations have selectively loosened intellectual property rules to allow for learning
and supported innovative firms through government procurement, export subsidies,
subsidized capital, and tariff protection.33
Although mentioned in each of these previous examples, human capital
formation is also essential for dynamic economic growth and diversification.34
Once again, private markets fall short of supplying human capital at a socially
optimal level. There are numerous arguments why markets undersupply education
and that govermments should intervene to increase the supply of educated workers.
Basic literacy and education have positive externalities such as improved health
and better participation in democratic processes-in other words the social rate of
return on education is higher than personal investment.35 With respect to learning
in private firms, firms may under-invest in the training of their workers because of
fears of high labor turnover. 36 East Asian tigers-like developed countries before
them-spent a great deal of effort providing education and training to their
people.37 This was done by spending a significant amount of funds on education
(including providing scholarships to obtain PhDs in developed countries),
30. Pecuniary externalities affect third parties through price fluctuations but not necessarily
through the misallocation of resources.
31. RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 255 (1982); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implicationsof Learning by Doing, 29 REV. OF

ECON. STUD. 155 (1962); Sanjaya Lall, Rethinking IndustrialStrategy: The Role of the State in the Face
of Globalization, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO
AND IFIs 33, 59 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2005).
32. AMSDEN, supra note 1, at 239.

33. Id. at 148; CHANG, supranote 29, at 60-61.
34. GENE N. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 122-23 (1991).
35. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).

36. Dani Rodrik, Conceptual Issues in the Design of Trade Policy for Industrialization, 20
WORLDDEV'T 309,310(1992).

37. Sanjaya Lall, Technological Change and Industrializationin the Asian Newly Industrializing
Economies: Achievements and Challenges, in TECHNOLOGY, LEARNING, AND INNOVATION:
EXPERIENCES OF NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 13, 41-46 (Linsu Kim & Richard Nelson eds.,

2000) [hereinafter Kim & Nelson].
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clustering schools in export processing zones, requiring that foreign firms hire
nationals and train them on the job, and subsidizing training programs in domestic
firms. 38 Table 1 exhibits an illustrative but far from exhaustive list of trade and
industrial policies used by East Asian and other developing economies over a 40
year period and the market failures such policies address. It is this list of policies
that will be expanded upon and analyzed in the following section.
Table 1. Tools for Correcting Market FailureS39
Market Failure
Policy Instrument
Coordination Failures
Tariff sequencing
Tax drawbacks
Infrastructure provision
Information externalities
Administrative guidance
Subsidized credit/entrepreneurship
Tariff sequencing
Patent restrictions
Scale
economies/ Tariff sequencing
technological dynamism
Technology transfer requirements
Joint Ventures
Public research and development
Compulsory licensing
Patent restrictions
Government procurement 40
Human capital formation
Public education
Local labor requirements
Movement of people
B. Getting the PoliticalEconomy Right
Some countries have been fairly successful at deploying policies to create
dynamic comparative advantages and to correct for market failures. In the
developing world, the recent standouts are Taiwan, South Korea and more recently
China. Table 2 exhibits average annual growth rates in GDP per capita for
selected regions of the world from 1960 to 2005.
Table 2: Growth in GDP Per Capita for Selected Regions, 1960 to 200541

High Income
East Asia and Pacific
China
Latin America and the Caribbean

38.
39.
40.
industry,
41.

1960-1980
5.7
3.5
3.4
2.9

1980-2005
2.1
6.6
8.6
0.5

2000-2005
2.8
7.2
8.6
1.4

Id. at 58.
Kumar & Gallagher, supranote 16, at 8.
Although countries have used various controls over government procurement to promote local
those measures, for purposes of space and time, remain outside the scope of this paper.
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 196-200 (2008).
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Today's developing nations look to these success stories as possible models
for 2 1st century policy. East Asia experienced 3.5 percent annual per-capita
income growth from 1960 to the 1980 and 6.6 percent since 1980-one of the most
impressive growth trajectories on record.42 What is more, such growth has also
corresponded with reduction in inequality and improvements in many other social
indicators.43 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain in detail the literature
on development in these nations, but experts attribute East Asian growth to four
general categories of policies. 44
Targeted industrial policy with reciprocal control mechanisms where
nations selectively secluded certain industries where they wanted to gain dynamic
comparative advantages;
Loose intellectual property rules where nations encouraged learning from
foreign nations through government R&D efforts and at times reverse engineering
goods from foreign counterparts;
The movement of people across borders for higher education and temporary
work. The best students were sent to the US and Europe to earn degrees in
science, mathematics, and technology then came home to work in targeted
industries or government;
Investment in human capital and public infrastructure where
governments invested heavily in education and provided infrastructure such as
roads, ports, and so forth.
There is considerable debate regarding the extent to which these policies were
the key drivers of growth in some countries. Nevertheless, at this point there is

widespread agreement that these policies did have some positive effect on
economic performance. The debate now centers on what level of effect that was.41
It is not the purpose of this paper to enter that debate. Nor is it the purpose of this
paper to judge the value of those policies for development. Rather, based on the
evidence that such policies have had some positive effect, this paper examines
whether developing countries are still given (or keeping) the choice to deploy them
under existing and proposed trade rules.
Whereas the East Asian nations-such as South Korea and Taiwanmanaged their integration into the world economy through gradual liberalization
and some degree of government involvement, nations in Latin American in the
Caribbean (LAC) rapidly liberalized their economies in a short period of timealong the lines currently being advocated in the Doha Round.46 As we see in Table

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: EcoNOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY 5-7 (1993) [hereinafter World Bank 1993];; Robert Hunter Wade, Is Globalization Reducing
Poverty and Inequality?, 32(4) WORLD DEV'T 567, 567, 580-81 (2004); AMSDEN, supranote 1, at 19394, 238-39;Kim & Nelson, supra note 37, at 1-5 (for useful full length treatments of development in
this region and the use of state policy tools).
45. See WORLD BANK 1993, supra note 44, at 1-6.
46. Id. at 22.
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2 for LAC, income growth since liberalization began in the 1980s has been barely
one percent annually.
Many economists have expressed caution over advising other developing
countries to follow the same path as East Asia.47 First, governments can be
pathetic in picking "winners" for industrial policy. Many governments have tried
to adopt pro-active policies and have failed miserably-in other words, meeting
market failures with government action often leads to government failure. 48
Governments have been criticized for not being able to pick winning sectors to
focus on. Indeed, there are many examples of governments picking "losers."
South Korea and Taiwan are often cited as success stories but Indonesia, Nigeria,
and Brazil have had failures that have received relatively less attention in scholarly
circles.49 In addition, subsidization and government involvement has been shown
to accentuate "rent-seeking" behavior that make it additionally difficult for
developing country governments to let go of projects that aren't going well or that
have already reached maturity. 0
Market failures are not always easy to identify and once they are identified it
isn't just a matter of pulling out a policy toolbox, grabbing a tool from one of these
lists, and hammering away. Indeed, while there is a strong theoretical justification
for pro-active government policy, development success takes much more than the
proper rationale and proper policies. Development success stories from the
twentieth century all struck a unique blend between state and markets-they got
the politicaleconomy of industrialization right.
These critiques are quite valid. Without the proper political economy
conditions, government intervention can create more problems than they correct.
However, the most successful cases in large part circumvented these problems
because governments designed policies where state actors were "embedded" in the
private sector and where the state enforced discipline on the private sector. I refer
to these phenomena as "embedded diagnostics" and "reciprocal control
mechanisms."
By definition, the presence of market failures demonstrates the inability of the
private sector to interpret the signals and trends it faces in the economy. If firms
right in the middle of the marketplace cannot always make the best decisions about
products and processes why should governments make better decisions?
To circumvent the "picking winners" problem, political economists have
shown that successful industrializers have had states that were "embedded" in the
47. See id at 367; MARCUs NOLAND & HowARD PACK, INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION: LESSONS FROM ASIA, 77-83 (2003).
48. Id.
49. See generally J. BURTON, PICKING LOSERS..."? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL
POLICY (1983); PETER EvANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
60-70 (1995).
50. ANN KRUEGER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE PROTECTION 13 (1996). [ALTERNATE
CITATION: Ann Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64(3) Am. Econ. Rev.
291 (1974).]
51. BURTON, supranote 49, at 7.
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private sector while maintaining "autonomy" from sectional elite interests seeking
rents.52 State agencies that are charged with correcting market failures have to
maintain constant communication and input with the private sector.53 Such publicprivate partnerships help both the private and public sectors "discover" what the
most pertinent market failures and other impediments to industrial development are
in an economy, and what assets there are in the economy that can be built upon,
and to pick activities that will have the largest economy-wide effects. 54
Having a good toolkit and embedded autonomy is still not enough. In fact,
public-private partnerships could become marriages of corruption and rentseeking. Successful industrial policy has also tamed the tendency of rent seeking.
In order for this to work, industrial policy has to be coupled with a good deal of
discipline and accountability for both private actors and the state. Alice Amsden
has referred to the need for "reciprocal control mechanisms."
A control
mechanism is "a set of institutions that disciplines economic behavior based on a
feedback of information that has been sensed and assessed." 56 For the East Asian
success stories, the key principle behind their use of control mechanisms was
"reciprocity":
Reciprocity disciplined subsidy recipients and thereby minimized
government failures. Subsidies were allocated to make manufacturing
profitable-to convert moneylenders into financiers and importers into
industrialists-but did not become giveaways. Recipients of subsidies
were subjected to monitorable performance standards that were
redistributive in nature and result-oriented. The reciprocal control
mechanism thus transformed the inefficiency and venality associated

with government intervention into collective good.5 7
In other words, firms have performance requirements that when they are not
met lead to a termination of supporting benefits by the state. The most successful

industrializers were able to abandon projects that were not performing whereas
others where perpetuated because bureaucrats became hijacked by business
interests who became dependent on the state. Since public policy may make a
difference in development, and, in fact, has been used successfully by some

developing nations to increase diversification and related growth, it is important to
understand the extent to which such policy space exists today.
II. TESTING FOR POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO AND BEYOND

Of the historical tools for diversity and development, which ones remain
available under the new global trading regime? Do bilateral and regional

52. See EVANS, supranote 49, at 4-20.
53. Id. at 81-83.
54. See DANI RODRIK, COMM'N ON GROWTH & DEV., NORMALIZING INDUSTRIAL POLICY 20-22

(2008), http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/RodrickNormalizing.pdf.
55. AMSDEN, supra note 1, at 8-11.
56. Alice Amsden, PromotingIndustry Under WTO Law, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE
IMPORTANCE OF POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO AND IFIS 216, 221-22 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2005).

57. Id. at 222.
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agreements further limit policy space for development? This paper examines four
trade-related areas (goods, services, investment and intellectual property) across
three agreement models. By comparing US-style, EU-style and South-South
agreements with the WTO trade disciplines we determine to what extent the
various regimes constrain policy space for member nations. In so doing we draw
important lessons from the different trade agreement models and evaluate which
are best for the purposes of promoting sustainable development in the long-run.
Table 3. Illustrative Tool Box Flexibilities
Policy Instrument

WTO&
Associated US
AgreementS59
Agree
ments

EU
Agree
mentS

South-South
Agreements
60

Tariff sequencing
Tax export incentives
"Non-tariff barriers" in X

X

X

services
Movement of natural
persons
Public education
Local

labor

requirements

Technology transfer
Domestic content61

Infrastructure
provision
Administrative
guidance
Subsidized
credit/entrepreneurship

58. As a caveat before going forward, the agreements within each trade regime are by no means
homogenous. Within each of the principal trade areas, the regimes contain some measure of variation.
This paper attempts to draw some generalizations about disciplines under each trade regime. Where the
agreements significantly depart from each other, however, the difference is noted.
59. As with all measures under the WTO, even permitted policies are subject to the two pillars to
the WTO: non-discrimination and national treatment. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I,
III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT.
60. These South-South arrangements are by far the least uniform. Thus, the designations in this
column represent generalizations from the later analysis.

61. This and other policies may be permitted despite violating certain WTO rules if they pass as
legitimate public welfare regulations. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, art. 63, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1221 (1994).
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Patent restrictions by
origin/industry/duration
Compulsory licensing
Table 3 expands the illustrative list of development policy tools in Table 1 in
the first column and then indicates whether such policies are permitted under
various trading arrangements. A "4" signifies that yes the measure is permitted; an
"x" denotes that a measure is not permitted. We go into this table in great detail
below, but an initial examination reveals that some models provide considerably
more policy space for member countries.
Policy space also varies across issue areas. In the following pages, we first
discuss the role that bilateral and regional agreements play within the multilateral
trading system. We then examine the policy space available in each of four issues:
trade in goods, trade in services, investment protection and intellectual property.
Although the agreement models are by no means homogenous, we hope to draw
some general conclusions about which trade agreements best promote long-term
development.
A. BilateralAgreements in the MultilateralSystem
Since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
1947, member countries have attempted to establish a baseline of liberalization for
global trade in goods. The creation of the World Trade Organization in 1994
expanded that vision to cover trade in services, intellectual property, and a host of
other sub-issues related to trade.62 Alongside of the multilateral trading system,
countries have clamored to sign bilateral and regional accords, broadening and
deepening their commitments to trade liberalization.63 For that reason, most
(though not all) free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) exceed
the disciplines of the WTO.
The most favored nation (MFN) clause, requiring that WTO members treat all
other members as their most favored trade partner,64 would seem to make bilateral
agreements moot. However, Article XXIV of the GATT, as well as Article V of
the GATS make room for these agreements so long as they liberalize "substantially
all" trade in goods and services.65 By fully liberalizing trade between partners,

62. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

WTO LEGAL TExTS (1994),

available at http://www

.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/legal e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
63. Theresa Carpenter, A historicalperspective on regionalism, in MULTILATERALIZING
REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM. 13, 23 (Richard Baldwin and Patrick

Low eds., 2009).
64. GATT supra note 59, at art. I.
65. GATT supra note 59, at art. XXIV (defining customs unions and free trade areas as a group of
countries in which tariffs and other restrictive measures "are eliminated on substantially all the trade
between the constituent territories"); General Agreement on Trade in Services art. V, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments Results ofthe Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] (permitting bilateral services
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proponents of the multilateral trading system hope that the agreements will act as
building blocks toward multilateral free trade.
WTO oversight has met with very limited success, however. Of the hundreds
of agreements notified, only one has ever been deemed to meet the terms of
Articles XXIV and V. 66 Still, most agreements do exceed the WTO in both
breadth and depth. US-style agreements, traditionally the most uniform and
comprehensive model, govern everything from goods and services trade to
investment protection, intellectual property, and domestic regulation among
others. 67 EU-style agreements tend to depend more on the trading partner. While
EU-Chile, EU-Mexico and the more recent EU-CARIFORUM agreements
resemble the US model, 68 EU-South Africa and EU-Tunisia cover less ground,
omitting such issues as financial services, electronic commerce, and labor and the
69
environment.

agreements provided they have "substantial sectoral coverage" and eliminate "substantially all
discrimination ... between or among the parties").
66. Roberto V. Fiorentino, Jo-Ann Crawford and Christelle Toqueboeuf, The landscape of
regional trade agreements and WTO surveillance, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM:
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 28, 35 (Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low, 2009).

67. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic - Central America FTA) Final Text, Aug. 5,
2004, Office of the United States Trade Representative [hereinafter USTR], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-centralamerica-fta/final-text [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]; North American Free Trade Agreement, May, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 605, NAFTA Secretariat, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343
[hereinafter NAFTA]; Chile FTA Final Text, June 6, 2003, USTR, available at
http://ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html
[hereinafter
US-Chile]; Singapore
FTA
Final
Text, May
6,
2003,
USTR,
available at
http://ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/FinalTexts/asset upload file708 4
036.pdf [hereinafter US-Singapore].
68. Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member
States, of one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, Nov. 11, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 352),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc 11 1620.pdf
[hereinafter
EU-Chile];
Decision No 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 - Joint Declarations Title VI,
Mar. 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 157) 10, 25 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/ oj/dat/2000/1 157/1
15720000630en00100028.pdf [hereinafter EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000]; Decision No 2/2001 of the
EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 Feb. 2001 - implementing Articles 6, 9, 12(2)(b) and 50 of the
Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, Feb.. 27, 2001, 2001 O.J. (L
70) 7, www.sice.org/Trade/mex eu/English/ DecisionsCouncil/2 2001 e.pdf [hereinafter EU-Mexico
Decision 2/2001]; Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part,
and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, CARIFORUM-E.U., Oct. 30,
2008,
2008
O.J.
(L
289/I)
3, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2
008/february/tradoc 137971.pdf [hereinafter EU-CARJFORUM].
69. Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part, E.U.-S. Afr.,
Dec. 4, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 311) 3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:1999:311:0003: 0297:EN:PDF [hereinafter EU-S.A.], and Euro-Mediterranean Agreement
establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one
part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, E.U.-Tunis., Mar. 30, 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 097) 2,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127986.pdf [hereinafter EUTunisia].
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The 1979 GATT decision on "differential and more favorable treatment" (the
"Enabling Clause") makes more room for lesser developed countries to sign
bilateral accords without demanding reciprocity or liberalization of "substantially
all" trade, as Article XXIV requires. Today, many developing countries enter into
FTAs and CUs under the Enabling Clause in order to retain extra flexibility in
complying with WTO standards. In part for that reason, many South-South
agreements seem skeletal in comparison with the north-south models. The South
Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), for example, effectively contains
commitments only in the area of goods trade.
On the other hand, the Southern
Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community (CAN) cover
as many issues as some EU agreements. Still, broader issue coverage does not
always signify deeper trade commitments. Likewise, depth of coverage within
these agreements can act as much to protect developing economies from the
outside as to liberalize within. In the next pages, we explore how differences in
agreement breadth and depth affect the policy flexibility that countries enjoy
within the global trading system.

70. Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, Jan. 6, 2004, available at www.saarcsec.org/data/agenda/.../safta/ SAFTAo2OAGREEMENT.pdf [hereinafter SAFTA].
71. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the
Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay Annex I,
Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1050, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsr7.asp
[hereinafter MERCOSUR Goods]; Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services of MERCOSUR, Dec. 15,
1997,
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
of
Brazil,
available
at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/relinter/ingles/mercosul/montv-e.asp [hereinafter MERCOSUR Services];
Protocol on Harmonization of Norms on Intellectual Property in MERCOSUR in Matters of
Trademarks, Indications of Source and Appellations of Origin, Aug. 5, 1995, 2145 U.N.T.S. 460,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/12/10/5009.pdf [hereinafter MERCOSUR
IPRs]; Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments in
MERCOSUR, Jan. 17, 1994, Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil, available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/relinter/ingles/mercosul/coloni-e.asp
[hereinafter
MERCOSUR
Investment]; Treaty of Asunci6n Annex IV, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1059, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrl1.asp
[hereinafter
MERCOSUR Safeguards]; The
Commission of the Andean Community, Decision 563: Official Codified Text of the Andean
Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement), June 25, 2003, Andean Community,
available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D563e.htm
[hereinafter Cartagena
Agreement]; The Commission of the Andean Community, Decision 486: Common IntellectualProperty
Regime, Sept. 14, 2000, Andean Community, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/
ingles/normativa/D486e.htn [hereinafter CAN IPRs]; The Commission of the Andean Community,
Decision 439: GeneralFramework ofPrinciplesand Rules andfor Liberalizingthe Trade in Services in
the
Andean Community,
June
11,
1998,
Andean
Community,
available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/D439e.htm
[hereinafter CAN Services]; The
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Decision 292: Rigimen Uniforme para Empresas
Multinacionales Andinas,
Mar.
21,
1991,
Andean
Community,
available
at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d292.HTM [hereinafter CAN Andean Business]; The
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Decision 291: Rigimen Comain de Tratamiento a los
Capitales Extranjeros y so-bre Marcas, Patentes, Licencias y Regalias, Mar. 21, 1991, Andean
Community, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d291.HTM [hereinafter CAN
Foreign Investment].
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B. Goods Trade Policies
Countries have employed many policies affecting trade in goods to promote
growth and development. Here we explore the flexibilities still available to
member countries under bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements, looking
specifically at tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers, export incentives and safeguards.
Table 4 provides a brief overview of the policy space available under the WTO
and two North-South trade agreement models.
Table 4. Goods Checklist
Policy Instrument

WTO
& US
EU
Associated
Agreements Agreements
Agreements

Tariffs
Quantitative Restrictions/Licensing
Tax Drawbacks/Deferrals and EPZs
Safeguards for injurious imports and

balance of payments72
Safeguards for shortages 73
1. Tariffs
Tariffs have long been the preferred trade barriers under the WTO and its
predecessor and underlying agreement, the GATT because they are easy to
measure, transparent to apply, and straightforward to liberalize progressively over
time. Employed carefully, countries can raise and lower tariffs to protect nascent
industries until they are ready to face global competition.74 The WTO implicitly
permits such measures, allowing countries to bind their tariff rates at or below the
current applied rates - giving little or no room for adjustments upward. 5 Table 5
provides an example, comparing bound and applied rates for photographic paper in
rolls wider than 610 mm. 76
72. The degree of procedural requirements varies greatly between agreements. See EU-Chile,
supranote 62, at arts. 92, 195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supranote 62, at arts. 15, 21.
73. Among US and EU disciplines, the rules are not identical across agreements.
74. CHANG, supranote 29, at 66.
75. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CHILE: TARIFF PROFILE, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tariffs e/tariff rofiles 2006 e/chl e.pdf (May 15, 2006). Take,
for example, Chile's tariff profile as provided by the WTO. While the simple average bound is 25.1%,
the simple average applied is much lower at 6%. This trend repeats for the countries in this study.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, CURRENT SITUATIONS OF SCHEDULES OF WTO MEMBERS (Mar. 17,
2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/schedules e/goods schedules table e.htm
(May 15, 2006) [hereinafter WTO CURRENT SCHEDULES].
76. This trend repeats itself over and over again in the countries' individual tariff schedules.
Taking a simple average of the bound rates under the RTAs and comparing it to the simple average of
the MFN applied rate across all products would prove this conclusively. Unfortunately, we were unable
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Table 5. Illustrative Tariff Comparison: Photographic paper, in rolls wider
than 610 mm (%)

Country/Agreement

WTO
binding77

Bilateral
Agreement
binding

MFN
applied
rate (avg)78

Chile: US and EU79

25.0

6.0

6.0

35.0

0.081

11.5

45.0

10.0

9.0

Nicaragua: DR-CAFTA 83

40.0

5.0

10.0

Honduras: DR-CAFTA 84

35.0

10.0

10.0

45.0

10.0

10.0

8.0

8.0

6.5

0.0

0.0

EU-Tunisia

38.0

0.0

15.0

EU-South Africa 89

15.0

0.0

5.0

Mexico: US and EUs0
Costa Rica: DR-CAFTA

82

85

Guatemala: DR-CAFTA
Dominican
CAFTA 86

Republic:

US-Singapore87
88

DR- 35.0

to find a schedules document that would export to a spreadsheet program and take such averages.
77. WTO CURRENT SCHEDULES, supranote 92.
78. Id.
79. EU-Chile, supranote 62; See US-Chile, supranote 67, at annex 3.3
80. EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supra note 62; NAFTA, supra note 67.
81. This represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over seven years. NAFTA, supra
note 67.
82. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Costa Rica), 56 (HS8 37031000).
83. DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Nicaragua), 54 (HS8
370231000).
84. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Honduras), 63 (HS8 37031000).
85. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of Guatemala), 56 (HS8 37031000).
86. DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at annex 3.3 (Tariff Schedule of the Dominican Republic), 66
(HS8 37031000).
87. US-Singapore, supra note 67. To many, Singapore no longer counts as a developing country,
though it was once a Newly Industrializing Country that employed many of these policies. We chose
the US-Singapore agreement to provide some geographical variation and contrast to the Latin American
agreements with the US.
88. The FTA binding represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over five years. EUTunisia, supranote 63, at art. 11, annex 3.
89. The FTA binding represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over five years. EUS.A., supra note 63, at art. 12.
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2. Non-tariff barriers
In addition to tariffs, countries have employed other trade restrictions (nontariff barriers or NTBs) to protect domestic industry and promote development.
Unlike tariffs, however, all modem trading regimes strongly disapprove of NTBs,
generally prohibiting quantitative restrictions (quotas), import licensing, and
import and export price requirements. 90 Under the WTO, however, countries may
introduce NTBs to address food shortages and balance of payments difficulties, or
enforce certain local standards and regulations. 91
EU-style agreements generally mimic WTO standards and incorporate both
the balance of payments and shortages exceptions for imposing NTBs. 92 Still, EU
treaty language tends to vary with the treaty partner. EU-CARIFORUM, for
example, contains an exception for balance of payments difficulties, but none for
shortages. 93 Meanwhile, EU-Tunisia and EU-South Africa expressly prohibit only
quotas. 94 US-style agreements likewise mirror the WTO standard for NTBs. Few
US-style FTAs, however, make the same room for exceptional circumstances.
Only one of six treaty partners under DR-CAFTA retained a shortages exception,
and most recent agreements have eliminated the exception for balance of
payments .
3. Incentives for export
Another way countries have encouraged development is through export
incentive programs to reward companies, industries and even regions for export
performance.96 Taking the form of duty drawbacks, tax deferrals and export
processing zones (EPZs), these measures can promote a healthy trade balance and
enable local industry to compete globally.97 The WTO places no restraints on
export incentive policies ad seems to prefer them to more direct subsidy

90. See Raj Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: the Uruguay Round Agriculture
Agreement and its Implicationsfor the DOHA Round, 79 N.D. L. Rev. 691, 732 (2003).
91. GATT, supra note 59, at art. XII; see infra Section II.B.4. (discussing the availability of
safeguard measures). The WTO treats import licenses as quotas, and has a separate annex governing the
use of licenses in cases where they are permitted. See Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal
Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Import
Licensing].
92. EU-Chile, supranote 62, at art. 76; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supra note 62, at art. 12.
93. EU-CARIFORUM, supranote 62, at art. 240.
94. EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 19; EU-Tunisia, supranote 63, at art. 19.
95. US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 3.11(2); DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 3.8(2). DRCAFTA also expressly incorporates the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing, and imposes an
additional notification requirement. Id. at art. 3.9. However, neither NAFTA, US-Singapore, US-Peru,
nor US-Colombia have any exceptions for balance of payments difficulties or shortages.
96. See generally Bela Balassa, Export incentives and export performance in developing
countries: A comparative analysis, 14(1) REV. OF WORLD EcON. 24 (1978). Export incentives based on
geography are often called Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The International Labour Organization,
InFocus Initiative on Export Processing Zones, Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.ilo.org/public/english
/dialogue/sector/themes/epz.htm.
97. See Balassa,supra note 77.
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programs.98 Likewise, EU agreements incorporate the WTO standard here,
omitting explicit discipline on the subject.99
The US model, on the other hand, almost universally prohibits such
incentives. 00 Under NAFTA, member states may not provide drawbacks or tax
deferrals on condition that goods are exported or used as material for another
exported good.101 US-Chile and DR-CAFTA, also prohibit new or continuing
duties waivers based on certain "performance requirements," which include export
level or percentage requirements as well as other production performance

measures.102
4. Safeguards
Despite the current controversy surrounding the Special Safeguard
Mechanism for agriculture at Doha, the WTO actually retains a fair amount of
safeguard flexibility for by countries facing sudden injurious levels of imports,
balance of payments difficulties, and critical food shortages.Under the WTO,
countries may address these problems temporarily by imposing NTBs, suspending
tariff concessions or raising tariff rates. 103
Based largely on the WTO model, EU agreements provide the same
flexibilities for countries addressing harmful levels of imports, balance of

98. Yung Whee Rhee, Instrumentsfor Export Policy and Administration: Lessons from the East
Asian Experience 79 (World Bank Staff, Working Paper No. 725, 1985) quoting BELA BALASSA,
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SEMI-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES 72 (1982), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/07/08/000178830_981019034
31389/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. Rhee implies that, export subsidies, unlike duty drawbacks and
deferrals, are categorically prohibited under each of these regimes. Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994);
DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 3.14; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 3.16; NAFTA, supra note 67,
at art. 705. Mexico's maquiladora program provides a ready example of such a system. Under
NAFTA, however, "maquila firms were granted a seven-year phase-in period during which they
continued to enjoy duty-free importation benefits." This ended in January, 2001, when NAFTA article
303 entered into effect. John Sargent & Linda Matthews,Combining Export Processing Zones and
Regional Free Trade Agreements: Lessons From the Mexican Experience, 29(10) WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1739, 1741 (2001) [hereinafter Sargent & Matthews].
99. Several EU-style treaties prohibit the use of taxation to protect domestic industry, which could
indirectly restrict tax-based export incentives. EU-Chile supra note 62, at art. 63; EU-Mexico Decision
2/2000 supra note 62, at art. 13; EU-CARIFORUM supra note 62 at art. 13. By contrast, EU
agreements with several African nations implicitly permit drawbacks by limiting the amount to that of
the original tax. EU-Tunisia supra note 63, at art. 22; EU-S.A. supra note 63, at art. 21. This
provisions seems to be aimed at preventing hidden export subsidies - payments called "drawbacks" or
"deferrals" by the government, but which actually exceed the amount of the tax.
100. The one exception here is US-Singapore. NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 303; US-Chile,
supranote 67, at art. 3.8; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 3.4.
101. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 303.
102. This does not include conditions, however, that the good be subsequently exported and other
such rules as required under NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 303.1. US-Chile, supranote 67, at art. 3.24;
DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 3.31.
103. GATT, supra note 59 at arts. XII: 1, XIX: 1(a).

2010

21sT CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENTS

331

payments difficulties and, in some cases, shortages. 104 Taking it a step further to
promote development, some EU treaties also permit transitional safeguards, which
may be imposed solely to protect infant industry.1 05
Once more, US agreements close in on the policy space otherwise available,
not allowing safeguard measures in the case of shortages.106 The agreements also
do not allow countries to introduce new NTBs as safeguard measures and they
require that, in the case of injury by imports, the imports not only cause serious
injury or threatthereof(GATT language), but that they be the substantialcause of
that injury-a higher legal standard.10 7
5. North-south models and south-south responses
North-south trade agreements generally constrain policy space more tightly
than the WTO and its associated agreements. However, some developing
countries have begun to make their own room for public policy by joining together
to form south-south trading blocs that leave open even more policy options for
diversification and development. Some South-South agreements, for example,
allow member countries wholesale exceptions to the general liberalization
program. These "sensitive lists" are often safe from both tariff concessions and the
elimination of NTBs. 108 Furthermore, by excluding certain issues, such as tax,
from the agreement terms, South-South arrangements make room for members to
provide export and other incentives. 109
Notably, these agreements disfavor safeguards except in "exceptional cases"
and limit their use to situations with injurious levels of imports. Lesser-developed
countries seem to worry that industrialized trade partners would use safeguards
against them, injuring their exports. SAFTA hints at this concern by making a

104. The EU agreements in Latin America allow safeguards in all three of these cases. EU-Chile,
supra note 62, at arts. 92, 93, 195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000, supra note 62, at arts. 15, 16, 21. The
EU agreements with Tunisia and South Africa, however circumscribe the application of safeguards
somewhat more. EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at arts. 25-26 (excluding express safeguards for balance of
payments); EU-S.A., supra note 63, at arts. 24, 26 (no allowance for goods trade safeguards for balance
of payments difficulties or shortages). EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at arts. 25, 240 (making no
room for safeguards for shortages).
105. EU-Tunisia, supra note 69, at art. 14; EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 25.
106. Since the agreements mention nothing about shortages, safeguards to protect against them is
presumed prohibited.
107. US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 7.1; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 8.1; DR-CAFTA,
supra note 67, at art. 8.1; NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 801. The only US agreement to take special
consideration of developing countries, DR-CAFTA article 8.1(4), places limitations on imposing
safeguards against developing countries.
108. Both the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR) contain "sensitive lists" within the agreement, and SAFTA even permits countries to
maintain NTBs on such sensitive products. SAFTA, supra note 70, at arts. 7.3, 7.5; MERCOSUR
Goods, supranote 71, at art. 6.
109. Article 101 of the China-Chile Agreement, for example, exempts all tax issues from coverage
by the agreement. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Government of the Republic of Chile, Chile-P.R.C., Nov. 18, 2005, Asia Regional Integration
Center, available at http://aric.adb.org/fta.php?id=79&ssid=3&title= People's%20Republic%20of
o20China-Chileo2OFree%20Tradeo20Agreement [hereinafter China-Chile].
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special consideration for lesser-developed members, limiting safeguards against
them. 110
Since 1994, global trade disciplines have increased in scope to cover services
trade regulation, treatment of foreign investment, and intellectual property
protection, among others. The following sections explore these trade-related
policy areas and the extent to which trade agreements impact policymakers'
decisions today.
C. Trade in Services
Since the Uruguay Round, global trade in services has increased drastically.
Some of the fastest growing sectors such as computer-related services, legal
services, and advertising and technical service jobs grew between 70 and 250
percent from 1994 to 2004.111 Of 54 bilateral and regional agreements with
services trade provisions, only five predate the Uruguay round.1 12 Prior to the
formation of the WTO, countries retained substantial freedom in regulating
services trade so long as the measures didn't interfere with goods trade as well.113
Today, however, the new multilateral trading system and bilateral agreements
circumscribe their efforts to varying degrees. Table 6 compares the policy space
available for certain measures affecting services trade. In the following discussion,
we detail the practical constraints that today's trade agreements place on member
country governments.
Table 6. Services Checklist
Policy Instrument

WTO&
Associated
Agreements

US
EU
Agreements Agreements

Control over sensitive sectors1 14
"Non-tariff barriers in Services
Duty of establishment
Withholding
establishment

right

Domestic regulation

of

16

110. SAFTA, supra note 64, at art. 16.8.
111. OSHANI PERERA, THE GLOBALISATION OF SERVICES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 3 (International Institute for

Sustainable Development 2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/globalisation-services-sd.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. While some amount of control is permitted under all agreements, US agreements employ a
negative list rather than the positive list approach of the GATS and EU agreements.
115. Here, the EU agreements could be evolving to look more like US agreements but the rules are
not consistent across the four treaties.
116. The difference here is that the balancing test for regulations is self-enforcing under the EU
and US agreements, while enforcement under the WTO requires further rulemaking.
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Movement of natural persons
Investments in public education4
1. Sensitive sectors
Many countries have retained control over sensitive sectors such as "essential
services, network infrastructure services, and financial services" within their
economy in order to promote economic stability.1 17 Theoretically, countries may
continue to protect these sectors under any FTA through the negotiation process.
However, the process differs significantly depending on the trade agreement
model. The WTO adopts what has been called a "positive-list approach," meaning
that protection is the rule rather than the exception.1 18 Thus, unless the country
specifically commits a sector, it remains unbound. The WTO's General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also permits lesser developed countries
(LDCs) to liberalize later and carve out public services from coverage so that they
are not bound by the rules of the agreement.1 19
Like the GATS, EU agreements have adopted a positive-list
approach. 12 0Some EU agreements pronounce a general standstill on future
measures inconsistent with liberalization, indirectly binding even unbound sectors.
However, recent agreements such as EU-CARIFORUM do not contain such a
clause, indicating that standstill provisions may not become a permanent trend in
EU-style treaties. 12 1 The pivotal difference between the US model and GATSbased models is found in the negative list approach to liberalization - making
protection the exception rather than the rule. 122 Practically speaking, this means
117. ACTIONAID, CHRISTIAN AID & OXFAM, EU FTA MANUAL, BRIEFING 4: THE EU's APPROACH
To FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: SERVICES 2 (Feb. 2008), http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/

policy/trade/downloads/fta4_services.pdf [hereinafter Oxfan Services].
118. MARIO MARCONINI, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SERVICES
TRADE 12 (ICTSD Policy Paper on Trade in Services and Sustainable Development (Draft) 2006),
http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2006-02-28/marconini.pdf.
119. GATS, supra note 65, at arts. IV, XIX (demanding "appropriate flexibility for individual
countries Members for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, progressively
extending market access in line with their development situation and, when making access to their
markets available to foreign service suppliers, attaching to such access conditions aimed at acheiveing
the objectives referred to in Article IV."); Id. at art. I, para. 3 (excluding "services supplied in the
exercise of governmental authority" from coverage). It is important to note, however, that the WTO
contains inherently the expectation of full liberalization across sectors eventually. Id. at Annex on
Article II Exemptions.
120. Although the four EU agreements studied here contain actual services commitments only to
varying degrees, each contains a reference to the positive list approach stated in their negotiating
mandate at the very least. EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 7; EU-Chile, supra note
62, at art. 99; EU- S.A., supranote 63, at art. 29.1; EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at art. 32.1. And like the
WTO, with the exception of EU-Tunisia, these agreements call for the eventual elimination of
"substantially all remaining discrimination between the parties" in all sectors and all modes of supply.
EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 7; EU-Chile, supra note 62, at art. 100; EU-S.A.,
supranote 63, at art. 30.1.
121. Oxfan Services, supra note 117, at 5; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at arts. 5,
7.
122. Marconini, supranote 118, at 12.
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that countries must negotiate for every sector they want to protect - a highly
negotiation intensive process.
In theory, US agreements permit countries to make reservations to the MEN
principle, to reserve room for future measures that are inconsistent with
liberalization, and to protect whole sectors from the agreement. These options
seem unavailable under an EU or WTO framework. 123 Both EU-style agreements
and the GATS expect eventual full liberalization across sectors. 124 If such
comprehensive liberalization results, developing countries that seek multilateral or
EU-style trade preferences for the policy flexibility they provide may end up with
more restraints than they bargained for, twenty or thirty years down the road.
2. "Non-Tariff Barriers" in Services: quota equivalents for services trade
Just as in goods trade, countries have introduced quantitative and qualitative
restrictions on trade in services to promote domestic industry and control the
behavior of service suppliers. For the most part, these measures are no longer
permitted under any international trading regime. GATS provides a template for
such restrictions, prohibiting service supplier quotas, transaction or asset
restrictions, output quotas, employment limitations,
organization-type
requirements (such as joint ventures) and limitations on foreign capital
participation by any means.1250nly in sectors where countries did not undertake
market access commitments do they have policy flexibility. The same applies to
US and EU-style agreements. Some employ GATS-equivalent language (EUChile, EU-Mexico, EU-CARIFORUM, US agreements), 126 while others simply
incorporate the terms of GATS by reference (EU-Tunisia, EU-S.A.). 127
Two differences stand out between the trade agreement models, however: the
binding approach and the type of agreement coverage. As mentioned above, under
the GATS and EU treaties, countries must specifically bind sectors to market
access rules, while the US model binds all sectors except those expressly excluded.
More importantly, the US model regulates foreign capital participation and joint
ventures under the investment chapter rather than the services section of the
agreement. Since the investment chapter is not sector-specific, it binds even more
broadly than the US's negative list approach to service commitments. 12 8
123. Id. at 8; NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 1206; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.6; USChile, supra note 67, at art. 11.6; US-Singapore, supranote 67, at art. 8.7.
124. GATS, supranote 65, at Annex on Article II Exemptions.
125. GATS, supra note 65, art. XVI (prohibiting two other measures: requiring a certain
organization type for service suppliers and foreign capital participation limits - both of which will be
addressed in the coming sections).
126. EU-Chile, supranote 62, at art. 97; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supranote 62, at art. 4; DRCAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.4; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 11.4; US-Singapore, supranote 67,
at art. 8.5. The exception to many of these rules is NAFTA, since it came about so much earlier - on
this subject it states: "The Parties shall periodically, but in any event at least every two years, endeavor
to negotiate the liberalization or removal of the quantitative restrictions set out in Annex V pursuant to
paragraphs 1 through 3." NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 1207, 14.
127. EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 29, 1; EU-Tunisia, supranote 63, at art. 32, 1.
128. Restricting foreign capital participation may also be prohibited through maintaining the right
of establishment, present in all US agreements and discussed below.
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3. Duties and rights of establishment
Policy makers have also introduced policies influencing establishment rights
to control the quantity and quality of service suppliers. A duty of establishment,129
forces service suppliers to establish a local place of business or become a resident
in order to provide their service.130 By contrast, a "right of establishment"
provides foreign services suppliers with a presumptive right to establish
themselves in the partner countries.
The text of the GATS mentions neither a duty nor a right of establishment for
foreigners. At the same time, specific commitments by some countries maintain a
duty of establishment in certain sectors. In bound sectors, such measures would
likely have to be set out in the schedule for continued liberalization.131 EU-style
agreements look much like the GATS with regard to maintaining an establishment
duty; however, they vary widely in their treatment of establishment rights.132 EUChile, for example, mandates national treatment with respect to establishment, for
both legal and natural persons of agreement partners1 33 The agreement with
Mexico provides an express right of establishment for financial service suppliers
only. 134 Meanwhile, EU-CARIFORUM carves out a narrow right of establishment
for maritime services. 135
Unlike the GATS and EU agreement models, the establishment commitments
in US agreements are neither sector- nor partner-specific. Countries that partner
with the US may not impose any duties on foreign services suppliers or investors
to establish a local commercial presence. 136 Likewise, they must extend a
universal right of establishment to all US legal entities who desire entry into their
country.137 The standardized US approach, therefore, allows little wiggle room for
countries seeking policy options for development.
4. Domestic regulation
Possibly one of the most domestically invasive and yet universally accepted
provisions in trade agreements addresses the issues of domestic regulation of
service suppliers.As countries have expressed concern that their trading partners
129. Also known as the "right of non-establishment."
130. NAFTA, supranote 67, art. 1205.
131. Marconini, supra note 118, at 9.
132. Oxfam Services, supra note 117, at 3.
133. EU-Chile, supranote 62, art. 132.
134. EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, art. 12.
135. EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at art. 109(5). The agreement also indirectly refers to
"establishment" in Article 224 on General Exceptions, however, the context would indicate that the
word means "direct investment" rather than any general right of establishment. Id. at art. 224(1)
("Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination .
or a disguised restriction on trade in goods,
services or establishment. . .").
136. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1205; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.5; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 11.5; US-Singapore, supranote 67, at art. 8.6. One author mentions that while the US
agreements contain clearer language about the prohibition of duty of establishment clauses, they may
not necessarily be "more forceful in actually putting them into effect." Marconini, supra note 118, at 9.
137. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 10.3 (emphasis added).

336

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

would use regulation as veiled discrimination, the GATS, followed by regional and
bilateral agreements, imposes some limits on the use of domestic regulation.
The GATS spells out the universal standard for balancing legitimate
regulation with trade liberalization: that general policy measures are administered
reasonably, objectively and impartially manner, that the regulations are based on
"objective and transparent criteria, ... not more burdensome than necessary ...
[and] not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service." 38 EU and USstyle agreements mirror that same standard while stepping up the binding nature of
that standard. The GATS provision acts only as a basis for future rulemaking by
the Council for Trade in Service, however, the standard in US and some EU
agreements is self-enforcing - the parties must meet those standards or risk
violating the agreement. 139
5. Human Capital Development
The most direct way for countries to improve their services sectors is through
local human capital development. Countries have employed numerous means to
this end, including opening their borders to migration and immigration and
investing heavily in public education. In the case of opening borders, it is the
developing countries that favor liberalization over protection, and the developed
world that resists. Under the GATS, countries may schedule commitments to
remove barriers to migration and immigration. 140 EU-style agreements also allow
for such commitments, but in most cases, the EU offers only minimal liberalization
of their own borders. 141US agreements simply omit border liberalization from the
scope of the services provisions, permitting all kinds of restrictions on th free
movement of persons. 142
International trade agreements rarely interfere with government investments
in public education. Where WTO members recognize the licensing of schools and
teachers of another member, those countries must give other members a chance to
negotiate recognition of their own licensing procedures. 143 However, the WTO
does not require that countries harmonize their domestic licensing standards or
automatically recognize that of other trade partners. Instead, such licensing is
subject to the same standard of reasonableness, objectivity, and impartiality as all
other domestic regulation mentioned in the previous section. 144 The biggest
138. GATS, supranote 65, at art. VI,
1,4.
139. Id. at art. VI, 1 4; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 11.8; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art.
11.8; US-Singapore, supranote 67, at art. 8.8; EU-Chile, supranote 62, at art. 102; NAFTA, supranote
67, at art. 1210. But see EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 8 (containing only a vague
"regulatory carve out" for parties wishing to regulate service supply). The EU-South Africa and EUTunisia agreements have only a skeletal services section, more of an agreement to agree than a
commitment to liberalize services immediately See, e,g., EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 30; EUTunisia, supranote 63, at art. 31.
140. GATS, supranote 65, at art. VI,
1, 4.
141. E.g., EU-Chile,supra note 62, at art. 95; Oxfam Services, supranote 117, at 5.
142. E.g., DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 11.1.
143. GATS, supranote 65, at art. VII.
144. Consequently, as mentioned above, EU and US agreements maintain the same standard for
such licensing, with potentially stronger enforcement abilities.
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obstacles to public education investments, however, come from the domestic
political and economic situation within the developing countries. Where they have
no money to invest, or where the money is poorly used or inequitably distributed,
countries may not be able to build up their human capital effectively.
6. Services commitments and South-south complacence
Across the board, international agreements in services trade have limited the
policy options available to countries directing public policy toward diversification
and growth. Surprisingly, South-South arrangements have done little to either
preserve or increase policy space in this area. Services commitments are relatively
new in the arena of free trade agreements they are often negotiated once an
agreement on goods is in place. Consequently, many south-south agreements, such
as China-Chile and SAFTA have not yet concluded a section on services, and the
CAN, under Secretariat Decision 439, contains only minimal services
obligations. 145
MERCOSUR's Montevideo Protocol, by far the most comprehensive southsouth services agreement, contains largely GATS-equivalent language, especially
as regards market access commitments.146 As a result, these agreements retain the
flexibilities existent under the WTO and GATS but nothing more. Trade in
services has come to mean, in addition to cross-border trade and movement of
natural persons, the supply of services through commercial presence abroad - also
known as foreign direct investment. 147 Although the WTO and EU frameworks
treat most investment provisions as services disciplines, the US addresses it in a
separate investment chapter that more rigidly constrains the use of domestic
measures to control foreign investors as well as foreign capital. The next section
discusses the various policy limits on foreign investment regulation imposed by
modem trading regimes.
D. Investment
Countries have historically had at their fingertips numerous creatively crafted
investment measures aimed to protect domestic industry, preserve their current and
capital account balances, create local backward and forward linkages, and
otherwise strengthen their economy. These measures address both foreign direct
and portfolio investment - that is, both companies, and capital. Table 7 lays out
the current availability of these measures under trade agreement models.

145. CAN Services, supra note 65, arts. 14-16 (laying a general liberalization process with some
vague commitments).
146. MERCOSUR Services, supranote 65, at art. IV.
147. Designated under the GATS framework as Mode 3. GATS, supranote 65, at art. 1, 12.
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Table 7: Investment Checklist
Policy Instrument

WTO&
Associated
Agreements

US
EU
Agreements Agreements

X

X

Domestic content requirements
Trade balancing requirements
Foreign exchange restrictions
Domestic sales restrictions
Domestic producer preference
Local management requirements
Technology transfer
Local labor requirements
Headquarters/Production
restrictions
Research
obligations

and

development

Infrastructure provisions
Subsidized credit/entrepreneurship
Administrative guidance
International
restrictions

transfer/payment

1. Performance requirements for foreign direct investment
The WTO treats foreign direct investment (FDI) under two different schemes:
goods and services. Investment measures related to trade in services are covered
under the GATS.
With respect to investment measures related to trade in goods,
the WTO provides a baseline of prohibited measures under two broad WTO
principles.
The Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) prohibits
any measures that violate national treatment (Article III) or the general obligation
to eliminate quantitative restrictions (Article XI). It then lays out an illustrative list
148. In EU agreements, these measures may be effectively proscribed by other rules.
149. For local labor requirements, local management requirements, headquarters restrictions,
technology transfer and research and development, a country may not require them as a condition of
entry, but may condition receipt of a benefit on them.
150. Since the policy flexibilities and constraints of the GATS are discussed above (Trade in
Services), this section focuses on WTO treatment of investment measures related to trade in goods.
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of prohibited measures in an appended Annex.15 1 Under TRIMS, countries may
not require that foreign investors achieve a certain level of domestic content in
their goods or prefer domestic producers or products in their production process.152
They may not limit foreign investors' imports in relation to their local production
or export levels. 153 They may not require investors to acquire foreign exchange
only through export, and they may not demand that investors sell a certain amount
of their product within the domestic market (2).154 Furthermore, WTO members
may not create incentives for by requiring any of the above as a condition for
receiving economic advantages.15 5
EU-style agreements treat FDI as the supply of a service through commercial
presence (Mode 3 of the GATS framework). The EU-Chile agreement contains a
separate section entitled "Establishment" that protects the establishment of foreign
investors within the territory of a party.156 EU-CARIFORUM also covers
commercial presence separately from other modes of supply, protecting foreign
investors from measures violating national treatment, MFN and imposing
quantitative restrictions.15 7 All this, however, adds virtually nothing to the basic
WTO standards already in place.
Modem north-south trading regimes can be divided into two camps: TRIMS
and TRIMS+. While the EU generally maintains the TRIMS standard in its trade
agreements, the US tacks on several "plus" provisions that put additional limits on
government policy-makers. In addition to domestic content, trade balancing,
foreign exchange, preference for domestic producers and domestic sales
obligations, US agreements forbid export level requirements, technology and
knowledge transfer demands, local supply exclusivity and management nationality

pre-requisites.s15
The "plus" provisions in US agreements help to shed light on the policy
flexibility available under the TRIMS model. The more permissive model allows
countries to impose numerous measures historically applied to promote local
development, including requirements to export a certain level or percentage of
goods, to transfer technology developed locally, supply exclusively from the
territory, and hire local management.159 Of course, these measures remain subject

151. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Annex, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal Instruments - Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs].
152. Id. at Annex, 1.
153. Id. at Annex,
1-2.
154. Id. at Annex, 2.
155. Id. at Annex,
1-2; see also CARLOS M. CORREA & NAGESH KUMAR, PROTECTING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF A WTO REGIME AND POLICY OPTIONS 76-77 (2003).

156. See EU-Chile, supra note 62, at pt. IV, tit. III, ch. III. While the other EU agreements
incorporate sections entitled "Services and Establishment," as mentioned above, they are largely
agreements to agree in the future rather than active commitments between the parties.
157. EU-CARIFORUM, supranote 62, at arts. 67-68, 70.
158. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1106; DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 10.9; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 10.9; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 15.8.
159. Compare NAFTA, supra note 67, at arts. 1106-07 with TRIMS supra note 151, at annex.

340

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

to the pillars of national treatment and MEN treatment under the WTO, as do all
measures of WTO member countries. 160 Additionally, the GATS permits
developing countries to attach some conditions to their services liberalization
commitments with development in mind. 161
Even under TRIMS+ some flexibilities that countries have employed with
varying success to promote development.Members of US-style agreements may
continue to create incentives for export, technology transfer and backward and
forward linkages by providing advantages to companies that comply with certain
standards. US treaties also permit countries to condition advantages on
compliance with requirements "to locate production, supply a service, train or
employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out research and
development, in its territory."162
Certain other measures lay outside of the scope of these investment
provisions, making them available to all countries that have the capacity to impose
and enforce them. Members of both TRIMS and TRIMS+ agreements may still
invest in local infrastructure to promote direct investment. Countries may also
provide directed credit in key industries to draw investors into specific sectors, and
administrative guidance to multinational companies seeking to expand in to local
markets. 163
2. Capital controls and transfer restrictions
Countries have also attempted to regulate capital flows and other international
transfers and payments to promote and stabilize their development. Restrictions on
foreign portfolio investment (FPI), however, are generally disfavored within
modem trade agreement models. The WTO, EU agreements and US agreements
all prohibit international transfer and payment restrictions presumptively.164 The
difference here lies in the exceptions. The WTO employs the positive list
approach to bind only those sectors with specific liberalization commitments. The
WTO model, mirrored here by most EU agreements, also provides an exception in
the case of "serious balance of payments and external financial difficulties," which
is the primary purpose for such measures. 165
160. Oxfam Services, supra note 117, at 4.
161. GATS, supra note 65, at art. XIX ("There shall be appropriate flexibility for individual
developing country Members for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions,
progressively extending market access in line with their development situation and, when making
access to their markets available to foreign service suppliers, attaching to such access conditions aimed
at achieving the objectives referred to in Article IV.").
162. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1106; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 10.9; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 10.5; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 15.8.
163. The test for domestic regulation is articulated in full in Section C.4.
164. GATS, supra note 65, at art. XI; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at arts. 10.8, 11.10; NAFTA,
supra note 67, at art. 1109; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 10.8; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at arts.
8.10, 15.7; EU-Chile, supra note 62, at art. 163; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at art. 29;
EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at art. 33; EU-S.A., supra note 63, at art. 33. It should be noted that under
the EU agreements, Chile reserved a hefty exception for their investment law 600, and Mexico retains
an exception for exchange and monetary difficulties in addition to balance of payments.
165. EU-Chile, supra note 62, at arts. 166, 195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supra note 62, at
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The US model, as well as some recent EU agreements like EUCARIFORUM, applies the restriction on capital controls across sectors and
industries. 166 Foreign capital receives the same treatment as foreign companies
here - protection regardless of any specific liberalization commitments. US-style
agreements also place one more restraint on policy options by omitting the balance
of payments exception.
3. Investor-State Arbitration
The US goes one step further, indirectly binding policy-makers' hands in
introducing investment measures through investor-state arbitration. Unlike the
WTO and EU-style agreements, which only make room for dispute resolution
between treaty partners, the US allows private investors to sue states for interfering
with the value of their investment. 16 7 They rely on general treaty language
prohibiting expropriation, discrimination, unfair or inequitable treatment, which
has been interpreted broadly by private arbitral tribunals. 168 NAFTA is the only
agreement in force long enough to have a history of investor-state disputes and
since then a few agreements have attempted to clarify certain treaty standards. 169
However, more recent agreements that contain the same investor-state arbitration
provisions do not escape the risk of regulatory chill caused by NAFTA's
arbitration history.
4. South-south investment liberalization and protection
In response to the constraints of the US model investment provision, some
developing countries have created south-south trading relationships, like
MERCOSUR and CAN, that liberalize investment regionally and protect against
foreign investors from without.170 Both MERCOSUR and CAN echo provisions of
N-S agreements. MERCOSUR incorporates the US model language for national
treatment and CAN prohibits transfer and payments restrictions.
However, they
arts. 30-31; EU-S.A., supra note 63, at arts. 32-34; EU-Tunisia, supra note 63, at art. 35. See also,
GATS, supranote 65, at art. XII.
166. DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art 10.8; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 10.8; US-Singapore,
supra note 67, at art. 15.7; NAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 1109; EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at
arts. 122-24
167. Compare EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 62, at Ch. 2 and Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125, (1994) [hereinafter DSU] with DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at Section B.
168. Gus Van Harten, Reforming the NAFTA Investment Regime in THE FUTURE OF NORTH
AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: LESSONS FROM NAFTA 59, A Task Force Report (Frederick S. Pardee

Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, November 2009).
169. Rachel D. Edsall, Note, Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: Potential
Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 86 B.U. L. REv. 931, 952 (2006).
170. For example, the MERCOSUR Protocol on Investment Promotion and Protection contains the
same national treatment standard as that provided under US agreements. MERCOSUR Investment,
supra note 65, at art. 3. Likewise. CAN Decision 292 allows multinational enterprises the right to
establish subsidiaries, transfer payments freely, and transfer their domicile freely. CAN Andean
Business, supra note 65, at art. 15.
171. MERCOSUR Investment, supra note 65, at art. 3; CAN Andean Business, supra note 65, at
art. 15ff.
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enforce strict ownership requirements on foreign firms in order for them to qualify
for protection under the regime. Under CAN, for example, companies must be
owned at least 60 percent by national investors of two or more Community
Members.172 Additionally, for any country whose investor contributes at least 15
percent of the capital for the enterprise, one of the directors must be a national of
that country. 173
These S-S trade agreements provide an example of how to combine
substantial investment liberalization with regional protection of nascent industry.
The nature of the trading partner makes a difference however, as bargaining and
informational asymmetries between developed and developing countries lead to NS arrangements with the same terms placing undesired constraints on policymakers. Beyond investment protection, one more area of "trade-related" discipline
has drawn the attention of international human rights groups and developing
nations alike: intellectual property rules.
E. InternationalIntellectualPropertyProtection
Historically, countries have employed intellectual property rules in an attempt
to balance global integration with domestic development, correcting informational
asymmetries while creating financial incentives for inventors, and protecting
private property.
This balance has become particularly contentious when
protecting private property leads to limiting access to necessary medicines.174
Wealthier countries, as knowledge exporters, have prioritized incentives for
knowledge creation, while poor countries, as knowledge importers have favored
incentives for knowledge dissemination. 175
Today, however, the global trade regime places increasing limits on the
ability of developing countries to promote such dissemination. International
intellectual property rules have come under attack, in part, because of their adverse
effect on medicinal availability in the developing world. For that reason, the WTO
issued the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha
Declaration), which emphasized the importance of developing country concerns
about their access to medicines.176 Despite the controversy, the US continues to
push for stronger inventor incentives at the expense of policy flexibility. Table 8
provides a broad picture of the policy constraints over IPRS.

172. CAN Andean Business, supra note 65, at art. 1(d) (defining "multinational Andean enterprise"
as a firm in which investors of two or more member countries owns more than 60% of the company).
173. Id. at art. 1(e).
174. KENNETH SHADLEN, POLICY SPACE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE WTO AND BEYOND:
THE CASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 23 (Global Dev't and Env't Inst., Working Paper
No. 05-06 2005), available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/05-06PolicySpace.pdf.
175. Id. at 6.
176. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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Table 8. Intellectual Property Checklist
WTO

Policy Instrument

and US

Associated
Agreements

Patent
restriction
industry/origin

by

IP
protection
Limit
plants/animals

for

Permit
early-working
patented pharmaceuticals

on

Agreement
s

EU
Agreements

Compulsory Licensing
Local production requirement
Parallel imports
Limiting patent breadth
Utility models
1. Patent restriction by industry, origin or duration
The most direct way of intervening in the delicate balance between
information dissemination and information protection is by controlling the
industries, origins and duration of patent terms. In this one question, these three
trade agreement models concur. Patent restriction by industry, origin or duration is
patently (no pun intended) prohibited under the Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO. TRIPS states that "patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
of industrial application."17 7 This language is echoed in all US trade agreements
and likewise incorporated into most EU agreements by reference. 178 TRIPS also
requires that all patents last 20 years, minimum, a duration limit adopted by both
EU and US agreements. 179

177. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (emphasis added).
178. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1709; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 15.9; US-Chile, supra
note 67, at art. 17.9; US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001, supranote
62, at art. 36(1)(a); EU-Chile, supra note 62, at art. 170(a)(i); EU-S.A., supranote 62, at art. 46.
179. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 33.; NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1709, 12. This minimum
is not even mentioned in DR-CAFTA, US-Chile, or US-Singapore, but is implied. The minimum is
likewise not mentioned explicitly in EU trade agreements.
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2. Limited plant and animal protection
For countries where populations rely heavily on traditional knowledge of
plants and animals, limiting protection of such intellectual property ensures that the
people will continue to have needed access to food and medicines. Although plant
and animal species are generally found in nature (and therefore not new or
innovative), the US and other developed countries have sought intellectual
property protection for genetically modified plant species-a move that places
access of native populations to their traditional knowledge in jeopardy. All
international IPR regimes, demand some protection over knowledge derived from
plant and animal life. TRIPS allows that countries to exclude plants and animals
from patentability, with the exception of micro-organisms, but requires that some
81
180 effective protection for plant varieties by put into place.
This requirements
admits some theoretical flexibility for WTO members to establish their own plant
variety protection systems - a flexibility that many countries have exploited. 182
Bilateral north-south trade models have tightened that flexibility down,
specifying a minimum type of plant variety protection required to comply with the
agreement. EU agreements, for example, often require trade partners who have not
yet acceded to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV), either from 1978 or 1991,183 do so within a reasonable time from
entry into force and US agreements generally require accession to the latter. 18 4
The US model also demands that contracting states "make every effort" to impose
a plant patenting system.18 US-Singapore even omits the TRIPS flexibility of
excluding plants from the patent system. 186
3. Information disclosure and "Bolar" provisions
Some countries promote knowledge dissemination by establishing strict
information disclosure requirements. They then make the information available to
generics producers and domestic inventors who want to piggy back off the
patented invention or begin working on generic equivalents before the patent term
ends.187 The TRIPS model requires that patent applicants disclose the information
necessary "for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art."s18 It
also allows members to demand that applicants "indicate the best mode for

180. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 27.
18 1. Id.
182. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 12-13.
183. The key difference between the 1978 and 1991 conventions is found in their allowance of
third parties "to use protected seeds and plants for breeding new varieties". Shadlen, supranote 174, at
13. UPOV 1978, included a farmers exception allowing them to reuse seeds. This exception was
eliminated under UPOV 1991, "which provides much stronger rights to breeders." Id.
184. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 15.1, T 5; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 17.1, T 3; USSingapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.1, T 2. NAFTA, largely because of when it was negotiated and
signed, required only the UPOV 1978. NAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 1701.2.
185. DR-CAFTA, supranote 67, at art. 15.9, 1 2; US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 17.9, T 2.
186. US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7, T 1.
187. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 29.
188. Id.atart.29.1.
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carrying out the invention known to the inventor at the filing date."18 9 Even on
unpatented products, countries often require applicants to submit additional data
for regulatory approval.
Early working or "Bolar" provisions build on these disclosure requirements,
permitting producers to develop, test, and begin the registration process for generic
versions of patented pharmaceuticals before the end of the patent term.190
Although the text of TRIPS only proscribes "unfair commercial use" of protected
data, WTO case law reveals that TRIPS permits early working so long as it does
not result in commercial production or stockpiling purposes.191
While EU agreements are modeled after the TRIPS standards, the US model
favors knowledge creation and protection. US agreements do not allow more than
minimum disclosure requirements and they protect data submitted for regulatory
approval for at least five years "against both disclosure and reliance. 192
4. Compulsory licensing
In order to gain access to patented drugs and necessary technology in the
absence of a traditionally negotiated license, governments have granted
compulsory licenses (CLs) to domestic industry to make and distribute those
products. 19 3 TRIPS establishes the internationally accepted procedural standard for
CLs, implicitly adopted by both EU and US trade agreements.TRIPS Article 31
requires that countries consider each license individually, that they attempt to
negotiate a license from the patent holder "on reasonable commercial terms" over a
reasonable period of time (except in situations of national emergency), that they
limit the scope and duration of the license to a specific purpose, that they grant a
non-exclusive and non-assignable license, that they grant it only for the domestic
market and that they subject it to judicial review, among other procedural

requirements.194
Countries have also used CLs in order to encourage local production of
patented products. Brazil, for example, allows the government to grant CLs to
local producers when a patented good is not produced locally within 3 years from
the beginning of the patent term. This promotes "the transfer of non-codified, tacit
knowledge that occurs via the localization of manufacturing operations." 95
Although these measures have been somewhat controversial, no WTO ruling has
outlawed them and they remain available under TRIPS.
Some US agreements have circumscribed the use of CLs beyond the
procedural requirements of Article 31 and definitively prohibited such local

189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 18-19.
191. Id. at 19; TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 39, 3. This standard has been determined by WTO
case law and is not necessarily clear from the text of the agreement. Id.
192. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 19; see, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 15.10, T 1.
193. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 21.
194. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 31.
195. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 22.
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production requirements. 196 US-Singapore, for example, only allows CLs to
remedy anti-competitive practices, for public non-commercial use or in the case of
national emergency. 197 Furthermore, patent term marketing restrictions in
agreements such as DR-CAFTA may create an effective ban on compulsory
licensing. 198
US-Peru, on the other hand, incorporates the 2003 Doha Declaration on
Public Health, recommitting to Article 31 which emphasizes that countries may
establish their own grounds for providing CLs, and allows countries to grant these
licenses for export to least developed countries and to countries without production
capacity. 199 The recent US-Peru agreement may be evidence of international
pressure to improve access to medicines for the poorest populations, and indicate
that even bilateral agreements cannot place too many limits on policy space in this

area.200
5. Patent exhaustion
As an indirect route to promoting access to needed technologies, countries
may establish their own exhaustion policies under TRIPS - whether national,
regional or international - implicitly permitting parallel imports of goods where
the patent holder's rights have been exhausted.201 Where international exhaustion
policies apply, a producer from a developing country could purchase goods from
an industrialized country producer, repackage the goods and undersell the
industrialized producer in a third country. Developing countries can use this
advantage to increase competition and drive down prices, making patented
products more affordable.202
Since exhaustion is a matter of domestic policy, few trade agreements have
addressed the issue. The US applies a national standard of exhaustion which
allows patent holders to assert their patent rights against all parallel imports,
regardless of their origin.203 Within the European Community, countries apply a

196. US-Chile, supra note 67, at art. 17.9, 1 4; DR-CAFTA, supra note 67, at art. 15.9(5); USSingapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7(5). Once more, the early conclusion of NAFTA resulted in a
substantially different intellectual property rights regime. Since the conclusion of NAFTA, the US
model has evolved and moved further away from the more flexible disciplines in TRIPS.
197. US-Singapore, supra note 67, at art. 16.7, 6.
198. Id. at art. 15.10(2); Frederick M. Abbott, The DohaDeclarationon the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health and the Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements 14
(Quaker United Nations Office Occasional Paper, 2004).
199. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
(2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/min0l e/mindecl trips e.htm (last visited Dec. 8,
2009); Peru TPA Final Text art. 16.13, April 12, 2006, USTR, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfin send/1031 [hereinafter US-Peru].
200. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 24.
201. TRIPS, supranote 177, at art. 6.
202. Shadlen, supra note 174, at 20.
203. International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), United States of
America Report Q156 (for the United States Group, Leonard B. Mackey and Andrew H. Simpson) 1,
available at https://www.aippi.org/download/comitees/156/GR156usa.pdf [hereinafter AIPPI].
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regional exhaustion policy which protects against parallel imports from outside the
Union.204 A few US agreements, however, have attempted to export the national
standard to treaty partners. US FTAs with Morocco and Australia both demand
that the countries recognize national exhaustion of patent rights.205 Although EU
agreements have not, thus far, exported their exhaustion policies to their trade
partners, regional exhaustion will restrict producers originating outside the Union
from competing with EU patent holders by way of parallel imports.
6. Patent alternatives
Unlike the above aspects of patent protection, countries retain flexibility in
limiting patent breadth and protecting otherwise unpatentable inventions through
"utility models".206 The latter measures, in particular, provide local residents with
room for creative expansion on existing patents and incentives for their own
experimentation.
Neither the more permissive WTO model nor US-style agreements address
patent breadth or utility models directly. Some EU agreements, however,
expressly allow utility models "provided that they are new, involve some degree of
nonobviousness and are capable of industrial application." 207 Although it is not
clear whether such a provision would increase the use of utility models by
mentioning them, or further tie the hands of policy makers by the limiting the
conditions under which they are granted, it at least shows promise that the
developed world recognizes other types of invention incentives.208
7. South-south responses and the US model
For developing countries, intellectual property rights represents a new area of

trade-related issues that has yet to be addressed under most south-south
agreements. The Andean Community, however, has established a model S-S
arrangement that includes intellectual property provisions aimed at promoting the
interests of the nations in that region. First of all, the CAN demands that patent
applications based on material obtained from traditional knowledge meet the
requirements of international law, the Andean Community and domestic law with
respect to acquisition of that material.209 In addition, the Community excludes

204. Prof Dr. Joseph Straus, The Present State of the Patent System in the European Union: As
compared with the situation in the United States of America and Japan, available at
http://suepo.org/public/docs/2001/straus.pdf; see also Ladas and Perry LLP, II Preventing parallel
imports
under
trademark
law,
Section
B,
available
at
http://www.ladas.con/IPProperty/GrayMarket/GrayMa02.html#Heading4.
205. Morocco FTA Final Text art. 17.9(4), June 15, 2004, USTR, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text;
Australia FTA
Final Text art. 15.9(4), May 18, 2004, USTR, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text.
206. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 15-16.
207. EU-CARIFORUM, supranote 62, at art. 148.
208. Shadlen, supranote 174, at 20.
209. CAN IPRs, supra note 65, at art. 3.
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scientific theories, mathematical methods, an d living things (whatever the size),
among other pursuits, from patentability.2 10
Like many developing countries, the Decisions of the CAN Secretariat apply
an international standard for exhaustion, making room for the benefits provided by
parallel imports.2 1 1 Also similar to Brazil's intellectual property law (see above),
the CAN allows compulsory licensing when the patent holder does not exploit the
patent locally within three years of the grant of that patent.212 Finally, the Decision
explicitly mentions utility models, which can encourage a lower degree of
innovation often "more appropriate for local firms." 2 13
The Andean Community model for South-South intellectual property
protection demonstrates how developing countries can work together to encourage
information dissemination and establish financial incentives for creativity.
Unfortunately, as countries seek trade agreements with both the global north and
global south, the CAN model has come into conflict with the more restrictive US
agreement model.
The US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (a comprehensive FTA) entered
into force in January of 2009. As a condition of the agreement, Peru must
undertake "reasonable efforts" to establish a plant patenting system - a measure
that is forbidden under the Andean Community intellectual property regime. The
CAN Commission met multiple times to consider this and other conflicts between
the agreements and it concluded that Peru (and the other Andean nations) may
"develop and deepen" intellectual property protection through trade agreements
with the US. 214 If this trend continues, then the flexibilities exploited in southsouth regional integration will be short-lived and the US model may become the de
facto standard for intellectual property protection.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis of various types of trade agreements shows that the current
global trade regime substantially curtails the ability of countries to maintain
control over various policy tools that traditionally have been deployed as part of
long run development paths.215 Still, under the WTO, despite the constraint on
policy space, there remains considerable room to maneuver. Countries may,
legally, raise and lower tariffs, provide tax-related export incentives such as

210. Id. at art. 15.
211. Id. at art. 54; SISULE F. MUsuNGU, SUSAN VILLANUEVA, & ROXANNA BLASETTI, UTILIZING
TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL

FRAMEWORKS 51 (South Centre 2004), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=
com content&task=view&id=72.
212. CAN IPRs, supra note 65, at arts. 61, 65-66.
213. Id. at arts. 81-85; Shadlen, supranote 174, at 16.
214. Marienella Ramirez, El Perg logra allanar el camino para TLC con Estados Unidos,
ELCOMERCIO.COM.PE (Aug. 15, 2008), available at http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/edicionimpresa/
Html/2008-08-15/el-peru-logra-allanar-camino-tlc-estados-unidos.html.
215. Part of the reasons for this is that, with the spread of globalization, no issue is truly "uniquely"
domestic. Even though industry standards, licensures, and certifications may be matters of domestic
law, they impact foreign companies and, by extension, foreign governments.
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drawbacks and deferrals within EPZs, impose certain performance requirements on
investors and service providers, and employ domestic patent laws to prioritize
information dissemination over incentives for invention. The WTO also makes
extra room for developing countries to form bilateral and regional trade
agreements under the Enabling Clause. 216
Despite wide variation among bilateral and regional agreements, policy space
under north-south free trade agreements are the most constraining on the
traditional industrial development toolkit. Overwhelmingly, among both bilateral
agreements and the multilateral trade regime, the trend heads toward demanding
increased liberalization and decreased government intervention in the economy.
At the same time, some types of agreements continue to make space for the
policies aimed at industrial development, while others push for broader and deeper
liberalization. As shown above, trade agreements with the EU retain much of the
flexibility under the WTO in the areas of investment and intellectual property, and
employ the same positive-list approach as the global regime when it comes to
services trade. By contrast, the US imposes many additional disciplines on its
trading partners-expanding
patent protection, mandating
investment
liberalization, and employing a negative-list approach to services bindings. Since
the early 1990s,trade regimes have formed around these principles and US trade
policy has become more uniform. Meanwhile, EU trade policy varies by trading
partner, indicating a greater willingness to permit certain policies in these areas.
Provided this trend continues, countries that are still developing in thirty years will
have more opportunity to creatively use their policy space under an EU agreement
than under an agreement with the US.
Many S-S agreements are still formally notified to the WTO under Article
XXIV; yet they often provide the greatest policy space among the agreements we
studied. This flexibility derives not from lacking affirmative trade disciplines but
from using trade liberalization between developing countries to protect industries
and promote growth regionally. Investment and intellectual property rules under
the CAN provide the clearest example here. The CAN rules of origin establish
protection for regional firms against extra-regional companies. In addition, the
CAN explicitly protects traditional knowledge, tightens patentability requirements
and makes room for local, non-patentable innovation.
Still, some policy space remains under even the most restrictive trading
schemes. To the extent the state is economically capable, a country may invest
heavily in public education, subsidize credit to certain industries, and build up
domestic infrastructure. A method employed by developing and developed
countries alike, policy makers may also provide administrative guidancemarketing the country, its location, natural resources, and workforce, for
example-to investors and traders internationally. This technique may help a

216. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVORABLE TREATMENT:
RECIPROCITY AND FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Decision of 28 November 1979

(L/4903), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/enabling e.pdf
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country to target an industry that would transfer technology or provide backward
and forward linkages in the economy.
This paper is far from the final word on this subject. Indeed, it may perhaps
raise more questions than those that are answered. Each subject could be its own
separate paper, pursuing in more depth the implied and actual flexibilities inherent
in the global trading regime. For that reason, this paper aims only to give an
overview of the policies available to countries today, and point out some
significant differences between the various types of trade agreements. Going
forward, interesting ideas for further research are numerous. A legal analysis of
the dispute settlement cases under each regime would shed more light on the extent
to which the rules against selective policies have actually been enforced. Political
scientists might explore whether the divergence within international regimes, such
as that of the EU-Latin American agreements and the EU-African agreements, is
rooted in the geography of the trading partners, their development level, or other
factors.
From a policy perspective, it is our hope that negotiators and policy-makers
who have or are considering crafting longer run development strategies can use
this paper as a reference when deciding under which policy regimes such
development strategies would be most permissible. Just shy of 60 percent of the
people on the planet live in poverty, measured by the World Bank as less than
$2.50 per day. To raise the standard of living for those people, governments seek
to put together long-term development strategies that deploy the policy instruments
that have proven successful in other settings. This paper catalogues many of the
policies deployed by successful developed and developing countries that over a

35+ year period tripled the average incomes of many countries such as the US,
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and now China. We show that today, however,
poorer nations have a more limited toolkit to engage in long-run development
strategies, and that the trade arrangements they form will have an influence on the
policies they will have available in the future.

V. RoMuLO: SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
RULES ON POST-MEDELLIN CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A SOLEEXECUTIVE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED WITH THE UNITED STATES

NICOLAS

BENJAMIN BROCKMAN-HAWE*

On February 11, 2009 the Supreme Court of the Philippines ("the Court") En Banc
handed down its judgment in the consolidated cases of Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon
vs. Alberto Romulo, etc., et.al., Jovito Salonga, et. al. vs. Daniel Smith, et. al., and
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), etc., et. al. vs. President Gloria
MacapagalArroyo, etc., et. al.' The Court, by a vote of 9-4 with two abstentions, 2
upheld the constitutionality of the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA),
which establishes jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel traveling to the
Philippines, and with reference to the Subic Rape Case declared that the RomuloKenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 were inconsistent with the
VFA. Nicolas is noteworthy as the first decision in which a foreign court
considered the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Medellin v. Texas3 on
an agreement concluded with the President of the United States but not ratified by
the U.S. Senate (a 'sole-executive agreement'). 4 This comment analyzes the case
and its implications for U.S. foreign relations.
I. BACKGROUND

A. U.S. -Philippine Relations
Between 1898 and 1946 the Philippines were a territory of the United States,

* Benjamin Brockman-Hawe graduated Boston University School of Law with Honors in the
Concentration of International Law in 2008. He currently works in the Hague at Trial Chamber II of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
1. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Romulo, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888,
G.R. No.
17605 and G.R. No.
17622, (S.C.
February
11,
2009),available at
http://scjudiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/feb2009/175888.htm. (Phil.)
2. Evangeline De Vera, SC Rules Against Smith Transfer to Embassy but Status Quo Stays,
MALAYA NEWS, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.malaya.com.ph/febl2/news4.htm (explaining that Justice
Antonio Eduardo Nachura, solicitor general when the suit reached the Supreme Court, and the newly
appointed Justice Diosdado Peralta recused themselves).
3. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (finding the International Court of
Justice's Avena decision was not directly enforceable federal law and the President's memorandum
saying that state courts would give effect to the decision did not require states to reconsider and review
claims without regard to state procedural default rules). See generally Margaret E. McGuinness,
Medellin v. Texas: Supreme Court Holds ICJ Decisions under the Consular Convention Not Binding
Federal Law, Rejects Presidential Enforcement of ICJ Judgments over State Proceedings, ASIL
INSIGHTS, April 18, 2008, http://www.asil.org/insights080418.cfin (providing a general overview and
analysis of Medellin v. Texas).
4. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, InternationalAgreements and U.S. Law, ASIL INSIGHTS,
May 1997, http://www.asil.org/insighl0.cfi (providing a thorough discussion of the President's
authority to conclude sole executive agreements before Medellin v. Texas)
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and the relationship between the two countries was characterized by slow transfer
of sovereignty from the latter to the former. Having achieved full independence
in 1946, the Republic of the Philippines became a treaty ally of the United States
under the1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). United States military personnel
were stationed on twenty-three sites in the Philippines until 1991, when the
Military Bases Agreement governing the bases expired and was not replaced.
However, in response to a 1995 territorial dispute with China in the South China
Sea, President Ramos invited the U.S. to negotiate the new Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) with the Philippines. In 1998 consultations for the VFA
concluded, and the resulting document, in which both countries reaffirmed their
commitment to the MDT, entered into force on June 1, 1999.9
B. The Visiting ForcesAgreement
The VFA has been ratified by the Phillipine Senate and, as an agreement
concluded solely by the U.S. President, was reported to the U.S. Congress in
compliance with the Case-Zablocki Act.10 The primary purpose of the VFA is to
establish rules governing the relationship between U.S. service members visiting
the Phillipines and Philippine law. Regarding criminal jurisdiction, Article V
establishes the sole jurisdiction of Filipino authorities over US personnel who
violate any Philippine laws, but U.S. military authorities have exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes against American property, security or personnel, and
retain the right to exercise sole jurisdiction over any personnel accused of
committing a crime during the performance of their official duties." The VFA
also establishes various procedural safeguards for U.S. service members detained,
taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, including the right to a
prompt and speedy trial, to be informed of the charges against them and to be
granted access to appropriate U.S. authorities. 12

5. See TEODORO C. AGONCILLO & MILAGROS C. GUERRERO, HISTORY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
241-497 (8 ed. 1990) (providing a general historical overview of the Filipino people).
6. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the
Philippines, U.S.-Phil., Aug. 30, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3947.
7. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE, RALF EMMERS, MARI PANGESTU, & LEONARD C. SEBASTIAN,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY 84 (1st ed. 2005);
RENATO CONSTANTINO & LETIZIA R. CONSTANTINO, THE PHILIPPINES: THE CONTINUING PAST 205
(1978).
8. BERNARD D. COLE, THE GREAT WALL AT SEA: CHINA'S NAVY ENTERS THE TWENTY-FIRST
43 (2001).
9. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the
Philippines, U.S.-Phil., Feb. 10, 1998,T.I.A.S. No. 12931 [hereinafter Visiting Forces Agreement],
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/us/doc/vfa.html.
10. The Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. 112b (1972). See also Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment
in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No. 17605 and G.R. No. 17622, para. 28.
11. Visiting Forces Agreement, supranote 9, at Arts. 5(1) - 5(3).
12. Id. at Art. V(9).
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C. The Subic Rape Case and the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of2006
In December 2005, a Filipino prosecutor issued indictments against four
members of the U.S. Armed Forces for allegedly raping a Filipino woman, dubbed
"Nicole" by the media, in Subic.13 One year later the Regional Trial Court of
Makati acquitted three of the servicemen but convicted Lance Corporal Daniel
Smith of rape. 14 The Trial Court ordered that Smith be confined to the Makati jail
pending his transfer to the National Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City." Smith
filed a motion for reconsideration on December 5, 2006, which the Trial Court
denied on the 12t of December. 16 On December 14, 2006 he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Romulo-Kenney Agreements were arranged between and signed by
Ambassador Kristie Kenney on one side, and respectively Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuno and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alberto G. Romulo on the other.
Ostensibly "in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement," they provided for
the transfer of Smith from the Makati jail to a detention facility operated by the
U.S. government and dictated the conditions of his detention there." As per the
Agreements, on December 29, 2006 Smith was transferred to the custody of the
U.S. On January 2, 2007 the Court of Appeals held that the petition for certiorari
filed by Smith was moot in light of this arrangement.19 Petitioners challenged this
decision, arguing that the Philippines should maintain physical custody over Smith
since the VFA was incompatible with several provisions of the 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines.20
II. THE MAJORITY DECISION
The Court began by examining the consistency of the VFA with the Filipino
Constitution, which requires at Article XVII, Section 25 that "foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and ... recognized as a treaty by the other
Contracting State."2 1 After noting that Section 25 should be read broadly in light
of its purpose, which is "to ensure that any agreement allowing [a foreign military
presence] be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign state
involved," 22 the Court concluded that the VFA met the constitutional requirement
13. Groups Vow to Continue Anti- VFA CampaignDespite Nicole's Recantation, BULATLAT, Mar.
18,
2009,
http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2009/03/18/groups-vow-to-continue-anti-vfa-campaigndespite-nicolee2%80%99s-recantation/.
14. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No.
17605 and G.R. No. 17622 para 6.
15. Id. at para. 7.
16. Puno C.J., dissenting at para. 6 available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2009
/feb2009/ 175888_176051_176222_puno.htm.
17. Id. at para 7.
18. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No.
17605 and G.R. No. 17622 at para. 8.
19. Id. at para 9.
20. Id. at para 11.
21. Id. at para. 13.
22. Id. at para. 20.

354

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:2

for two reasons. First, as held by the Court in the prior case Bayan v. Zamora
nearly one decade ago,23 despite not having been submitted to the U.S. Senate for
advice and consent the VFA nevertheless imposes a binding legal obligation on the
United States. To that effect "[n]otice can be taken of the internationally known
practice of the United States .

. . "

of concluding sole-executive agreements and

notifying Congress of such under the Case-Zablocki Act.24 Second, the Court
concluded that the purpose of the VFA was to implement the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1951, which was approved after the advice and with the consent of the
U.S. Senate.25 The Court reasoned that, as an implementation agreement, only
notification of the VFA's conclusion to the U.S. Congress under Case-Zablocki
Act was required for compliance with Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution.26
The Court also addressed the claim that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Medellin had altered the constitutionality of the VFA. In Medellin, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that, absent language within a treaty to the effect that it was
self-executing or Congressional legislation implementing the accord, international
agreements entered into by the United States could not be enforced as part of its
domestic law.27 Petitioners argued that because the VFA was part of the domestic
law of the Philippines, Medellin had rendered the VFA unequally binding on the
two Contracting States and violated Section 25. 28
The majority rejected the argument, holding that the VFA was both selfexecuting (since "the parties intend[ed] its provision to be enforceable, precisely
because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty") 29 and was subject to implementing legislation
(vis-d-vis notification to the U.S. Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act,

"inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive
agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented."). 30 Moreover, although the Court had previously
recognized that the purpose of Section 25 was to ensure that a bilateral agreement
with the U.S. covering military matters was 'equally binding', the majority held
that absolute 'alignment and parity' regarding the enforceability of international
obligations was not required by the Constitution.31 Instead, formulaic mutual
acknowledgement of an agreement's 'treaty' status could suffice.32 Noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court in Weinberger concluded that executive agreements are

23. Bayan v. Zamora, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 138570 , G.R. No. 138572, G.R.
No. 138587, G.R. No. 138680, and G.R. No. 138698, (S.C. October 10, 2000), available at
http://scjudiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/oct2000/138570.htm.
24. Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon, Judgment in the Joined Cases of G.R. No. 175888, G.R. No.
17605 and G.R. No. 17622 at para. 24.
25. Nicolas v. Romulo, at para. 42.
26. Id. at paras. 26-31. See Case-Zablocki Act of August 12, 1972, 1 U.S.C. §112B (2009).
27. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008).
28. Nicolas v. Romulo, at para. 39.
29. Id. at para. 42.
30. Id. at para. 43.
31. Id. at para. 48.
32. Id.
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'treaties' within the meaning of that word, the majority was satisfied that the
obligations imposed by Section 25 had been met. 33
The opinion then briefly addressed the claims that the provision of the VFA
partially immunizing U.S. personnel from the jurisdiction of local courts violated
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which establishes the exclusive
authority of the Supreme Court in adopting rules of procedure for all courts in the
Philippines, and that the transfer of Smith to U.S. custody contravenes the
Constitution's Article III, Section 1 equal protection guarantees. 34 With respect to
both the Court noted that constitutional protections are not without limit, and that
in the present case general principles of international law, incorporated into the
Constitution at Article 2 Section 2, constituted "a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military." 35 Because international law provides
that "the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon - to subjects of another State,"36 the Constitution
can accommodate Article V of the VFA and the transfer of Smith to U.S. custody.
Having acknowledged the constitutionality of the VFA, of its own volition the
majority weighed in on the legality of the Romulo-Kenney Agreements. Recalling
that Article V of the Agreement calls for "[t]he confinement or detention by
Philippine authorities ... .]" the Court concluded that detention by U.S. authorities
was not in accord with the VFA.37 It was therefore ordered that the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs "negotiate with the United States representatives for [an]
appropriate agreement on detention facilities" consistent with Article V. 38
III. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Chief Justice Puno and Associate Justice Carpio, joined by Associate Justices
Alicia Austria-Martinez and Conchita Carpio-Morales, drafted separate dissents in
which they strongly condemned the majority's analysis of Medellin 's impact on
the VFA.39 Justice Carpio's impassioned dissent begins by describing what is at
stake in Nicolas:
In short, the Philippine Constitution bars the efficacy of such a treaty
that is enforceable as domestic law only in the Philippines but
unenforceable as domestic law in the other contracting State. The
Philippines is a sovereign and independent State. It is no longer a colony
of the United States. This Court should not countenance an unequal
treaty that is not only contrary to the express mandate of the Philippine

33. Id. at para. 49.
34. Id. at paras. 30-31.
35. Id. at para. 32.
36. Id. at para. 34 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at para. 36, quoting Visiting Forces Agreement, supranote 9, at art. 5, § 10.
38. Id. at para. 52.
39. Nicolas v.
Romulo
(Carpio,
J. dissenting),
at para.
1, available at
http://scjudiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/feb2009/175888_176051_176222 carpio.htm [hereinafter
Carpio, J. dissent]; Puno, C.J. dissent, supranote 16, at para. 2.
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Constitution, but also an affront to the sovereignty, dignity and
independence of the Philippine State.40
Although Justice Carpio joined the Court in 2001 and did not participate in
Bayan, he hinted that he regards it as having been correctly decided when it was
handed down. However, he also makes it clear that Medellin should be treated as a
"supervening event" that has manifestly altered the legality of the VFA as well as
the Mutual Defense Treaty. 41 After analyzing the framework for domestic
enforceability established by Medellin, he concluded that both bilateral agreements
are neither self-executing nor had were subject to implementing legislation. With
regard to the former, he noted that the text of the VFA and MDT provides no hint
of "intention that [they] be 'self-executing."' 42 Respecting the latter, he argued
that if the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations at issue in Medellin was not
regarded by the U.S. Supreme Court as having domestic effect, then certainly the
MDT, which contains only the usual "ratification and entry into force provision
found in treaties," also does not.43 Similarly, the VFA certainly should not be
regarded as subject to congressional implementing legislation, since:
[n]otification under the Case-Zablocki Act is obviously far less
significant legally than ratification by the U.S. Senate of a treaty. If a
ratified treaty does not automatically become part of U.S. domestic law
under Medellin, with more reason a merely notified executive agreement
44
does not form part of U.S. domestic law.

Finally, Justice Carpio broke with the majority and pointed out that the

travauxpreparatoirsof Article XVIII Section 25 make it clear that the purpose of
the provision was to ensure that any agreement involving foreign troops on
Filipino soil is equally legally binding in absolute terms on both Contracting States
and that it takes the form of a treaty.45 As an international obligation embodied
"merely [in] an executive agreement" 46 the VFA falls short of the constitutional
threshold. Interestingly, although he argues throughout his dissent that the MDT is
unconstitutional, in his conclusion Justice Carpio confines himself to affirming the
unconstitutionality of the VFA and noting that he would have ordered Smith
transferred from the U.S. embassy to the New Bilibid Prison, pending final
resolution of his appeal.47
Chief Justice Puno, who also dissented in Bayan, was largely in agreement
with Justice Carpio. His dissent reasserts his longstanding belief that Bayan was

40. Carpio, J. dissenting at para. 4, supranote 39.
41. Id. at para. 1.
42. Id. at para. 11, quoting Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008). Justice Carpio
points out that the MDT only contains the usual "ratification and entry into force provisions found in
treaties." Id. at para. 25. Although he does not explicitly do so, it may be inferred that this argument
extends to the VFA as well.
43. Id.
44. Id. at para. 23.
45. Id. at paras. 5-10.
46. Id. at para. 23.
47. Id. at para. 28.
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wrongly decided and reflects the strict interpretation he would have applied to
Article XVIII Section 25,48 his dissatisfaction with the "asymmetry in the legal
treatment" the VFA embodied in 2000 and continues to perpetuate post-Medellin,49
and his belief that the VFA fulfilled neither requirement for domestic enforcement
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 50 His opinion is noteworthy for its specific
examination of Medellin's impact on the U.S. President's power to conclude
domestically enforceable sole-executive agreements. Justice Puno concluded that:
In fine, the U.S. President's authority to enter into treaties that are
enforceable within its domestic sphere was severely limited by Medellin
In Medellin

[. . .], the Supreme Court held that "the president's

authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, must
stem from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself"5 1
Upon comparison of the Presidential Memorandum at issue in Medellin and
the VFA, Justice Puno reasoned that:
[i]n sum, the non-self-executing character of the [VFA and MPT] not
only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vest the President with
authority to unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic
courts, but also prohibits him from doing so. The responsibility to
transform an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing
treaty into domestic law falls on Congress, not the Executive. 52
IV. CONCLUSION
Several aspects of the majority and dissenting opinions are striking and
worthy of comment. First, it is surprising that the majority decided to sidestep the

issue of the domestic legal effects of a U.S. Presidential executive agreement and
declare that the Filipino Constitution requires equality but not parity in the
enforceability of international obligations in light of Medellin's recognition of a
limited Presidential authority to conclude sole-executive agreements with domestic
legal effect. In his majority opinion in Medellin, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Roberts acknowledged that the President has a "narrow and strictly limited
authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive
agreement."53 This power is based on "a history of congressional acquiescence
[that] can be treated as a "gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by §1
of Art. II."4 Justice Puno ignores this language completely, and the majority in
Nicolas could have used it to distinguish Medellin on the grounds that the
Presidential Memorandum at issue in the U.S. case represented a unique attempt by
the Executive branch to convert an international obligation approved by the U.S.
Congress into domestically binding law absent congressional authorization to do

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Puno, C.J. dissent, supra note 16, at paras. 31-32.
Id. at para. 49.
Id. at paras. 28, 39 & 49.
Id. at para. 25.
Id. at para. 29.
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008).
Id. at 1371 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 686 (1981)).
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so, whereas the VFA is an arrangement of a type embodied by an executive
agreement as a matter of historical practice.56 Medellin may also be distinguished
as concerning the power of the President to displace State criminal law,5 7 whereas
the VFA is an agreement more closely tied to the Presidents powers as
Commander-in-Chief, as it largely covers jurisdiction of U.S. military courts over
U.S. personnel in the Philippines.5 8 Thus the separation-of-powers issues at stake
in Medellin are not present with respect to the VFA, and the President's authority
to engage in executive agreements that become binding domestic law likely
remains unaffected by the outcome of Medellin.
A second startling aspect of the majority opinion is its decision to regard the
VFA as implemented through notification under the Case-Zablocki Act. This
portion of the opinion is conspicuous for the lack of jurisprudence justifying the
conflation of notification and implementation. It is, however, not nearly as
unexpected as the majority's failure to properly apply Medellin to the treaty.
Although Medellin is generally regarded as providing a less-than-clear framework
for determining when treaties are self-executing and which are not,5 9 the U.S.
Supreme Court did at a minimum clarify that the intent of signatory parties and
language of the agreement must be examined. 60 Not only did the Court in Nicolas
55. Id. at 1372, citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petioners, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2005), (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566), at 29-30 (noting that the
Presidential Memorandum at issue was described by the Executive Branch itself as an "unprecedented
action").
56. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND RELATED ISSUES
CONCERNING THE PROSPECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ 28 &

n.89 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34362 20080528.pdf (noting that "[t]he only
SOFA agreement to which the United States is a party that was concluded as a treaty is the North
Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA), 4 U.S.T. 1792, entered into force August
23, 1953.").
57. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1370.
58. Visiting Forces Agreement, supra note 9, at art. V(6).
59. See e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Treaties and the Separation of Powers in the United States: A
Reassessment after Medellin v. Texas, 47 DUQUESNE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1319818, ("What it does take for a
treaty provision to be self-executing is now less clear than prior to the Medellin decision, with some of
the language of the majority opinion squarely requiring explicit language of self-implementation in a
treaty, and other language providing a contrary statement that a treaty provision may be self-executing
without specific statement to that effect."). See also Frederic L. Kirgis, InternationalLaw in the
American Courts - The United States Supreme Court Declines to Enforce the IC.J'sAvena Judgment
Relating to a U.S. Obligation under the Convention on ConsularRelations, 9 GERMAN L. J. 619, 623629 (2008) available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/print.php?id=958; Luke A. McLaurin,
Medellin v. Texas and the DoctrineofNon-Self-Executing Treaties20 MICH. INT'L LAW. 1, 4 (2008).
60. Incidentally, this means that Chief Justice Puno's analysis of Medellin is also incorrect
inasmuch as he asserts that the "[U.S. Supreme] Court adopted a textual approach in determining
whether the relevant treaty sources are self-executory." In fact, "[t]he Medellin opinion states in several
places that courts should look to the intentions of the U.S. treaty-makers to determine whether a treaty
is self-executing." Ingrid Weurth, Medellin: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARKL. REV. 1,
14 (2009) citing inter alia Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1366 ("Our cases simply require courts to decide
whether a treaty's terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that
confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect."); Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1366 ("Nothing ... suggests
that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international
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fail to examine either element, but it (along with Justice's Puno and Carpio)
ignored language in Medellin that would have abrogated its need to do so; the U.S.
Supreme Court at one point suggests that, with respect to sole-executive
agreements that self-execution may not be relevant in terms of determining the
domestic effect of an agreement, since there was leeway for the Supreme Court to
find that "congressional acquiescence [alone] could support the President's
asserted authority to create domestic law pursuant to a non-self executing treaty."
61

Till now, scholars have discussed Medellin in terms of its implications for the
development of domestic treaty law while paying comparatively little attention to
its practical effects on U.S. relations with its allies. Nicolas is the first challenge to
a bilateral agreement with the U.S. brought under Medellin and heard by a foreign
court, and though the arrangement at issue emerged intact this time, the serious
shortcomings of the majority and dissenting opinions hint at a future of soleexecutive agreements with dubious enforceability abroad, even when those
agreements can reasonably be construed as consistent with Medellin. As a potent
reminder that the effects of Medellin on U.S. relations have only just begun to
manifest, Nicolas has already incited Executive action,62 and may finally inspire
Congressional action clarifying the domestic obligations of the U.S. vis-a-vis its
international obligations as embodied in thousands of bilateral agreements as well.

tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by 'many of our most fundamental constitutional
protections."' id. at 1367 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006)); id. at 1358
("Article 94 ... [does not] indicate that the Senate that ratified the U.N. charter intended to vest ICJ
decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts."); id. at 1358 ("the Executive Branch has
unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal
law."). Id. at 1351. See also McLaurin, supranote 59, at 4.
61. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372.
62. On March 13, 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama called Filipino President Gloria MacapagalArroyo to reaffirm his commitment to the VFA. Obama calls Arroyo on VFA, PHILLIPINE DAILY
ENQUIRER, March 15, 2008, available at http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?sec=1&id=4530.

